RUSSIA-ABKHAZIA: SEEKING A DEAL AT THE UNSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 011372

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-ABKHAZIA: SEEKING A DEAL AT THE UNSC


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) DFM Karasin convoked Ambassador October 10. He hoped
for "a more constructive and flexible" U.S. approach to the
Russian draft UNSCR on UNOMIG mandate renewal and said the
Europeans are willing to be flexible. If the resolution
included a "blunt message" to Tbilisi on its Kodori
operation, other basic elements of UNSCR could remain.
Ambassador replied that the U.S. will not be flexible on
condemning the Kodori operation, but would accept
highlighting violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. We
have delivered a blunt message to Tbilisi privately; the
international forum should complement that message, not
repeat it. A visa for Abkhaz "Foreign Minster" Shamba could
potentially be part of a package. Both the U.S. and Russia
need to be blunt with the Abkhaz on the unacceptability of
the use of force. Karasin said this approach is "smart," but
continued to push for condemnation of the Kodori operation;
Ambassador reiterated this is unacceptable. Ambassador
pressed Karasin on harassment of Georgians. Karasin said
"rough edges" will be smoothed out, but limitations will
remain on relations with Georgia. End Summary.

UNSC State of Play -- Russian View
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2. (C) DFM Grigoriy Karasin convoked the Ambassador October

10. He said the U.S. is blocking progress on a UNSCR
renewing UNOMIG's mandate. Russian negotiators say there are
hints that the Europeans are willing to be flexible, and
there has been some movement forward. The Russian bottom
line is that the UNSCR must contain:

-- a "qualification" of Georgia's action in the Kodori Gorge;
-- condemnation of violations of the Moscow ceasefire
agreement (1994);
-- restatement of the obligation not to put armed forces in
the Kodori Gorge;
-- assurance that joint UNOMIG-PKF patrols in Kodori will be
regular.

With those elements, other major elements of UNSCR 1666 can
remain. Karasin passed the Ambassador a non-paper (faxed to
EUR-RUS) and draft resolution.


3. (C) Karasin continued that the U.S. is being tough in
proposing alternatives unacceptable to Russia. U.S. language
on status "breaks the spirit" of UNSCR 1666. U.S. language
does not include expressions on the role of the CIS PLF, and
hints that it should leave. Without a more cooperative U.S.
attitude, Karasin said, he did not see how we could agree on
a resolution to renew UNOMIG's mandate for another six
months. He asked the Ambassador to convey Russia's concern
to Washington.

No U.S. Flexibility on Kodori
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4. (C) Ambassador agreed that the negotiations are difficult.
Russia should not expect the U.S. to show flexibility on
condemning the Kodori operation per se. However, there is a
willingness on our side to highlight violations of the 1994
Moscow Agreement. Russia should bear the distinction in
mind. Karasin responded that "if we fail to send Tbilisi a
clear signal, we will be de facto promoting its militaristic
stance."


5. (C) Ambassador replied that we are very clear with the
Georgians on the use of force. Our Ambassador in Tbilisi
delivered a blunt demarche on this to President Saakashvili
October 9. The Georgian leadership is in no doubt of the
U.S. position. With regard to the UNSCR, however, there will
be no flexibility. Karasin said he appreciated the U.S.
bluntness to the Georgians, but the message must come from
the U.S., Russia and the Europeans together. Ambassador
replied that our private bilateral channel to the Georgians
is the appropriate one for the message. The message from New
York should be different but complement it. It could
potentially be coupled with a visa issuance for Abkhaz
"Foreign Minister" Shamba to visit New York to meet with UNSC
members in the Aria forum. This would inter alia allow the
U.S. to reinforce the message to the Abkhaz of the
unacceptability of the use of force. That is part of the
package -- another element is a blunt Russian message to the
Abkhaz not to use force, a message we assume the Russians are
sending. Karasin said the package approach is "smart."
Still, he hoped for U.S. flexibility on the resolution, which
could help calm the situation.

MOSCOW 00011372 002 OF 002



Harassment of Georgians
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6. (C) Ambassador mentioned mounting concern in Washington on
Russian actions against individual Georgians in Russia. The
actions promote a negative image for Russia. Ambassador was
glad to learn that the Russians have stopped combing school
records for information on Georgian parents. However,
deportations (totaling 300 on October 10) and intensified
document checks continue, and Georgian-linked businesses and
restaurants continue to close.


7. (C) Karasin replied that "sometimes, decisions in Russia
are strong, not elegant, but gradually we put away the
extremes." He hoped there would be no more screaming from
schools and universities. "But certain elements of
limitation on our relations with Georgia will continue --
without the rougher forms, perhaps, but they will continue"
as a message to Saakashvili. Karasin pushed again on the
UNSCR, saying it would promote a better atmosphere for
normalizing relations with Georgia. Ambassador hoped that
some of these pieces will come together for a workable
resolution. He reiterated that Russia needs to work, too, by
pressing the Abkhaz not to use force.

Comment
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8. (C) Karasin, confident that the Europeans are ready to
abandon the U.S. position, was trying to see where the limits
of a deal might lie. Russia very much wants a resolution
that will show Georgia that its major allies, especially the
U.S., are angry with it and have reached the limit of their
support. The Russians have fixed upon condemnation of the
Kodori operation as the vehicle. The Ambassador gave Karasin
no comfort on this, but the Russians are likely to keep
trying before accepting a fallback of condemning ceasefire
violations.


9. (C) Karasin took the point that the Shamba visa is in play
as part of the package. We should try to get a decision as
early as possible -- by COB October 10 would be important --
as a catalyst for moving negotiations on the resolution.

BURNS