Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW11773
2006-10-19 15:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

A/S BOUCHER HEARS RUSSIAN WORRIES ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER SNAR ENRG XD ZK RS 
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1943
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0428
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1062
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0414
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 011773 

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CORRECTED COPY - PARAGRAPH MARKING AND DISTRIBUTION
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR ENRG XD ZK RS
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER HEARS RUSSIAN WORRIES ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

REF: MOSCOW 11241

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 011773

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CORRECTED COPY - PARAGRAPH MARKING AND DISTRIBUTION
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR ENRG XD ZK RS
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER HEARS RUSSIAN WORRIES ABOUT AFGHANISTAN

REF: MOSCOW 11241

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: During October 9 consultations in Moscow,
A/S Boucher outlined U.S. intentions in Central Asia,
stressed steps we were taking to address terrorism and
narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, and reviewed U.S.
nuclear policies in South Asia. Foreign Ministry officials
and the Russian Counternarcotics Director expressed growing
concerns about Afghanistan and the threat that terrorists and
drug traffickers posed to Russian security interests.
Foreign Ministry officials emphasized that Russia had no
monopoly of interests in Central Asia, but called for greater
transparency in U.S. goals in the region. A/S Boucher
briefed on U.S. support for regional economic integration and
civil society in Central Asia, eliciting Russian concerns
that too much pressure to change Central Asian states might
backfire. Russian officials expressed an interest in
increasing cooperation on counterterrorism and
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Russia is likely to support the India Civil-Nuclear
Initiative in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. End Summary.
.
2.(C) Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher and Ambassador Burns
met separately on October 9 with Deputy Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Alekseyev and Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy
Karasin and had a working lunch with both, joined by 3rd CIS
Department (Central Asia) Director Maksim Peshkov. Boucher
also met with Presidential Counterterrorism Special
Representative Anatoliy Safonov and Director of the Federal
Narcotics Control Service Viktor Cherkesov.
.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING TRANSPARENT
--------------


3. (C) A/S Boucher made clear what U.S. intentions were in
Central and South Asia and underlined the value of
transparency in U.S.-Russian relations. The U.S. did not see
itself in competition with Russia; Washington had made this

clear to regional leaders. U.S. goals were to strengthen
states so that they could be sovereign and independent, to
support the growth of civil society, democracy, and
prosperity and to foster long-term stability. Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin said Russia considered Central Asia as a
sphere of vital interest and that Moscow also sought
transparency and an understanding of U.S. intentions because
of the effect on stability in the region. Karasin pointed to
Russia's proximity, longstanding political and economic ties
with Central Asia and the presence of millions of Russians in
the region. He called for greater joint efforts to create a
"new spirit" of cooperation. Boucher and Alekseyev discussed
Russian attitudes toward the regional counternarcotics
conference held in May in Dushanbe and Boucher highlighted
the negative role that disinformation campaigns played in the
region.
.
AFGHANISTAN: GROWING RUSSIAN CONCERN
--------------


4. (C) A/S Boucher reviewed U.S. and Coalition efforts to
increase stability in Afghanistan by fighting terrorism,
countering the production and trafficking of narcotics, and
supporting the Karzai government's efforts to extend central
government rule over the country through road-building and
electrification projects. Boucher stressed U.S. support for
Karzai, but acknowledged that corruption complicated
stability efforts. He called for greater Russian support to
strengthen the Afghan military and counternarcotics programs.
Boucher also reviewed U.S. efforts to encourage closer
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan to police the
border and stop the transit of armed militants.



5. (C) All of A/S Boucher's interlocutors expressed serious
concerns about negative trends in Afghanistan and offered
Russian support for U.S. efforts. Deputy Foreign Minister
Alekseyev noted that the sharp rise in Taliban strength had
surprised the Russians and he drew attention to growing
anti-American sentiments in Afghanistan. Arguing that
increased instability in Afghanistan would have serious
negative consequences for Russian security, Alekseyev offered
that Moscow could sell arms to the Afghan Army at subsidized
prices and promised to review A/S Boucher's request for
renewed support to the Afghan Air Force. Special
Representative Safonov questioned whether Karzai was building
a strong team that would be able to take over efforts to
centralize power once Karzai was gone. Both Safonov and
Director Cherkesov emphasized the link between drug money and
terrorist activities in Afghanistan.
.
CENTRAL ASIA: WHAT DOES STABILITY MEAN?
--------------


6. (C) A/S Boucher explained that U.S. efforts in Central
Asia to support civil society and to encourage regional
integration were aimed at building stable, prosperous states.
U.S. goals were to provide economic and political choices
for countries in the region; we shared interests with Russia,
the EU and China in countering terrorism, proliferation and
narcotics trafficking. The U.S. was not opposed to regional
organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so
long as they do not target U.S. interests, and we support
transparent efforts to encourage economic cooperation and
trade. The U.S. had limited military training programs in
the region and was not interested in new military bases.
Boucher singled out President Karimov's repressive actions as
aggravating the real security challenges his regime faces.
Widespread corruption throughout Central Asia fueled popular
discontent and spurred terrorist recruitment and drug
trafficking. The U.S. was focused on practical, incremental
steps that would propel Central Asian states in a forward
direction. Leadership succession should be open and
inclusive; the key question was not necessarily who would
rule, but how citizens were involved in the selection process.


7. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin stressed that Russia
did not have a "monopoly" on interests in Central Asia.
Moscow's goals were to strengthen sovereignty so that states
could make their own decisions "based on responsible
thinking." Karasin was extremely cautious about political
change in the region, noting that legal opposition in each
country was limited or nonexistent and that there was some
overlap between opposition groups and extremist groups.
Reforms were implemented slowly, if at all, and many regimes
faced challenges from corruption, narcotics trafficking, and

Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Russia worked
through regional organizations to address these challenges.
Moscow wanted stable, peaceful neighbors and saw a "drastic
rush to new arrangements in a society" as dangerous.
Director Peshkov stressed that Central Asia's traditional
societies and leadership structures would not change
overnight and argued that pushing too hard would cause a
backlash. Russian interlocutors were concerned that
leadership succession in Central Asia would be painful,
warning that the perfect should not become the enemy of the
good.
.
CENTRAL ASIA: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
--------------


8. (C) A/S Boucher laid out U.S. goals in encouraging
regional integration, pointing to the benefits for Central
Asia. Afghanistan had long been a barrier between Central
Asia and South Asia; the opening of Afghanistan was a
historic and strategic change that now permitted north-south
flows for energy, trade and transport that would promote
links between Central Asia and the rest of the world.
Boucher encouraged Russian support for Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC) expansion to allow multiple routes to bring
Central Asian oil and gas resources to world markets. He
denounced attempts to block infrastructure links between
South and Central Asia. None of Boucher's interlocutors
addressed economic integration in any detail; Karasin
reaffirmed Russian support for ties between Central Asia and
the rest of the world, but underlined the strong links
remaining between Moscow and the region, in particular as a
result of the Russian diaspora in Central Asia. Alekseyev
stressed China's growing regional interests, noting that its
economic strength allowed it to pursue a more "muscular
approach," and pointed to the interconnections between
Beijing's security and energy needs.
.
COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------


9. (C) All A/S Boucher's interlocutors in Moscow focused on
the challenges to Russian security posed by the Taliban's
resurgence and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia. After the
Assistant Secretary briefed on U.S. efforts to counter
terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the challenges
President Musharraf faced in addressing terrorism, Alekseyev
responded that Russian cooperation with Pakistan on
counterterrorism was limited. It was unclear to Moscow how
much control, if any, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
exercised over terrorist training. Safonov called attention
to the sharing of methods and technology between Iraqi
insurgents and Afghan terrorists and noted that the fight in
Afghanistan was shifting to urban areas. He called for
greater cooperation with the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts
in Afghanistan and welcomed the increasing contacts he had
with S/CT Ambassador Crumpton. Safonov highlighted the
growth throughout the Islamic world of terrorist networks
only loosely tied to Al Qaeda. Karasin, Peshkov and Safonov
called attention to Hizb ut-Tahrir, arguing that its
above-board political activities masked growing support among
local populations for its extremist plans. A/S Boucher
refuted suggestions that the U.S. had contacts with groups
like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
.
COUNTERNARCOTICS
--------------


10. (C) A/S Boucher described shifting U.S.
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and support for the
Tajik Drug Control Agency and the Central Asia Regional
Information Coordination Center in Almaty. He emphasized
that counternarcotics cooperation should increase given
shared U.S. and Russian goals. Alekseyev was critical of
counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan, pointing to the
flood of heroin into Russia. He contrasted the excellent
cooperation Moscow had with Tehran with what he characterized
as a failing effort on Tajikistan's part. A/S Boucher
stressed the progress we had seen in Dushanbe as a result of
increased U.S. funding. Director Cherkesov briefed on the
Kanal counternarcotics operation that has traditionally
focused on Central Asia, but for the first time included
Poland, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania. He acknowledged that
Central Asian drug control agencies often had been
ineffective, but underlined his support for U.S. assistance
in Afghanistan and Central Asia. A/S Boucher pointed to
Pakistan and Turkey as models for a long-term approach to
control production and trafficking of narcotics. Cherkesov
and Safonov stressed the links between narcotics trafficking
and terrorism, and Cherkesov promised a Russian
counternarcotics office would be opened in Kabul by next
year.
.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
--------------


11. (C) Responding to A/S Boucher's request, Alekseyev
confirmed Russian support for the India Civil-Nuclear
Initiative in the Nuclear Suppliers Group "so long as the
U.S. keeps the deal transparent." However, Alekseyev made
clear that Russia would not get out in front in selling other
Nuclear Suppliers Group members on the initiative. Moscow
was looking to coordinate views with the U.S. He
acknowledged that Moscow had been approached by Islamabad
about supporting a similar arrangement for Pakistan and that
Russia had been asked to build nuclear plants in Pakistan,
but stressed Moscow did not view the situations in India and
Pakistan as similar and would not supply Islamabad with
nuclear plants.


12. (C) Alekseyev and Safonov both expressed concerns about
Pakistan's stability. Alekseyev emphasized Russian worries
about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
stockpile as well as growing separatist tensions and popular
discontent. FM Lavrov was likely to visit Islamabad before
the end of the year. Safonov focused on whether Musharraf
was prepared to fight terrorist elements in Afghanistan,
pointing to the North Waziristan agreement as casting doubt
on Pakistan's commitment. A/S Boucher acknowledged Musharraf
faced multiple challenges and stressed that the U.S. had
urged Musharraf to address all stripes of terrorists in
Pakistan as part of Islamabad's efforts to build a modern
society.
BURNS