RUSSIAN REACTION TO TORGAU '06 POSTPONEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010230

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: MARR MCAP MOPS PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN REACTION TO TORGAU '06 POSTPONEMENT

REF: A. MOSCOW 9821

B. MOSCOW 9915

C. MOSCOW 7384

D. SECDEF 291710Z AUG 06 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In response to U.S. insistence on extending
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) protection to personnel
participating in this year's Torgau '06 bilateral military
exercise, the GOR seized the initiative to postpone, but not
cancel, the event and left the door open for continued
bilateral military cooperation. Subsequent Russian reaction
has been relatively muted. Both Foreign and Defense Ministry
officials promised to seek State Duma ratification of the
long-awaited NATO SOFA, although timing remains uncertain.
While some commentators cast the postponement as an example
of worsening U.S.-Russia relations, others attributed the
decision to the GOR's desire to avoid public protests against
the deployment of U.S. forces and noted a similar GOR
decision to postpone NATO exercises. Political
considerations likely made postponement an easy decision for
the GOR. END SUMMARY.
.
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SOFA PROTECTION PRECIPITATES POSTPONEMENT
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2. (C) Faced with U.S. insistence that the GOR provide SOFA
protection to U.S. personnel participating in this year's
exercise (Refs C, D),the GOR pre-emptively postponed, rather
than canceled, the event and promised to seek State Duma
ratification of the NATO SOFA signed by FM Sergey Lavrov last
year. The overall tone of discussions with GOR officials has
been business-like, reinforcing the view that Moscow wants to
keep the door open to further military cooperation. Indeed,
a DoD delegation is currently in Moscow to discuss with
Russian counterparts the details of a bilateral workplan.
.
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MEDIA FOCUS MUTED
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3. (SBU) Media coverage of the postponement of Torgau '06
has also been relatively balanced. Most reports focused on
the stated reason for the postponement -- the absence of SOFA
protection for U.S. forces -- but some tried to portray the
decision more generally as an example of worsening
U.S.-Russia relations. Several commentaries, including one
on state-run television, suggested that the decision stemmed
from the GOR's desire to avoid public protests against the
presence of U.S. forces, especially in the month prior to
local and regional elections in various parts of the country.
Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party (KPRF),was
shown on TV calling for action against what he termed the
U.S. aim to establish a "bridgehead" in one of Russia's key
regions.
.
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PRIVATE COMMENTARY MORE POLITICAL
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4. (C) Several contacts told us they were not surprised by
the decision to postpone the exercise. Aleksandr Golts, a
respected defense analyst who often supports positions
contrary to official views, told us that senior Kremlin
officials had become increasingly concerned about KPRF
threats to mobilize protests against the exercise. In his
view, some Kremlin officials were probably pleased to see the
U.S. withdraw from a NATO exercise in Ukraine in May.
However, they did not want to concede political points in
Russia to the communists in the month prior to local and
regional elections -- nor did they want government
authorities to be seen as preventing or breaking up a
demonstration that, in all likelihood, would have found
substantial support among Russia's anti-U.S., anti-NATO
public. Politically, this would have been a lose-lose
situation for the Kremlin and its supporters.


5. (C) Golts went on to say that the Kremlin had made the
decision. He emphasized that the Kremlin wanted to make a
point about the general cooling of bilateral ties with the
U.S. He pointed to several irritants, such as lack of
resolution of WTO negotiations and Senator Richard Lugar's
statement the previous week suggesting an adversarial
relationship with Russia, as motivating the Kremlin decision.
In any case, Golts said there were many in the Defense
Ministry who welcomed the decision to postpone, particularly

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those who continued to view bilateral military ties with the
U.S. through a zero-sum prism. In this context, Golts noted
that only radical military reform within Russia's defense
establishment would lead to real change in Soviet-era
attitudes that in turn might permit deeper military
cooperation with the U.S.


6. (C) Aleksandr Belkin of the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy discounted the KPRF angle, explaining that the
Kremlin viewed Zyuganov and the communists as incapable of
generating substantial public support against the exercise.
Nonetheless, he conceded that the Kremlin did not want to
take any chances prior to local elections next month. Belkin
echoed Golts' view that the Kremlin had made the decision,
partly to signal its displeasure with Washington and the
general cooling of bilateral relations. In Belkin's opinion,
the exercise was an easy target.
.
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NATO EXERCISE ALSO POSTPONED
--------------


7. (C) Isabelle Francois of the NATO Information Office said
she was not surprised by the decision to postpone the
exercise. She noted that the Defense Ministry had postponed
a scheduled NATO exercise in Pskov several weeks previously.
Although the reason given pertained to "timing," Francois
suspected that Russian authorities were nervous about the
prospect of foreign military forces operating in Russia at a
time when public support for closer ties to the Alliance had
recently fallen.
.
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COMMENT
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8. (C) The muted tone of the GOR's announcement of the
postponement of the Torgau exercise indicates a desire not to
let bilateral tensions torpedo the overall mil-mil
relationship. Political considerations made a postponement
convenient, as the Kremlin avoids the need to explain the
presence of foreign military forces just prior to regional
elections. How quickly the Kremlin moves -- or does not move
-- in securing Duma ratification of the NATO SOFA will be a
telling barometer of whether the GOR wants to take some
political risks to advance the mil-mil relationship. The
outcome of this week's bilateral military discussions should
also be insightful in this regard. We will seek to measure
with contacts in the Duma and elsewhere in the coming weeks
the prospects for SOFA ratification.
BURNS