Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW10439
2006-09-19 12:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ON IRAN, FROZEN

Tags:  PREL PGOV ETTC PARM IR RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 010439 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ON IRAN, FROZEN
CONFLICTS, NATO, UKRAINE, BOEING, SUKHOI SANCTIONS

REF: MOSCOW 10382

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 010439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC PARM IR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY ON IRAN, FROZEN
CONFLICTS, NATO, UKRAINE, BOEING, SUKHOI SANCTIONS

REF: MOSCOW 10382

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a September 18 meeting, Russian Security
Council Secretary Ivanov briefed on his September meetings in
Spain with Iranian Security Council Secretary Larijani, UNSYG
Annan, and former President Gonzales; raised concerns over
mixed messages to Iran; and reiterated Russia's willingness
to move to economic sanctions and speak with one voice with
the EU 3. Ivanov underscored the reasons, however, why the
GOR would not support a move to military action. He analyzed
divisions within Iran and argued the absence of a ME peace
process played into the hands of Iranian radicals. Ivanov
expressed disappointment with Georgian negotiating tactics
and concern over the prospect of military escalation and NATO
Intensified Dialogue. Ivanov ridiculed a GOR-Transnistria
union and urged Moldova to follow on the Transnistrian
referendum by negotiating with "President" Smirnov. Ivanov
welcomed the decline in polemics with Ukraine. On U.S.
relations, he termed the Sukhoi/Rosoboron sanctions
"punishment" for GOR arms sales to Venezuela and Syria, and
said that U.S. allegations were without basis. Ivanov
repudiated his Deputy's interjection that a Boeing commercial
aircraft sale would be tied to resolution of the sanctions.
He noted his intent to call NSA Hadley to discuss Iran and
other bilateral issues. End Summary


2. (C) In an hour-plus meeting on September 18, Russian
Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov briefed the Ambassador
on his holiday diplomacy in Madrid, where he had an informal
session with Iranian Security Council Secretary Larijani and
UNSYG Annan, a separate two-hour discussion with former
Spanish President Gonzales, in addition to other
(unspecified) consultations with Iranians and Iranian
watchers. Ivanov's notetaker was newly appointed Security
Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Pavlovich Nazarov, who
comes to the Security Council via a long tenure in the

security services.

-------------- --------------
Iran: Sanctions, strategy and speaking with one voice
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Ivanov opened the meeting by noting his concern over
the competing and not always coordinated voices reaching the
Iranian government. He was puzzled by Gonzales' decision to
travel to Iran on a "personal" initiative, which did not even
reflect a policy consensus of the Spanish government. It was
critical, he emphasized, that everyone coordinate through EU
High Representative Solana; this was a key factor in Ivanov's
decision to abstain from meeting Larijani one-on-one, rather
than with UNSYG Annan. The Italians and Spanish were
searching for a role, with the Japanese also tempted.
Ivanov's message to Gonzales was that this was a "dangerous
and delicate game" that did not require outside players, but
rather subtlety and a consistent message. Citing the
confusion of the Spanish Ambassador (in Madrid for Larijani's
meeting) over the international community's approach to the
suspension of uranium enrichment activity, Ivanov warned that
the Iranians would profit from discrepancies within the
international community.


4. (C) One factor contributing to Larijani's wavering in
the negotiations, Ivanov argued, was his lack of
understanding over who Solana represented and the extent of
his mandate. A second factor was internal differences within
the Iranian government, which Solana told Ivanov was the
reason behind the postponement of the September 14 meeting.
The virtue of drawing out the dialogue with the Iranians,
Ivanov maintained, was that it led to nuances within the
ruling circles in Iran and a better understanding of the
international community's position. Larijani understood
better than those he represented what were the possible
consequences of Iranian inaction; prolonged dialogue helped
Larijani bring others around within the government, while
simultaneously revealing publicly the differences between
competing actors. Ivanov's assessment was that Larijani was
not resisting a solution: "he is ready." The sequencing and
setting were critical; "we have to help" the Iranians square
our demand for a halt to enrichment activity beforehand with
their offer to suspend during the negotiations. Larijani was
a good interlocutor, Ivanov added, since he enjoyed high
political standing at home and had direct connections to the
Supreme Leader.


5. (C) Ivanov agreed with the Ambassador that it was Iran's
turn to be responsive, and noted Solana's guarded telephone
assessment that some forward movement had been achieved.
Ivanov repeated that it would be difficult for Iran to change
its position, having staked out such an uncompromising public

MOSCOW 00010439 002 OF 005


line. In the event there was movement, Ivanov floated the
possibility of a UNSYG-chaired informal session on the
margins of UNGA modeled on the six-plus-two process for
Afghanistan, which could provide a useful beginning to
U.S.-Iranian engagement. The Ambassador reiterated that a
suspension of enrichment remained a necessary precondition
for moving to direct engagement, formal or informal, with the
Iranians. He also repeated that, in the absence of an
Iranian decision to suspend, it was essential to move toward
a sanctions resolution in New York, as Russia had earlier
agreed.


6. (C) Ivanov underscored that the GOR would not move
toward support for military action against Iran, but remained
committed to the negotiating process, the prospect of
economic sanctions, and the necessity of speaking with one
voice. He repeated GOR concerns that preparation for
sanctions developed its own logic and rhythm and incited the
worst in the Iranian government, which had received
conflicting signals from ad hoc actors and had drawn its own
conclusions about U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Sanctions were the easiest approach, Ivanov insisted, but
lacked an endgame, and seemed certain to drive Iran away from
the negotiating table. While Ivanov planned to call Larijani
soon to underscore EU 3 disappointment with the Iranian
response and to underscore that Russia is prepared to move to
sanctions, the GOR would approach imposing sanctions
carefully. This was not, he insisted, a function of Russian
economic interests. Italy, Japan, and Europe writ large
would suffer more from economic sanctions than Russia, with
Ivanov describing any losses from Bushehr as "minimal."
Russia's policy was not driven primarily by economic
concerns, but by pragmatic concerns over the destabilizing
effect of sanctions, perhaps leading to military action
against Iran, on Russian interests in the Caucasus, Middle
East, and North Korea. Before Russia advanced to the next
stage, it needed to know the final destination. In this
context, Ivanov drew attention to Israeli vulnerability to a
missile attack, lacking even basic ABM defenses against an
Iranian reprisal.


7. (C) Ivanov noted differences between GOR and U.S.
assessments over the time frame within which Iran could
acquire nuclear weapons, underscoring the difficulties that
Iran had faced with the cascade technology. He accepted the
Ambassador's point that it was difficult to ascertain whether
technical difficulties, Iranian disinformation or a political
decision to "go slow" were at play, but reasserted that Iran
was not going to have nuclear weapons "tomorrow."


8. (C) Ivanov made a final pitch for sustained U.S.
engagement, acknowledging that it was both difficult and
frustrating, but stating that the process had not played
itself out. Characterizing the last UNSC resolution as
"transitional," Ivanov said a subsequent resolution could
remove the question of Iran from the IAEA entirely. The
Ambassador stressed that it was incumbent on the Iranians to
do something on suspension, in order to open the door to
further talks, and the U.S. looked to Russia for assistance
in reaffirming that message. Ivanov accepted the
Ambassador's point that success with Iran was important to
U.S.-Russian relations and agreed that the U.S. had
demonstrated significant restraint in responding to Iranian
statements and acts. Ivanov reiterated that "on principle,
there is no disagreement; there are differences of prognosis
and timing." Russia will continue with the U.S. "until it
can't." What was important was that when Larijani's aide
Hossein-i Tosh came to Moscow he heard a coordinated message:
Russia was speaking with one voice to Iran, and reinforcing
to Larijani that Solana was the voice of the EU 3.

-------------- -
Middle East: peace process as antidote to Iran
-------------- -


9. (C) Ivanov warned that Larijani's negotiating posture
reflected the general consensus within Iran that the U.S. and
Israel were weakened by the wars in Iraq and Lebanon. This
played into the hands of the extremists, particularly in the
absence of any successful peace process in the Middle East.
Noting FM Lavrov's visit to the Middle East (reftel),Ivanov
underscored the GOR's conclusion that PM Olmert needed a
negotiating process to offset the damage inflicted upon him
domestically by the war in Lebanon. Olmert had told Lavrov
that he was serious about negotiations with the Palestinians,
but only after the Israeli soldier was returned. The
Ambassador agreed that Lebanon appeared to foreclose, at
least for now, the option of unilateral withdrawal to Olmert,
but noted the constraints on Abbas dictated by disarray
within Palestinian circles. Ivanov argued that the Arab
League-driven ministerial at UNGA could politically

MOSCOW 00010439 003 OF 005


jump-start serious discussions, particularly given disquiet
within the Arab world over the stalemate, at a time of
Iranian ascendancy.

--------------
Georgia: Situation Unsettling
--------------


10. (C) After a deep breath and long pause, Ivanov said he
was offended by Georgian government behavior and saw little
reason to be optimistic about prospects for success in the
bilateral relationship or over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
To the contrary, the GOR feared the possibility of an
escalation. Ivanov conceded that Russia had made its share
of mistakes, and had its faction of hot heads who exacerbated
relations. While Ivanov counseled pragmatism and
face-to-face negotiations, he expressed frustration over
Saakashvili's quest for any diplomatic route that avoided
Russia. Ivanov judged inclusion of the frozen conflicts on
the UNGA agenda by a 16-15 vote a mistake that reflected GUAM
naivet over the significance of internationalizing an
internal dispute. Russia sat at the negotiating table with
Georgia and tried to proceed methodically, but Georgia was
always looking over its shoulder for someone else with whom
to talk. GOG assertions that they had no negotiating
partners were contradicted by repeated offers from the
parties to engage. Georgia's search for alternate
negotiating partners took it away from the realities of the
negotiating table.


11. (C) Ivanov questioned the value of introducing
"Congolese or Bangladeshi troops" into the fray as
international peackeepers in the separatist regions.
"Georgia cannot impose a final status, it must negotiate one
with the parties involved." The GOR increasingly was
convinced that the GOG was preparing for war, maybe as a
scare tactic, but "maybe because they have become accustomed
to this option." Such an action, he warned, would not be
"profitable" -- "Georgia cannot win militarily." Ivanov
predicted further complications introduced by the November 12
referendum in South Ossetia, which the Russians could not
stop. It would take place at a "difficult moment," since the
JCC presently was stalled. There needed to be a long-term
solution built on the basis of trust.


12. (C) Ivanov complained that all positive Russian steps
were pocketed, whether on Ajaria, the closure of Russian
bases, the facilitation of those refugees who wanted to
return, the work on reopening the railroad from Sochi to
Tbilisi, and assistance on energy (sic). This track record
was ignored. What Russia was not prepared to do was to
"smother" Abkhazia or South Ossetia: these were Georgian
problems, Georgian issues. However, if Georgia started a
military action, "it would be hard to stop the people from
our territory" from becoming involved in the fighting. The
atmosphere, Ivanov repeated, was unsettling and any incident,
even trivial, could lead to an outbreak of hostilities.
"That's why we need the JCC." Ivanov said that no matter how
difficult, Georgia would need to negotiate with the breakaway
provinces.


13. (C) The Ambassador responded that an outbreak of
hostilities would be a disaster for all parties concerned and
urged Russia to intervene with its South Ossetian
interlocutors to underscore the danger of firing upon
Georgian helicopters, noting that a U.S. Senate delegation
had been on a similar helicopter on the same basic flight
path a week before the latest firing incident. Ivanov agreed
that these actions were unacceptable, and that Russia had a
responsibility to urge the South Ossetians to use their heads.

--------------
Georgia: NATO ID
--------------


14. (C) Ivanov stated that he did not understand the
attraction of NATO for Georgia, since it would complicate
matters and compound the lack of trust. At the same time,
Ivanov warned mildly, a step toward NATO, such as Intensified
Dialogue, would make Russia's relations with NATO more
difficult. Accepting Georgia was purely political, not
strategic in nature, he maintained, and -- unlike Central
Europe -- could hardly be justified by geography. While NATO
announced that it would not establish bases in Georgia, the
fact of the NATO relationship would reduce Russia's abilities
in the region. The Caucasus factored squarely in the Kremlin
calculations over security, given its intimate connection to
stability in the North Caucasus and interconnections to the
Middle East.


15. (C) Just as a Socialist-led Spain joined NATO in order

MOSCOW 00010439 004 OF 005


to preclude a return to Francoism, Georgia's embrace of NATO
was designed to provide a military shield against Russia.
Was it really in NATO's interest to get involved, Ivanov
asked, questioning the stability and reliability of the
Georgian regime. By bringing NATO and Russia into conflict,
the ability of the international community to fight terrorism
would be negatively affected. While 9/11 precipitated
unparalleled cooperation, Iraq and other events had eroded
this relationship. Putting Georgia on a membership track in
NATO would hasten this process. The Ambassador responded
that the Alliance would move deliberately and transparently:
it sought to deepen relations with both Georgia and Russia,
on their own terms.

--------------
Transnistria Referendum is a reminder
--------------


16. (C) Whether or not the referendum in Transnistria was
legal, Ivanov noted, "it exists." While Russia would not
recognize the referendum, he insisted that it was a reminder
to Moldova that it needed to negotiate with someone, even
Smirnov. Ivanov ridiculed the notion of Transnistria being
absorbed into Russia. Maybe it could become a part of
Ukraine, he observed, but the specter of a
Russia-Transnistria union was akin to Yugoslavia grafting on
to Belarus. The referendum was effective in measuring the
mood of the population and demonstrating that the breakaway
enclave did not share the political view of Chisinau. Ivanov
urged Moldova to use the referendum to inform its own
negotiating position with the Transnistrian leadership, and
not just the OSCE, EU, UN, or U.S. Ivanov complained that
President Voronov brought nothing new to his meeting with
Putin. "He came, talked, left, but what comes next?," Ivanov
posed. If the Kozak plan was unacceptable, the GOM needed to
put forward other proposals. In contrast to South Ossetia,
where plans were a dime a dozen, there was a dearth of
initiatives in Chisinau and Tiraspol. Ivanov welcomed the
subsiding of tensions over the customs union.

--------------
Ukraine: Move away from polemics
--------------


17. (C) Ivanov noted that the GOR is ready to meet at a
high level with Ukraine, and is waiting for the
Intergovernmental Commissions to commence, chaired by
Presidents Putin and Yushchenko. The Security Council was to
serve as the Secretariat, but Ivanov was unclear with whom he
would be working on the Ukrainian side. There would be an
array of working groups, including on the Black Sea fleet,
with PM Fradkov chairing economic cooperation. Both
governments were avoiding sharp polemics, and attempting to
create a better atmosphere for discussions. Yanukovich, he
predicted, would be able to accomplish a lot after a six
month hiatus of governing in Kiev. On gas, the dialogue
continued, but the reality of new Turkmen gas deal meant that
Ukraine would confront a price hike.

-------------- --------------
Boeing/Sukhoi Sanctions: U.S. punishment for GOR arms sales
-------------- --------------


18. (C) Ivanov raised Boeing, noting the signing of the
titanium deal, and asking the Ambassador for an update on the
commercial aircraft negotiations. The Ambassador noted that
Boeing would likely soon be compelled by the press of other
prospective buyers to sell the 787's that it had reserved for
Russia, pushing back a possible delivery date from 2010 to

2012. He urged the GOR to keep the door open. In a
whispered aside, NSC Deputy Nazarov linked the Boeing sale to
the sanctions imposed on Sukhoi and Rosoboron export, with
Ivanov responding that he was not aware of any direct linkage
between the commercial aircraft deal and the resolution of
the sanctions.


19. (C) The Ambassador briefed Ivanov on his meeting with
Sukhoi, reiterating that the U.S. was prepared to review the
sanctions if there were new GOR information and assurances,
and noting that a Sukhoi executive had accompanied Deputy FM
Kislyak to his meeting with U/S Joseph. Nazarov interjected
that the GOR believed the U.S. should review the case
unilaterally; it was inappropriate for Sukhoi to provide the
USG with assurances, which was the preserve of the MFA.


20. (C) Ivanov noted "in all frankness," that the GOR
assessment was that sanctions were imposed as retribution for
Russian sales to Venezuela and Syria, as a "political signal
and warning" to Sukhoi over its contracts with Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. The GOR had carefully reviewed the
U.S. non-paper and the actions of Rosoboron and Sukhoi.

MOSCOW 00010439 005 OF 005


There was nothing to the U.S. allegations. In the past,
there were instances of leakage to the Iran, of abuse of
Russian export laws; however, that was not the case in this
instance. Rosoboron had no dealings with Iran: it was a
government organ and the GOR knew with precision what was the
scope of its activities. "We know what it did and did not do
and there were no violations," Ivanov repeated. The result,
he said, was a poisoning of the atmosphere: U.S. actions were
not partner-like and had a bearing on other aspects of the
U.S.-Russia strategic relationship. It was difficult for
Russia to build a relationship with the United States and to
adopt a long-term perspective to strategic cooperation when,
at any moment, the U.S. could withdraw and impose sanctions.



21. (C) The Ambassador denied any political calculation to
the sanctions and reaffirmed that the U.S. wanted good
relations with Sukhoi. The U.S. was prepared to review any
new GOR information and assurances. Navarov characterized
the exchange between Deputy FM Kislyak and U/S Joseph as
unproductive: the U.S. expected a written GOR submission, the
GOR believed the onus was on the U.S. to correct the mistaken
application of sanctions.


22. (C) Ivanov noted that he planned to call NSA Hadley
later this week to touch bases on Iran and discuss the status
of relations more broadly.
BURNS