Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW10607
2006-09-21 16:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA PREEMPTS SAAKASHVILI UNGA SPEECH: UNOMIG

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS GG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010607 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

MOSCOW 10366, MOSCOW 10439

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIA PREEMPTS SAAKASHVILI UNGA SPEECH: UNOMIG
RESOLUTION


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell: 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010607

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

MOSCOW 10366, MOSCOW 10439

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIA PREEMPTS SAAKASHVILI UNGA SPEECH: UNOMIG
RESOLUTION


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Russell: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Convoking the Friends of Georgia on
September 21, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin
expressed concern over the deteriorating status of
Georgian-Abkhazian relations, passed draft language on an
UNOMIG resolution that condemns -- sharply and at length --
GOG operations in the Kodori gorge (see para. 9 for full
text),detailed undemocratic actions by the GOG, reiterated
that Russia would maintain its peacekeeping commitments and
added that without CIS peacekeeping forces there is no
justification for UNOMIG. Separately, Karasin told the
Ambassador that the resolution text was open to negotiation
and Russia simply wanted to circulate a draft before FM
Lavrov's upcoming meetings in New York. End Summary


2. (C) On September 21, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Grigory Karasin convoked the representatives of the Friends
of Georgia, noting that the importance of the topic made it
imperative to meet; in particular, the deterioration in the
status of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. According to UNOMIG
data, Karasin stated, the GOG had refused to fully withdraw
its troops and treaty-limited equipment from the Kodori
gorge, as stipulated by the Moscow Agreement, and the GOG had
impeded the free movement of the CIS peacekeeping and UNOMIG
observers. Karasin added that 2000 Georgian military forces
were present in the upper gorge area and UNOMIG had recorded
16 violations by the GOG of the Moscow Agreement. The GOR
was concerned by the on-going efforts of the GOG military,
engineering, and police forces to build infrastructure for a
government-in-exile.


3. (C) With a nod to President Saakashvili's upcoming
address at UNGA, Karasin commented that the GOR had "serious
grounds" to believe that he would demand the withdrawal of
CIS peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia and assign blame to
Russia for the ineffectiveness of these forces. Karasin said
that he did not intend to repeat the contents of the MFA's
September 14 statement on developments in Georgia (reftel),
but would only underscore that the GOR, as before, remained

committed to its multilateral and bilateral commitments. "We
will carry them out in full."


4. (C) In response to events on the ground, Karasin
explained, the GOR would introduce new language for the
UNOMIG resolution, and was offering a draft in advance to
allow its partners to carefully study the GOR proposals and
make comments and counter-proposals. A number of the
elements, he noted upfront, contained language that directly
blamed the GOG for events in the Kodori gorge. Karasin
reaffirmed that the CIS peacekeepers were inextricably linked
to UNOMIG's mission and the protection of UN personnel. The
international community had an obligation to react, he
argued, when agreements were violated. GOG actions created a
threat to regional security that were "absolutely
inadmissible." In order to normalize the situation, Karasin
said, it was helpful to have a "frank and direct" assessment.
The violations recorded by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeepers
complicated GOG efforts to blame the GOR.


5. (C) Karasin urged the FOG members to carefully study the
proposals for discussion in New York and by the special
representatives in Berlin on September 28. Karasin summed up
that he was "absolutely convinced" that all the Friends
understood the importance of a unified approach to resolving
this conflict, and hoped for a substantive response in
Berlin. Karasin closed by noting the GOR's satisfaction with
FOG gatherings in Moscow, as a venue for conveying
information.


6. (C) Karasin also delivered a separate critique of
Georgia's democratic credentials, noting with concern the
trend in Georgia to diminish freedoms and basic rights. He
expressed concern over the security forces' attacks on the
opposition and the shrinking number of independent media
outlets, including the closure of three television stations
and ten newspapers. Recently, he added, the management of
another television station had been replaced. There had been
mass arrests of influential opposition figures, charged with
coup plotting, but no evidence provided of their complicity.


7. (C) Separately, Karasin made clear to the Ambassador
that the draft resolution text was being distributed now to
open the door for meaningful discussion in New York during
Lavrov's visit. Karasin emphasized that the text was open
for negotiation. He reiterated his concern about
Saakashvili's UNGA speech and that the situation was
spiraling out of control, noting that NATO's extension of
Intensified Dialogue to Georgia was not a welcome development

MOSCOW 00010607 002 OF 002


and Saakashvili would draw the wrong message from it.


8. (C) Comment: In Security Council Secretary Ivanov's
comments to the Ambassador (ref B) and in subsequent meetings
with MFA officials, the GOR has made clear that it finds
Georgian efforts to internationalize the disputes, through
expanding the negotiating formats, putting frozen conflicts
on the UNGA agenda with its GUAM partners, and courting NATO
membership, unacceptable. The "frank and open" language of
the Russian draft resolution appears to be a tit-for-tat
response to the GOG's "Basic Principles" that offended the
GOR. The tenor of the debate may further intensify depending
on the tone and direction of the Georgian President's UNGA
address.

--------------
Text of Russian Draft Resolution
--------------


9. (U) Text of "Elements to the Security Council Resolution
on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict settlement":

"The Security Council,...

-- Expresses its deep concern with regard to the actions of
the Georgian side in the Kodori valley in July 2006 in
violation of provisions of the relevant Security Council
resolutions containing, in particular, an appeal to the sides
to refrain from any action that might impede the peace
process, as well as of the Moscow agreement on cease fire and
separation of forces of 14 May 1994, and other
Georgian-Abkhaz agreements concerning the Kodori valley;

-- Urges the Georgian side to withdraw its troops and other
armed formations from the Kodori valley and not to undertake
any new additional steps aimed at destabilization of
situation in the Kodori valley;

-- Also urged the Georgian side to return to the status quo
available before the entry of its units in the Kodori valley
and, in particular, to abandon the plans of installing the
"the government of autonomous republic of Abkhazia as well as
other actions capable of complicating the peace process of
Georgian-Abkhaz settlement;

-- Demands from the Georgian side to fully adhere to its
international legal obligations, in particular regarding the
urgent resumption of regular monitoring of the situation in
the upper Kodori valley by joint UNOMIG and CIS peacekeeping
force patrols and the provision in this regard of effective
security guarantees;

-- Reaffirms the important role of the CIS peacekeeping force
in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, deplores the actions of
the Georgian side aimed at the termination of its activities,
and stresses that such a development would lead to a further
aggravation of the situation in the zone of conflict with
unpredictable consequences;

-- Recalls the direct inter-connection of the UNOMIG and the
CIS peacekeeping force mandates;

-- Urges the Georgian side once again to address seriously
legitimate Abkhaz security concerns, to avoid steps which
could be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant
rhetoric;

-- Calls on both parties to finalize without delay the
document on the non-resumption of hostilities and the
international guarantees of security, and to sign it;

-- Underlines that is the primary responsibility of both
sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure the
freedom of movement of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and
other international personnel and calls on both sides to
fulfill their obligations in this regard;

-- Calls on both parties to continue participation in
quadripartite meetings on safety issues in Chuburhindzhi on a
regular basis in order to be able to reaction promptly to the
mutual security concerns or threats in the security sphere
and to this end to develop, agree and endorse the rules of
procedure o such quadripartite meetings;

-- Requests the Secretary General to include the detailed
information on the Kodori valley in the next report on the
situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."
End Text
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