POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 011169

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN RS
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST

REF: STATE 166404

Classified By: Amb. William J. Burns. For Reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary: DFM Alekseyev told the Ambassador October
4 that Russia recognized the seriousness of the situation
following the DPRK's announcement and understood U.S.
concerns. Alekseyev urged that the Security Council move
deliberately to craft a response, but was lukewarm about a
potential Five Plus Five meeting. In an October 3 statement,
the MFA called on Pyongyang to exercise restraint and make
the "right choice." Colleagues from other Embassies are also
set to approach the MFA to urge a unified response. End
Summary.
.
MFA Press Statement
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2. (SBU) The MFA responded immediately on October 3 to the
DPRK MFA announcement of North Korea's intention to conduct a
nuclear test by expressing "deep concern" and calling on
Pyongyang to show restraint. While noting the DPRK's
concerns for its security, the MFA urged that a resolution to
the problem must be sought through the Six Party Talks and
called on North Korea to make "the right choice."
.
DFM Alekseyev
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3. (C) The Ambassador raised reftel points with Alekseyev
October 4 and urged Russia to cooperate with the U.S. and
other concerned partners in the UN Security Council and in
the Five Plus Five process. Alekseyev said U.S. concerns
were understandable and that the DPRK announcement had
created a serious problem. He said the announcement had been
unexpected and that Moscow had already begun consultations
with Beijing given the latter's relatively good understanding
of DPRK intentions and leverage with Pyongyang. Alekseyev
noted that he planned to accompany PM Fradkov on his October
16 visit to Seoul and might go on to Beijing. He had no
intention of going to Pyongyang.


4. (C) Turning to the issue of possible UN Security Council
action, Alekseyev acknowledged that the DPRK's expressed
intention posed a very serious challenge to the Council's
authority. He stated that the Council should move
deliberately on next steps, keeping in mind that the regime's
reactions were often abnormal ("close to craziness") and that
the Council should not take steps that might lead to
counterproductive results. Caution was particularly called
for in advance of any testing -- the Council would not profit
from taking action that prompted the DPRK to do the very
thing we all opposed.


5. (C) The Ambassador underlined the usefulness of the Five
Plus Five in working out a regional solution to North Korea's
threatening behavior. Alekseyev was lukewarm about the
process, but suggested that the U.S. provide specific
proposals in New York or Washington about activating the
process. Alekseyev said that Russia wanted to approach this
serious situation "carefully," and would likely keep a close
eye on Beijing's reaction in formulating Russian policy.
.
Third Party Diplomacy
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6. (C) Our Japanese, French and Australian colleagues all
have been instructed to go in to the MFA on the tests, but
have faced some problems in getting access. The South Korean
Political Counselor told us October 4 that he was still
awaiting instructions.
BURNS