RUSSIA COMFORTABLE WITH STATUS QUO IN BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001171

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR BO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA COMFORTABLE WITH STATUS QUO IN BELARUS
(C-RE5-01635)

REF: A. MOSCOW 548

B. 05 MOSCOW 15342

Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: The MFA's official stance on Belarus seems
to have shifted from resigned noninterference to passive
support for Lukashenko and the status quo. However, Russian
activists and leaders of the Belarusian opposition based in
Moscow have not given up hope that determined resistance will
eventually produce results. Participants in the Janaury 30
meeting of the Russian-Belarusian Human Rights Commission
conceded that Lukashenko will win the March 19 election, but
believe it is time to begin developing a cogent post-election
strategy. On February 6 Belarusian opposition candidates
Milinkevich and Kozulin visited Moscow for talks with Russian
opinion-makers. While Russia walks a careful political line
between support for the Belarusian status quo and frustration
with Lukashenko, its economic goals seem clear: the Kremlin
wants increased control over Beltransgaz and eventually
monetary union. End Summary.

No News on Putin-Lukashenko Meeting
--------------


2. (C) Asked January 30 for a read-out of the January 24
Putin-Lukashenko one-on-one that took place on the eve of the
Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) special plenary, MFA
Belarus Desk Senior Counselor Igor Gurko was unable to
provide any details, noting that only the two presidents knew
what had been discussed. Instead, Gurko played up the packet
of six bilateral agreements signed by the two presidents that
address Union State matters such as registration, taxation,
and health care. Without a hint of irony, Gurko
characterized the Union State as "90 percent complete on the
expert level." Coverage of the Putin-Lukashenko meeting by
the major Russian dailies was almost non-existent. A front
page Nezavisimaya Gazeta article on January 25, humorously
entitled "It's Taking Some Time to Separate the Flies from
the Meat," merely rehashed Union State issues without
broaching the subject of the presidential meeting. Like
their December 15 meeting in Sochi, no one knows (or wants to
say) what Putin and Lukashenko discussed in St. Petersburg.
(Note: Belarus Embassy Political Counselor Leonid Sennikov
declined to meet with us. End Note.)

GOR on Belarusian Election
--------------


3. (C) Turning to the March 19 election, Gurko underlined
points we first heard from DFM Karasin January 18 (ref A):
Belarus is a small country that threatens no one and will
modernize (even democratize) at its own pace. There is no
chance for an Orange Revolution there, Gurko continued, given
the outlook and character of the Belarusian people, and
therefore taking a hard line on the Belarusian election will
only box the West into a corner. When Lukashenko wins the
election, the U.S. and EU will have no alternative but to
resort to a tougher stance toward the Lukashenko government.
Gurko noted the current Belarusian standard of living is not
bad and concluded that sanctions, should they be enacted
against Minsk, would only hurt ordinary Belarusians.


4. (U) Putin himself may have best outlined the GOR position
on Belarus in his January 31 press conference. Putin said "a
free election is always possible" and characterized his
contact with Lukashenko as support for the Belarusian people,
not as support for "one political figure or another whatever
the cost." Putin said the GOR is pursuing "balanced"
relations with Belarus -- including complex negotiations over
details of the Union State -- and cast the bilateral
relationship as historically "special," a fact, he added,
that the West should not forget. DPM and Minister of Defense
Sergey Ivanov went further at the February 5 Munich
Conference on Security Policy, asking rhetorically, "Does
anybody in this hall doubt Lukashenko is the most popular
candidate for president in Belarus?" Ivanov said Lukashenko
"will win" and called on the international community to "do
all we can" to prevent any election-related unrest from
turning ugly.

The Russian-Belarusian Human Rights Commission
-------------- -


5. (C) On January 30 the little known Russian-Belarusian
Human Rights Commission met in Moscow to discuss the
situation in Belarus. Co-chaired by Sergey Karaganov (member
of the President's Council for the Development of Human
Rights) and Valeriy Pavlov, the organization's designated
liaison between the Belarusian democratic movement and
Russia, the Commission's stated purpose is to safeguard human

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rights and free speech in Russia and Belarus, according to
its June 23 RIA Novosti press release. ORT Special Projects
Director Pavel Sheremet has given several interviews about
the Commission and acts as an informal spokesman. However,
apart from a late December press announcement criticizing the
GOB for its clamp-down on free expression, the Commission has
worked largely behind the scenes. Notably, while the
Commission has ties to the Russian government and remains
officially non-partisan, it also includes activists with
strong anti-Lukashenko tendencies.


6. (C) In separate meetings, Pavlov and Sheremet -- both
opponents of Lukashenko -- agreed the Belarusian president
has a lock on the election, and the GOR will likely recognize
a Lukashenko victory, despite any U.S. and EU claims that the
elections were not free and fair. They also concurred that
the GOR perceives Milinkevich as Western-leaning and that the
Russian elite is not backing him politically or financially.
Notably, Sheremet indicated that Lukashenko has been spending
"huge" sums of money to wine and dine Russian journalists,
especially those from the regions, and that the Belarusian
Embassy in Moscow has at least seven employees devoted to
public affairs outreach. (Bio Notes: Born in Belarus, Pavel
Sheremet served as ORT's Minsk Bureau Chief before being
sentenced to two years for illegally crossing the Belarusian
border in 1997. He ultimately served three months and later
moved to Moscow. Valeriy Pavlov was a Major General in the
Belarusian KGB and served a stint as Interior Minister before
later winning a seat in the Belarusian Upper House. Pavlov
is now Deputy Director of the Dionis Club, a Russian
import-export firm trading in wine and tobacco. End Note.)


7. (C) Pavlov and Sheremet did not agree on the opposition's
next steps. While concerned that the Belarusian authorities
may remove Milinkevich from the ballot (on the pretext of
registration irregularities),Sheremet maintained that, even
after a Lukashenko victory, Milinkevich remains the best
figure to lead a unified opposition front and perhaps help
the opposition make significant gains in Belarus' local
elections this fall. For his part, Pavlov believes that
Milinkevich will no longer be the best candidate to lead the
Belarusian opposition after losing the March election and
that the U.S. and EU are wasting money in supporting him.
Instead, Pavlov is betting that Aleksandr Kozulin, described
as having ties to the security services, will make the best
compromise candidate in the next (possibly early) Belarusian
presidential election. The Commission is already planning to
hold a meeting in Minsk on March 20, the day after the
presidential election.

Belarusian Cultural Society
--------------


8. (C) On February 6 the Belarusian Cultural Society of
Moscow hosted a roundtable that brought Belarusian opposition
figures -- Aleksandr Milinkevich, Aleksandr Kozulin, Sergey
Kalyakin, and Anatoliy Lebedev among others -- to Moscow for
discussions with Russian opinion-makers. Among Russian
participants were Boris Nemtsov, Union of Right Forces (SPS)
leader Nikita Belykh, CIS Institute Deputy Director Vladimir
Zharikhin, RFE/RL's Vitaliy Portnikov, and several media
correspondents.


9. (C) The Belarusian opposition's objective was to assuage
Russian concerns. Milinkevich called Russia a "strategic
partner" and said Russians should view Belarus as a bridge to
the West, not a country that could end up behind a "Western
wall." Milinkevich underlined that the United Opposition
harbored no latent anti-Russian agenda, not least because an
anti-Russian platform would never win in Belarus, but added
that two-thirds of Belarusians want to keep their
sovereignty. For his part Kozulin took umbrage at the
mention of a united opposition candidate. While plugging
integration with Russia, Kozulin said anti-Russian sentiment
in Belarus is increasing and attributed this to Lukashenko's
manipulation of the state media.


10. (C) Most of the Russian participants expressed support
for a unified opposition, but Belykh went furthest, saying
the Union of Right Forces was ready to support the Unified
Opposition and work for a Milinkevich victory in March.
Zharikhin said Lukashenko has considerable support in Russia
and that the opposition's message got little attention.
Nemtsov welcomed the unified opposition, lamented the growth
of anti-Russianism on Belarusian state TV, and said it would
not be possible to create a Union State with a dictator (who
would never give up sovereignty). Nemtsov also questioned
whether the participation of the Belarusian opposition
wouldn't give the March 19 election legitimacy. Nearly all
present -- from both sides of the table -- agreed that the
election results would be falsified and that Lukashenko has

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already designated a 70-75 percent election victory for
himself.

What the Kremlin Wants
--------------


11. (C) While official Moscow is ready to accept
Lukashenko's continued tenure in office, the Kremlin's
economic designs in Belarus are clear. According to
Sheremet, Kremlin is waiting until after Lukashenko's victory
at the polls to begin a serious bid for control of
Beltransgaz; everything is on "stand-by" until after March

19. Explaining his view, Sheremet pointed to several GOR
statements indicating that all CIS countries, including
Belarus, would eventually have to pay market rates for
Russian gas. He said Belarus' current price for Russian gas
($46/tcm) would be revisited, possibly as early as April.
Continued low rates will depend on what further concessions
Gazprom can squeeze out of Beltransgaz. He added that
Gazprom's negotiations with Beltransgaz would be timed,
conveniently, to take place when Russian-Ukrainian relations
are in the foreground of CIS news coverage. Without going
into details, Sheremet said that achieving a monetary union
with Belarus was also an important, though secondary, goal
for the Kremlin.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Our conversations with the MFA's Belarus desk
officer reinforce our view (ref B) that the Foreign Ministry
does not have the lead on policy toward Belarus. The MFA's
talking points on the Belarusian election, not to mention
press comments by Putin and DPM Ivanov, hint of a stiffening
in the GOR position. Where before, we sensed a resigned
acceptance of Lukashenko's reelection, now there seems to be
some indication that -- faced with a united U.S.-EU position
-- the GOR is beginning to defend Lukashenko and the status
quo.


13. (C) Russia's approach to Belarus must be seen in the
broader context of Russian policy in the region. Lukashenko
may at times be frustraing, but from the Russian perspective
he is better than a Western-leaning alternative. The GOR
does not want the problems it faces with Ukraine and Georgia
following their colored revolutions to spread to Belarus or
to see in Minsk a government that might eventually seek NATO
membership. The recent warming of Russian-Uzbek relations is
instructive; those spurned by the West can still find a
friendly face in Moscow.

BURNS