Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW10227
2006-09-13 15:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

BREAKFAST WITH ROGOZIN: TALES OF A KREMLIN PROJECT

Tags:  PGOV PINR RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 010227 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH ROGOZIN: TALES OF A KREMLIN PROJECT


Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice G. Wells: 1.5 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 010227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: BREAKFAST WITH ROGOZIN: TALES OF A KREMLIN PROJECT


Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice G. Wells: 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: As the political season commences, the
rise and fall of former Rodina Party Chairman Dmitry Rogozin
is a cautionary tale for other politicians seeking poster-boy
status in Kremlin electoral projects and a timely reminder of
the ability of the Presidential Administration to intervene
in the political process. One of Russia's most charismatic,
clever, and potentially dangerous politicians, Rogozin is
frustrated by his sojourn in the political wilderness --
which he attributed to his unsettling success in attracting
voters, Orange revolution-era praise of Ukrainian President
Yushchenko, and gullibility in taking on Moscow Mayor Luzhkov
-- and is looking for a way back, through the nationalist
trump card of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, and frozen
conflicts. End Summary

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Putin's Pet
--------------


2. (C) In conjunction with the September 8 release of his
book, "Enemy of the Nation," former Rodina party chairman
Dmitry Rogozin hit the publicity circuit, deigning to
breakfast with us as one stop on his presumed path to
political redemption. Six months following his forced
removal from the party's leadership after a racist television
advertisement culminated in Rodina's exclusion from seven out
of eight regional ballots, Rogozin was hardly contrite as he
fed us his version of his Kremlin-propelled career arc:

-- a self-declared "Putin project," Rogozin came to the
President's attention in 2002 while working on the transit
rights of Russian citizens in Kaliningrad, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Duma's International Relations Committee.
Putin, who liked Rogozin's rhetorical punch and political
effectiveness, offered him leadership of United Russia, but
settled on Rogozin's spearheading of Rodina in 2003, as a
leftist political combination that would bleed support from
the Communists and Zhirinovsky.

-- to the alarm of the Kremlin, Rogozin's blend of Russian
chauvinism and great power nationalism proved "shockingly"
effective and Rodina had the misfortune of garnering "too
many votes," attracting 150,000 members in six months (sic),
and shooting up to second place in the opinion polls and

party fundraising -- second only to Putin and United Russia,
despite a lack of access to administrative resources.
Wistfully recalling his popularity, Rogozin savored one
particular live television debate conducted in prime-time
("they learned; they don't do that anymore"),in which he
purportedly cleaned the clocks of his United Russia
counterpart.

-- misreading the political tea leaves and disturbed by his
visit to Beslan in the aftermath of the terrorist 2004
takeover of the school, Rogozin called then-Ukrainian
presidential candidate Yushchenko and praised "on human
terms" his public condolence over the loss of life. This,
followed by his November 2004 visit to Kiev, donning of an
orange scarf, public embrace with Yushchenko, and
increasingly strident criticism of Putin's failed policy
toward the orange revolution, Rogozin claims, was the last
nail in his political coffin.

-- forgetting that he was on a leash, Rogozin began to stray
too far and ultimately crossed Kremlin redlines, to the anger
of Putin. Believing that he was an opposition politician, he
began to take, and even savor, opportunistic pot-shots at the
President and to adopt crowd-pleasing tactics such as his
February 2005 ten-day hunger strike to protest the cutting of
social subsidies. This, Carnegie analyst Dmitry Trenin told
us, was Rogozin's real sin: he stopped playing at being an
opposition politician and started acting like one.

--------------
Fall from Grace
--------------


3. (C) Rogozin's account of his fall from political grace,
as self-serving, was by his account equally Kremlin-driven:

-- Kremlin anger over Rogozin's agenda and tactics translated
into orders to intimidate and injure Rodina's supporters.
Swearing that one misanthrope was released from jail for
24-hours solely for the purpose of attacking the party's
Volgograd leader with an axe, in exchange for a reduced
sentence, Rogozin said the authorities' message was
unambiguous, particularly when followed by other assaults on
family members of the party leadership and threats to
Rogozin's wife and son.
-- Governors and other regional powerbrokers had "friendly"
conversations with Rodina politicians, spelling out the
consequences of Rogozin's continued chairmanship of the
party. The specter of other strong-arm tactics -- including
stripping Rodina of its name and disqualifying its
registration -- were raised.

-- Defacto barred from television, Rogozin maintained that
it was the government-influenced mass media that worked
overtime to create the image of Rogozin as a pro-Hitler,
anti-US, "monster" inciting skinhead attacks. The infamous
advertisement run during the Moscow city elections implicitly
disparaging people "of Caucasian nationality" and promoting
"Russia for Russians" was, he first insisted, really about
sanitary conditions in the capital. When criticized by us
for inciting ethnic tensions, Rogozin took a different tack
and said he had been encouraged by the Kremlin to take on
Moscow Mayor Luzhkov where he was vulnerable -- illegal
immigration. Luzhkov won. While Rogozin railed against the
Mayor's corrupt practices, he grudgingly admired his chutzpah
in having Liberal Democratic Party leader (and outspoken
xenophobe) Zhirinovsky lead the charge against Rodina in the
courts that ultimately led to the party's disqualification in
seven of eight regional elections.

--------------
Courting Public Opinion
--------------


4. (SBU) Rogozin told us of his continued desire to be a
player, but, he insisted, not in a toothless parliamentary
body. The answer, he maintained, was to kick-start a social
movement based on Great Slav unity, which in separate press
interviews he articulated as promoting the union of Russia
and Belarus, the right of dual citizenship in Ukraine, the
protection of ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltics, and
the cause of the frozen conflicts. Mikhail Demurin, head of
Rodina's International Department, elaborated to us the
party's dissatisfaction over the "corporate" foreign policy
espoused by the Kremlin. Rather than split the wealth among
insiders, he said, Rodina believed that Russia should be
prepared to pay a price -- in subsidized oil and gas, and
other preferential trade and security regimes -- to maintain
influence over former republics. While Rogozin sits outside
the party structure for "tactical considerations," he
affirmed to us that the would continue to throw his weight
behind Rodina and its nationalist agenda.


5. (C) More neutral observers testify to Rodina's -- and
specifically Rogozin's -- electoral drawing power. Golos
Director Lilia Shebanova told us that despite Rogozin's
sidelining, the party has by Russian standards a deep bench
of energetic regional representatives. Rogozin's blend of
nationalism and chauvinism, while alienating a strata of the
elite, generated a stable bedrock of support. Shebanova and
political representatives across the spectrum predicted
Rodina's reelection to the Duma, with or without a merger.
Demurin noted that Rodina's 11 percent placement in the one
republic that it was permitted to contest elections was
achieved despite ethnic Russians constituting less than half
the population. Carnegie's Trenin predicted that Rogozin's
social movement would not amount to much, but did leave the
deposed party leader well-positioned to leave political limbo
when the next opportunity presented itself.

--------------
Comment
--------------


6. (C) Rogozin is clinical when discussing tactics for
resurrecting his public profile and political standing, and
lacks any of the fervor typically associated with the
nationalist wing in Russia. He shrugged off our concern over
his track record and agenda: this was politics, not personal.
His ability to find a local publisher, albeit one that
specializes in xenophobic and anti-Semitic literature (a
sampling: "Masons in Power in Russia," "For Motherland! For
Stalin!", "Judaic Yoke") indicates that he is not beyond the
Kremlin's political pale. By rededicating himself to
"patriotic" causes, Rogozin clearly hopes to become a player
in the 2007-2008 election campaigns and (as his purported
effort to curry favor with the Kremlin by challenging Luzhkov
demonstrates) is not picky about which camp he occupies, as
long as it provides a visible political berth.
BURNS