BELARUS ON THE EVE OF THE G8 SUMMIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000719

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS ON THE EVE OF THE G8 SUMMIT

REF: MINSK 708

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Many in the Belarusian opposition are hopeful G-7
leaders will raise Belarus at the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg
in an effort to convince Russia to stop both its support for
the repressive Lukashenko regime and its efforts to establish
a union with Belarus that could extinguish defacto Belarusian
independence. Since Lukashenko's March 19 re-election, which
many consider the tacit support Putin gave Lukashenko
facilitated, Lukashenko has come under great pressure from
Russia to pay his bill for that support - namely to allow
Russian companies to own and control the strategic pipelines
connecting the Russian gas and oil system to Western Europe
and to move on holding a referendum to create a "more perfect
union" of the two countries effectively making Belarus a more
perfect vassal state.


2. (C) Faced with hostility from the U.S. and the EU and
these pressures from Russia, Lukashenko is clearly feeling
the heat. The opposition's nightmare is that Lukashenko will
have no choice but to submit to Moscow's diktat resulting in
neither a more democratic nor an independent Belarus. Giving
in to Russian control would reduce Lukashenko's power but
probably not affect his regime's repression of the opposition
whom Russia sees as proponents of a pro-U.S.-EU orientation
for Belarus.


3. (C) Opposition leader Milinkevich, who sent an appeal to
G-8 leaders (reftel),sees maintaining Belarus' independence
against Russian pressure as even more important than
promoting democratic change in Belarus. He has even said he
would support Lukashenko if it meant keeping Belarus
independent. He calls for the G-7 to exert maximum pressure
on Russia to prevent it from effectively taking over Belarus.
He harbors little hope Putin could ever be persuaded to
promote democratic change in Belarus.


4. (C) For his part Lukashenko has not appealed to the G-8
but has made public statements criticizing Russian pressures
and claims he would never surrender Belarusian political
independence or economic control to Russia. The regime
continues to laud its relations with Russia but now states
that China is Belarus' most important strategic partner as a
hedge against pressures from the West and Russia.


5. (C) As for the prospects for democratic change, despite
the surprising turnout of support for the opposition March
19, currently the opposition seems to be losing the momentum
it was building among the population during the shortly
contested and highly manipulated presidential elections.
Leadership rivalries and the penchant for opposition leaders
to spend their time on foreign trips seeking foreign support
rather than building up support among the Belarusian people
have damaged the opposition leadership in the eyes of many
who came out to demonstrate for change March 19 and March 25.
But a new generation of activists less connected to the old
opposition structures seems to be emerging.


6. (C) In the meantime the regime continues its repressive
actions against its opponents but with increasingly mixed
results. The sense even in government circles is that Belarus
is entering a transition phase with the old leadership,
including Lukashenko and the old opposition, on their way out
in the next five years. The question is what comes after -
an independent democratic Belarus, an independent but still
authoritarian Belarus, or a Belarus under tighter Russian
control neither independent nor democratic.


Krol