EUR A/S FRIED MEETS RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 011987

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED MEETS RUSSIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
OMBUDSMAN: GEORGIA, HR DIALOGUE, POLITKOVSKAYA


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In his October 21 meeting with EUR A/S
Fried, Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin urged
presidential endorsement of the unofficial human rights
dialogue initiative organized by his office and the Moscow
Carnegie Center, against a backdrop of public disenchantment
with the bilateral relationship. He shared USG concerns over
GOR treatment of Georgians in Russia, which was exacerbated
by a sycophantic bureaucracy, but placed more blame on the
Georgian President than on Russia for the deterioration in
GOR-GOG relations. Lukin criticized the GOR response to the
murder of Anna Politkovskaya, and said the protection of
journalists was a critical human rights concern. He argued
for greater public attention to the successes of US-GOR
cooperation, while agreeing that issues like Kosovo and
Georgia could hurt efforts to strengthen the foundation of
US-Russian relations. End Summary


2. (C) On October 21, EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried
met with Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin, who
was accompanied by longtime adviser, Nataliya Borisovna
Mirza. Fried briefed Lukin on Russian-Georgian relations
(septel),and Fried underscored the Secretary's concern over
the tensions in that bilateral relationship and dismay over
the anti-Georgian campaign underway in Russia, capped by
concern over the murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya.
Fried concluded that it had been a "bad couple of weeks" for
Russians and Russia's friends. Noting the failure to
finalize details of an unofficial human rights dialogue in
advance of the July 2006 G8 summit, Fried reiterated the USG
interest in seeing this project succeed.

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Human Rights Dialogue
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3. (C) Lukin agreed that this was a bad period in
US-Russian relations and stressed that, no longer a diplomat,
he could afford to speak bluntly. Mechanisms for conducting
public diplomacy were in poor shape and the public mood had
soured against the bilateral relationship. This fact made a
difference, both in the Kremlin and MFA, and Lukin noted it
was ironic that there was a better dialogue throughout the
late Soviet period, regardless of spy scandals and other
ruptures politically, than today. That said, Lukin did not
see opponents to the proposition of an unofficial human
rights dialogue sponsored by his office and the Moscow
Carnegie Center, either at the Presidential Administration or
MFA: Presidential Aide Prikhodko and Foreign Minister Lavrov
and his team were all satisfied with the proposal.


4. (C) Lukin made the case for a "public face" to the
dialogue, in the form of an endorsement by Presidents Bush
and Putin. Without an official imprimatur, he explained, it
would become "just one more dialogue." An endorsement by the
Presidents, whether in writing or otherwise, would generate
momentum within the Russian human rights community and
bureaucracy for the dialogue.


5. (C) Fried agreed that it made sense to seek an explicit
endorsement of the Presidents, assuming that the Russian
government was behind the proposal and could move quickly,
and undertook to raise it at senior levels in Washington.
Fried stressed that the idea of a roundtable was positive,
but that its success would be judged by its ability to
address all issues, even politically sensitive ones. Lukin
agreed, joking that freedom of speech would be extended to
the roundtable participants, and repeated that there was no
point in conducting a sterile or "politically correct"
exchange. Fried agreed to meet with Lukin during his
mid-November trip to Moscow to discuss next steps in securing
an endorsement, noting that an announcement by the foreign
ministers was another possible option.

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Georgia: Assigning Blame
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6. (C) On Georgian-Russian relations, Lukin assigned
Saakashvili 60 percent responsibility for the deterioration
in bilateral relations (with Russia responsible for the other
40 percent, by current Russian standards a forthcoming
position) and noted that there was little appreciation in
Moscow for America's role in restraining the Georgian
President; to the contrary, received wisdom was that
Saakashvili was acting at US behest. Lukin described this as
a function of the "Moscow psychosis." Fried outlined US
policy towards Georgia and briefed on his recent
consultations in Tbilisi, reiterating that the US was best
served by an independent and capable Georgia that had good

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relations with Russia. Fried noted GOG concerns over the
prospect of a resumption of ethnic cleansing in Gali and
South Ossetia, as well as the possibility of Russian
recognition of the separatist territories that could
encourage the worst elements in both disputed territories to
precipitate conflict with the central government. Fried
underscored the dangers of questioning Georgia's territorial
integrity and rejected Kosovo (or, in response to Lukin,
Eritrea) as a model.


7. (C) On internal Russian actions against Georgians and
Russian nationals of Georgian origin, Lukin agreed with
Fried's characterization of the campaign and said that in the
first ten days "our country did not behave in a civilized
manner." Lukin noted his own statements on television and to
the press on this subject, but pointed to popular anger
towards the GOG and the tendency of "sycophants" in the
bureaucracy and law enforcement authorities to implement
their directives too enthusiastically. The situation in St.
Petersburg was not as bad as Moscow, Lukin said, because
Governor Matviyenko had taken a firm stance early on against
these excesses. Lukin said that the average citizen expected
war to break out between Russia and Georgia, which created an
atmosphere similar to the one that resulted in America's
internment of Japanese during WW2, but conceded Fried's point
that this was not an example for a democracy to emulate.


8. (C) Lukin posited that the overall situation was
improving slowly, but flagged deportations and the
politically sensitive issue of illegal immigration. Lukin
explained that when he met with General Procurator Chayka he
made the point that whereas equal numbers of Tajiks, Azeris
and Georgians were rounded up and deported in the past, now
the number of Georgians was disproportionately high. The
discriminatory application of the law was the problem. Lukin
agreed with Fried that this was a grave challenge for a
multi-ethnic society.

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Politkovskaya: Journalists remain vulnerable
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9. (C) Fried recognized the importance of Lukin's gesture
of attending the Politkovskaya funeral, in the absence of
other senior ranking GOR officials, and noted the serious
concern raised among Russia-watchers by the GOR's tacit
acceptance (even approval) of her death. Lukin said that the
problem went beyond the murder of an individual journalist,
but encompassed the general vulnerability of journalists.
While progress had been made in identifying suspects in the
murder of Deputy Central Bank Deputy Governor Kozlov (if not
those who ordered the murder),the authorities rarely solved
the cases of murdered journalists. Lukin noted that he
raised this as a critical issue with Putin in their biannual
review of human rights last December. No one could defend
the Russian track record.


10. (C) Lukin described Putin's response to the murder as a
question of psychology, agreeing that the Russian President
should have responded in a timely fashion, more passionately,
with greater diplomacy, and without recourse to aspersions on
the influence of the slain reporter. Lukin noted that
Politkovskaya was a difficult person, and retrograde in the
sense that she was convinced that everything bad in Russia
occurred because of the orders of a Politburo-like leadership
-- she did not recognize another alternative explanation and,
as a result, repeatedly offended many in power, including
Putin. For example, Lukin explained, everyone understood
that torture occurs in Chechnya. But this is not because
Moscow issues an order, but because of a stew of competing
local powers, revenge, historical rivalries and betrayals;
and lack of bureaucratic order. Lukin repeated that
Politkovskaya's death begged the question of how Russia would
protect its journalists.

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US-Russia: Focus on Successes
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11. (C) Lukin accepted Fried's description of US support
for a strong but also democratic and modern Russia, but
noted that this was not believed by the general populace.
There was an inferiority complex, understandable in light of
the fall of the Soviet Union and the hardships of the 1990's;
now, however, Russia's economic rejuvenation had led to a
rebirth of old stereotypes and illusions. The prescription,
Lukin argued, was a period of quiet, a time for Russians to
focus on themselves and remaking their society. Where the US
could help, Lukin noted, was in directing more public
attention to those areas where the US and Russia are
cooperating productively. Issues that would complicate this

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task, he explained, included Kosovo. Fried agreed that more
needed to be done to sell the relationship, but urged the GOR
to refocus the Kosovo debate to one of how Russia could play
a positive role in securing the historical presence of Serbs
in Kosovo. Georgia, Fried stressed, was another area that
handled poorly could prove a setback for US-GOR relations.

BURNS