Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK795
2006-07-31 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION COALITION SET TO LAUNCH THREE-STEP

Tags:  PGOV PHUM BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #0795/01 2121326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311326Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4798
INFO RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0095
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 3378
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3529
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0336
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 1742
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 3754
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 3394
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1235
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000795 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION COALITION SET TO LAUNCH THREE-STEP
DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN

REF: A. MINSK 692


B. MINSK 629

C. MINSK 707

D. MINSK 764

E. MINSK 442

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CONSTANCE PHLIPOT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000795

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION COALITION SET TO LAUNCH THREE-STEP
DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN

REF: A. MINSK 692


B. MINSK 629

C. MINSK 707

D. MINSK 764

E. MINSK 442

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CONSTANCE PHLIPOT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D
)


1. (C) Summary: Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met with United
Democratic Forces (UDF) Political Council member Viktor
Ivashkevich to discuss the UDF's preparations for the
tentatively scheduled 2007 municipal elections and the new
executive body that was formed to implement the coalition's
plan of action (Ref A). Despite the concern of some UDF
leaders, former opposition presidential candidate and overall
leader of the UDF Aleksandr Milinkevich selected Ivashkevich
to serve as the head of the executive arm, or Secretariat.
Ivashkevich outlined the UDF's three-step strategy for
promoting democratic change, which emphasizes intense
regional travel for Milinkevich and voter mobilization for
the upcoming municipal elections. The creation of the
Secretariat may be an indication that the opposition is

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trying to focus more on voter outreach than on internal
disputes. End Summary.

Ivashkevich Leads Secretariat
--------------


2. (C) On July 25, deputy leader of the Belarusian Popular
Front (BPF) and former mass activities planner for
Milinkevich's campaign team Viktor Ivashkevich explained to
Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff the UDF's plans for the local and
district council elections that are to be held in January.
The Political Council (PC) agreed to form an executive body,
a Secretariat, in charge of implementing the campaign
strategy and one-year plan. Milinkevich wanted leader of the
Belarusian Communist Party (BCP) Sergey Kalyakin to chair the
Secretariat, but the latter refused, allowing Milinkevich's

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second choice, Ivashkevich, to assume the position.


3. (C) Pol/Econ Chief noted that some UDF members have
expressed concern that a staunch BPF activist like
Ivashkevich would only exacerbate party tensions in the
coalition, but Ivashkevich replied that he has yet to hear
any complaints. Ivashkevich is working with the UDF PC, the
supreme organ of the coalition, to select the coalition
members who will staff the departments within the

Secretariat. Currently, Ivashkevich envisions the creation

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of at least seven departments: preparation of democracy and
election related material, distribution of material, legal
affairs, volunteer recruitment, volunteer training, mass
demonstrations, and international affairs.

The Three-Step Plan
--------------


4. (C) The plan of action approved by the PC consists of
three parts. The first stage calls for mobilizing and
recruiting volunteers to support the campaigns of the UDF
local election candidates. In September and October, UDF
leader and former opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr
Milinkevich will visit 28 regional cities that make up
approximately 50 percent of Belarus' voters to strengthen
support for the UDF and its candidates.


5. (C) The second stage is to coordinate and support
campaigns for the selected candidates during the months of
November and December. The UDF plans to coordinate the
selection process for at least 150 candidates in the 28
regional cities on Milinkevich's tour. UDF's individual
parties and member organizations have yet to submit to the
Secretariat lists of candidates, but Ivashkevich suspects the

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UDF will require aspiring candidates to collect at least 200
signatures of voter support. Ivashkevich knows that it may
be difficult to find 150 willing candidates (ref B),but
signature collection will help to avoid or minimize
inter-party struggles. The final stage is to wait for the
election results, assess the immediate political impact of
possibly higher gas prices (ref C),and determine whether an
active push for new presidential and parliamentary elections

would be prudent.

Secretariat Aware Of Early Election Threat

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--------------


6. (C) Ivashkevich stressed that the UDF campaign strategy
was created on the assumption that municipal elections will
be held in January 2007. When Pol/Econ Chief asked about
rumors the elections could be moved to Fall 2006, Ivashkevich
said if that were the case, the announcement would come
sometime in August. (Note: According to Belarusian law, the
GOB is to announce the date of elections no later than 90
days before Election Day.) However, Ivashkevich reassured
Pol/Econ Chief that should this happen, the UDF would quickly
make the necessary adjustments to its campaign strategy.

Where Support Lies
--------------


7. (C) According to Ivashkevich, the UDF is receiving
increasing help from three sources. Trade unions, although
small and occupied with their own activities, are helping the
UDF distribute information in work places. Another group,
which Ivashkevich dubbed the "Freedom Volunteers," consists
of 100 independent, unaffiliated youths who agree to support
the UDF, though not be under its control. Although
Ivashkevich called the Freedom Volunteers an uncontrollable
group, he claimed they were a source of "new blood" for the
opposition. Entrepreneurs under the business interest NGO
Perspektiva, traditionally a non-political group, are
involving themselves as well in the UDF movement. (Note: In a
separate meeting with Perspektiva leader Anatoly Shumshchenko
on July 28, Shumshchenko denied Perspektiva was involved in
the UDF movement or that the UDF approached them for
assistance. However, he said that Perspektiva would not
refuse help to the UDF if asked.)

Internal UDF Problems More or Less Resolved
--------------


8. (C) Ivashkevich assured Pol/Econ Chief that this summer's
power struggle between Lebedko and Milinkevich (Ref D) had
been more or less resolved and Milinkevich's position as UDF
leader was no longer questioned. (Note: Recent press reports
on the state of play in the coalition indicate otherwise.)
According to Ivashkevich, the UCP and BCP backed down because
they did not have much support within the UDF and realized
that if they seceded, they would receive as much material and
financial support as they would as part of the UDF.


9. (C) When Pol/Econ Chief raised the concern of several
leading organizations that felt they were being excluded from
the decision-making process in the UDF's presidential
campaign, Ivashkevich agreed that their concern was
understandable. However, he pointed out that the umbrella
organization Belarusian Assembly of NGOs has observer status
on the PC and, in theory, represents most NGOs. Ivashkevich
stressed there must be structure in the UDF and that NGOs
should funnel their proposals through the Assembly.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Milinkevich originally wanted Kalyakin to chair the
Secretariat and asked him four times to fill the position.

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Based on the complaints Emboffs heard about Ivashkevich's
lackluster performance during the presidential election
campaign and his poor planning of the April 26 Chernobyl
March (Ref E),Kalyakin probably would have been a better
choice. Regardless, credit should be given to the UDF for
finally turning their words into actions by forming a
campaign strategy and an implementing body well in advance of
the local elections.
Phlipot