"NOT WAR, BUT CLOSE:" RUSSIAN REACTION TO GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 010986

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO GG RS
SUBJECT: "NOT WAR, BUT CLOSE:" RUSSIAN REACTION TO GEORGIA
ARRESTS OF RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: DFM Karasin told Ambassador September 28 the
arrest of Russian officers in Georgia "could have been a
casus belli." Russian reaction "will be more reasonable."
Russia "has the impression that it cannot rely on its
American partners." Karasin asked for U.S. help in freeing
the officers. He made clear that expulsion to Russia would
be acceptable. He passed a non-paper on the Russian
position. Karasin was tough -- but the opinion of Russia's
political classes is tougher still. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador met Karasin September 28 to discuss the
September 27 arrest of Russian military intelligence officers
in Georgia. Karasin handed Ambassador a non-paper
(translation, para. 11). He said a chain of events showed
Georgia has an "orientation to force." The situation is "not
war, but close to war." The arrest of Russian officers was a
"qualitatively new escalation." It called forth a "whole
bouquet of tough and unpleasant thoughts." The officers were
there to help withdraw Russia's military bases -- in
fulfillment of Russia's commitments.


3. (C) The arrest, Karasin said, was part of a chain of
events: the September 21 decision on Intensified Dialogue
(ID) for Georgia; the Kodori Gorge operation with its
aftermath of "political circus;" and intensified attacks on
Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Later he
added the GUAM initiative on frozen conflicts as one of
Georgia's "provocative actions."


4. (C) Karasin regretted that Georgia had received
encouragement: the push for ID, the applause for Pres.
Saakashvili's UNGA speech, and the generally anti-Russian
tone of Georgian policy. This encouragement has created the
impression in Russia that it cannot rely on its partners, and
in particular on the U.S. The explosion of tensions in South
Ossetia was unnecessary. It is a zone of Russia's vital
interests; America must understand the dangers.


5. (C) Karasin said Russia insists on immediate freedom for
its soldiers and for an end to the blockade around the Group
of Russian Forces in the Trans-Caucasus (GRVZ). Tomorrow,
Russia will evacuate the families of embassy employees. It
will recall its ambassador. Washington, he concluded, must
understand the gravity of the situation.


6. (C) Ambassador promised to convey Karasin's seriousness to
Washington. Neither the U.S., nor Russia, nor Georgia needed
an increase in tensions. We appreciate Russia's fulfillment
of its obligations to withdraw its bases. Despite Russian
perceptions, the U.S. message to Georgia has been consistent:
we are prepared to move down the road toward Georgian NATO
membership, but Georgia must show restraint on Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Ambassador asked what outcome would work for
everyone in the present crisis.


7. (C) Karasin responded that Russia is still considering its
course of action. Karasin did not want to close any option.
Its priority is the release of its people. This "could have
been a casus belli," he said, "but our response will be more
reasonable." However, he stressed, "Our reserve of patience
is near an end." It was important to return the situation to
"a more reasonable basis." When a situation evolves on its
own, he said, there can be a dangerous chain reaction. There
were a million Georgians in Russia. This gave the problem
great magnitude. Russia would have to think about how to
proceed. "We hope our partners will help," he said, "by
being tough and precise with Georgia." He said Ambassador
Ushakov would be seeking a senior appointment to make these
points in Washington, and hoped he would be received. He
added that if Saakashvili "returns to normal negotiations on
Abkhazia," ending the "political circus" in Kodori, which
"smells of adventurism," Russia will try to convince the
Abkhaz "there is a chance."


8. (C) Ambassador reiterated he would convey Karasin's sense
of seriousness. He asked whether the Russian Embassy had
access to the detainees. Karasin said yes; they were in
satisfactory conditions. At a later date -- after their
release -- Russia would be prepared to discuss the claims
against them. He reiterated that it was important that these
people be freed. "They can stay or leave the country," as
long as they get out of jail.


9. (C) Karasin's comments, tough as they were, are restrained
in comparison to the public statements of political figures
and the analyses of our institutional contacts. Foreign
Minister Lavrov stated that Russia would seek an emergency
session of the UN Security Council to discuss the detention.
All commentators note the proximity to the NATO decision on

MOSCOW 00010986 002 OF 003


ID, and call the arrests a deliberate provocation, not a
serious counter-espionage operation. A number stated that
the U.S. must have approved, or at least did not veto the
arrests, and some point to the arrests as part of
Saakashvili's "narrow agenda to undermine Russia" --
presumably as a catspaw for American ambitions. Federation
Council Chair Mironov bluntly said the arrests "could lead to
war." Fyodor Lukyanov, Chief Editor of Russia in Global
Politics, told us that the detentions would unite radical
elements in Russian politics. He said the only positive
element he could see so far was that Russian elites were
calling for sanctions rather than military action. Lukyanov
thought that the incident would demonstrate to NATO what
Georgia's membership would entail NATO disputes with Russia.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The Russian non-paper below is a cry of anger and
outrage -- but without concrete decisions on the Russian
reaction, because Russia has no good options in this case.
We strongly recommend pressing Georgia to expel the Russian
officers and make public its evidence for the accusations.
The sooner that is done, the sooner the crisis can be
defused, and it would also help dampen some of the more
inflammatory rhetoric. Some of that rhetoric is genuine
outrage; some an attempt to recoup after the decision on ID.
Russia's message to NATO members is clear: giving Article V
guarantees to Georgia allows Georgia to embroil NATO in a war
with Russia.

Text of Russian Non-Paper
--------------


11. (C) Begin text of informal Embassy translation:

On the blatant provocation by the Georgian side

The Russian side expresses the most serious concern in
connection with the arbitrary action (proizvol) committed by
Georgian security forces yesterday evening and early morning
against Russian military personnel who were on territory of
Georgia, in the staff of the Group of Russian Forces in the
Trans-Caucasus (GRVZ) completely legally and in accordance
with treaties.

The series of arrests undertaken by Georgian authorities on
27 September against Russian officers of the GRVZ was the
latest blatant attack confirming the anti-Russian course of
the leadership of Georgia. The actions of the Georgian side
contradict the conditions of the Agreement between the
Russian Federation and Georgia on the timetable and regime of
temporary functioning and withdrawal of Russian military
bases and other military sites of Russian Forces in
Trans-Caucasus deployed on the territory of Georgia; in
particular, of Article 4, which mandates "the provision of
normal living conditions and temporary functioning" of
Russian military bases. Despite the treaties, the Georgian
authorities continue to put outrageous obstacles in the path
of the normal work and living conditions of Russian military
personnel, who are responsible for the fulfillment of their
obligations, inter alia in the interests of and in accordance
with the wishes of Georgia itself. Last week the last
echelon of Russian military equipment was sent from Georgian
territory in accordance with the timetable planned for 2006
for the withdrawal of equipment and materiel by bilateral
Agreement. The logic of steps by the Georgian side clearly
directed at disruption of the process, worked out with such
effort, of withdrawing the Russian military bases is
completely incomprehensible to us.

The provocative actions of the Georgian side against Russian
military personnel in Georgia when taken together with the
incessant chain of defiant actions of Tbilisi, together with
the use of force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
exacerbate tensions throughout the region and constitute a
direct threat to stability and security in the
Trans-Caucasus. The consequences of such actions are
unpredictable and fraught with the most negative effects both
on bilateral Russian-Georgian relations and the region-wide
situation. Given the existence of unregulated conflicts in
the Trans-Caucasus, the irresponsibility of the Georgian side
cannot remain unnoticed by the international community.

We consider the unceremonious and impudent character of the
actions by the Georgian "siloviki" with regard to Russian
citizens, and other actions by the Georgian side directed at
undermining existing agreements, demolishing the negotiating
and peacekeeping formats and mechanisms in the region, worthy
of unqualified condemnation by all leading international
organizations, in the first instance the UN and OSCE,

MOSCOW 00010986 003 OF 003


directly involved in the issue of world security and conflict
resolution. We expect the Georgian provocations will be
given an appropriate and unbiased evaluation by the
international community. It must be recognized in Tbilisi
that the period of indulgence and permissiveness, including
by a number of Western states, has ended and that the time
has come to answer for one's actions.

Concrete conclusions will be drawn in Russia from the
Georgian leadership's line. We have no intention of leaving
our citizens in trouble -- whether ordinary tourists or
military personnel fulfilling their service obligations
abroad in accordance with international treaties. The
reaction of the Russian side will be appropriate calculated
as a warning against the repetition of such unfriendly acts.

End text.
BURNS