Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW11931
2006-10-24 14:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

S/CT URBANCIC DISCUSSES CHECHNYA WITH DEPUTY

Tags:  PTER PHUM PREL RS 
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VZCZCXRO8478
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1931/01 2971431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241431Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4435
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011931 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PTER PHUM PREL RS
SUBJECT: S/CT URBANCIC DISCUSSES CHECHNYA WITH DEPUTY
POLPRED


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011931

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PTER PHUM PREL RS
SUBJECT: S/CT URBANCIC DISCUSSES CHECHNYA WITH DEPUTY
POLPRED


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Russia's Deputy Presidential
Representative to the Southern Federal District briefed
Deputy S/CT Urbancic on Chechnya, placing it solely in the
category of a terrorist conflict. Recognizing that mistakes
were made by the GOR, he noted the importance of economic
opportunity and the re-establishment of local organs of
government to turning the terrorist tide, encouraged reliance
on local forces, and emphasized the need to demonstrate that
terrorism was a "path to nowhere." He welcomed further
consultations with Urbancic, and coordinated efforts with the
US and Europe to combat terrorism. End Summary


2. (C) On October 13, S/CT Deputy Director Frank Urbancic
met with the Deputy Presidential Representative to the to the
Southern Federal District, Suleyman Gelaniyevich Vagapov, to
discuss counter-terrorism lessons learned from the evolving
conflict in Chechnya and terrorist acts in the North
Caucasus. Vagapov, who volunteered that he was an ethnic
Chechen, provided a personalized account of the Chechen wars
that strictly adhered to the Russian government's version of
the conflict. According to media reports, Vagapov was
appointed Deputy to Presidential Representative Dmitriy Kozak
in 2005. Before that, he was Chief Federal Prosecutor for
the Southern Federal District.

Chechnya: Terrorists, not Insurgents
--------------


3. (C) Urbancic, noting that terrorism was a multifaceted
challenge that required the tools of counter-insurgency to
address successfully, asked Vagapov if there were areas of
US-Russian cooperation and information-sharing that could be
expanded. Vagapov welcomed his visit and the opportunity to
discuss this theme, noting that he was involved in
decisionmaking on the ground in Chechnya since 1999, when he
helped reestablish local organs of power. While recognizing
that there can be a grey area between rebels/insurgents and
terrorists, Vagapov stated that Chechnya was a "terrorist"
conflict and emphasized the miseries endured over the last 15
years by the local population, none of whom had been asked by

the terrorists whether they wanted to live as part of Russia
or not. From a highly educated populace that enjoyed many
social benefits from the Soviet period, Chechens were thrown
back into the Middle Ages and "broken" as a people.


4. (C) The GOR's success, Vagapov explained, was in
reestablishing all local branches of government, adopting a
constitution, and holding a referendum that reaffirmed the
population's commitment to remain within Russia. The
problems that still exist, he maintained, reflected the fact
that terrorism in Chechnya had roots in what was taking place
far removed from the Caucasus. The spread of
internationalized terrorism made Chechnya a problem that
required international solutions. What was imposed on the
population during the 1996-1999 heyday of a "terrorist
regime" was a culture and interpretation of Islam completely
foreign to its inhabitants.


5. (C) Urbancic reiterated longstanding US concerns over
Chechnya. Vagapov conceded that the GOR's strategy of
counter-terrorism and restoration of reliable local organs
was not without fault. But the end result, he stressed, was
a republic whose leadership was energetically rehabilitating
the economic, health, and educational spheres (with all
children enrolled in school),and where NGOs were active.
The threat from terrorist organizations remained, but it
wasn't an imminent threat, although recent information
indicated that terrorist acts may be on the rise.

Economic Growth as Impediment to Terrorist Appeal
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Urbancic asked Vagapov to specify the
counterinsurgency tools that were most effective in quelling
the violence in Chechnya, specifically the value of religious
appeals, social programs, and economic investment. Vagapov
explained that in Chechnya and the North Caucasus writ large,
a minority of the population was attracted to the terrorist
movement, but many law-abiding residents joined because of
the economic benefits that they accrued, in the absence of
legitimate employment. Speeding economic growth and
increasing the well-being of the local population were
critical factors in inhibiting the terrorist appeal and
rooting out terrorist elements. "Only economic growth,
prosperity, and the principles of civilized countries can
stop terrorism," Vagapov summarized.


7. (C) As for Islam, Vagapov elaborated on the unique form
of Islam that flourished in the North Caucasus, which was

MOSCOW 00011931 002 OF 002


rooted in tradition. The ideology imported by Saudi
adherents or by al-Qaida was alien to local practice and
local religious leaders, who condemned the use of terrorism
for political purposes.


8. (C) Vagapov welcomed cooperative efforts with European
nations and the U.S. to combat terrorism. The destruction of
terrorism would only be possible through concerted efforts
that eradicated terrorism's roots.

Transitioning from Federal to Local Forces
--------------


9. (C) Urbancic questioned Vagapov on the importance of
relying on local forces to fight insurgencies, and asked what
advice Russia would extend to other countries battling
insurgents. Vagapov rejected the term insurgents in the
Russian context, emphasizing that "from the very beginning"
Chechnya was a terrorist battlefield. With that
clarification, Vagapov underscored the importance of shifting
to local forces, noting that the GOR had quickly begun to
form units of Chechnyan forces under the Ministry of Interior
(MVD). Today, 95 percent of the forces were local, with only
15-16,000 MVD troops remaining. Four battalions -- the
North, South, East, and West -- were fully Chechenized. The
population welcomed this development and it helped encourage
active opposition to the "independent republic" leadership,
whose rule was never accepted by the local population. It
was local Chechens who took up arms against Chechen terrorist
leader Shamil Basayev.


10. (C) Vagapov stressed that it was much more efficient to
rely upon local forces than on troops from around the
country. Federal troops impart a sense of occupation, which
is resisted. Generating a local backlash against terrorists
is essential, and should be a lesson learned by other
countries, regardless of the religious makeup of the
population. Locals must be engaged and committed. In
response to Urbancic's query on the tools used to elicit this
support, Vagapov stressed that in Chechnya there was a split
in the population from the very beginning, with a majority
never supporting the separatist aims and terrorist tactics of
the leadership. The part of society that sought to remain
within Russia expanded as the devastating consequences of the
war spread. It was never necessary to bribe or subvert
locals for their support.


11. (C) At the same time, military losses began to convince
those who supported Chechen "President" Dzhokhar Dudayev and
Basayev to realize the hopelessness of their cause and that
terrorism was a "path to nowhere, a path to the destruction
and death of the Chechen people." After the death of Chechen
separatist leader Maskhadov (in 2005),many realized the
futility of terrorism. The decision to amnesty former
fighters and allow them to join the ranks of the MVD troops
and receive salaries was an important tool to changing the
hearts and minds.


12. (C) Vagapov encouraged Urbancic to return for further
consultations, "anytime and anywhere," including in Grozniy.


13. (C) Comment: As mentioned above, Vagapov presented the
official view of the Chechen conflict. This view conflates
separatist insurgents, who adhere to Chechnya's traditional
forms of religion, and Jihadist Islamists, who imported
wahhabism and fought not for Chechnya but for pan-Islamic
umma. This view labels all of them terrorists. End Comment.


14. (U) Deputy S/CT Frank Urbancic has cleared this cable.
BURNS