OPPOSITION LEADER OUTLINES MULTIPLE PROBLEMS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000692

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREF BO
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER OUTLINES MULTIPLE PROBLEMS IN
COALITION, BUT IS STILL HOPEFUL

REF: MINSK 588

Classified By: Ambassador Krol for Reasons 1.4 B and D


1. (C) Summary: During a June 26 meeting with Ambassador,
pro-democracy Belarusian Party of Communist (BPC) head
Aleksandr Kalyakin described the United Democratic Forces
(UDF) plan of action outlining "concrete" measures to
coordinate the activities of the UDF leaders and to mobilize
activists. Kalyakin expressed frustration with UDF
presidential nominee Aleksandr Milinkevich's tendency to act
as the representative of the UDF without consulting with
other UDF leaders. Kalyakin commented that if Milinkevich
wants to lead the UDF, he must demonstrate leadership and
cooperate with other UDF leaders. Kalyakin denied rumors
that the coalition is disbanding and dismissed the GOB
proposal to unite BPC with the pro-government communist
party. Kalyakin claimed Lukashenko is losing some of the
personal control he had over all aspects of the government
and that other members of his regime are making decisions for
him. He encouraged more U.S. engagement of Belarusian
officials despite GOB roadblocks. Kalyakin pra
ised U.S. financial sanctions on members of the Lukashenko
regime as a strong symbolic gesture but cautioned against
expanding the list for fear of losing the support of people
within the regime who want change. End Summary.


New UDF Year Long Strategy Plan Effective July 2006
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Belarusian Party of Communist (BPC) head Aleksandr
Kalyakin told Ambassador that he and the other United
Democratic Forces' (UDF) leaders, Aleksandr Milinkevich,
Anatoly Lebedko, and Vintsuk Vyachorka, met in Vilnius during
the week of June 19 to flesh out the coalition's strategy
that was adopted by the UDF Political Council at the end of
May (reftel). They created a two-page 12-step plan of action
for July 2006-July 2007 that attempts to provide more
concrete measures on how leaders can better coordinate the
actions of the respective parties can mobilize people who
want change (see paragraph 20 for an unofficial translation
of the action plan).


3. (C) According to Kalyakin, Milinkevich offered Kalyakin
the position of coordinator of this action plan, but Kalyakin
stated that he was reluctant to take on such a project
without knowing what actions are being contemplated.


4. (C) Kalyakin acknowledged that people are looking for
direction and instruction. He admitted "the UDF has been on
hiatus" since the April 26 Chernobyl opposition march.
Kalyakin recognized that the UDF needs to engage people now;
otherwise, they will consider the UDF defunct.

Redefining Milinkevich's Role in the UDF
--------------


5. (C) Kalyakin told Ambassador that he had a frank
conversation with Milinkevich about Milinkevich's role in the
UDF. Kalyakin reminded Milinkevich that he was selected to
be the UDF's presidential candidate, but the presidential
campaign is over and he must work with others as an equal.
Kalyakin stressed if Milinkevich aspires to lead the UDF, he
must demonstrate leadership. Milinkevich's actions and
remarks must reflect the agreed views of the UDF, not only
his personal positions.


6. (C) The BPC leader is also frustrated with Milinkevich
repeatedly accepting invitations to travel abroad to meet
with foreign leaders as the representative of the UDF without
consulting other UDF leaders. (Note: He noted that
Milinkevich provides read-outs of the trips for the UDF
leaders after he returns but does not consult with them
before he goes to develop an agreed message.) Kalyakin
admitted that this problem might work itself out because the
leaders have agreed to meet more regularly to coordinate
actions and plans and share information.


7. (C) Kalyakin intimated to Ambassador that with the
conclusion of the elections, there is no need for Milinkevich
to remain the de facto UDF representative. Although he did
not articulate a clear position on the need for holding
another democratic congress, Kalyakin did suggest to

Ambassador that maybe someone besides Milinkevich could be
selected to represent the UDF when the next presidential
election comes along. In the meantime, Kalyakin told
Ambassador that the Communist party will promote its own
candidates for the January 2007 municipal elections, "as
political parties do", but that it will continue to work
within the framework of the UDF.

Milinkevich Continues to Agitate Russia
--------------


8. (C) Kalyakin downplayed any threat from Russia to
Belarusian independence and said Milinkevich's practice of
raising Russia as a threat to Belarus' independence only
served to drive away Russian support for the democratic
opposition. He claimed Milinkevich's public statements on
this issue do not reflect the view of all the democratic
leaders.


9. (C) Kalyakin claimed from his Moscow contacts that Russia
is actively looking for Lukashenko's successor. Kalyakin
claimed that Russian President Putin does not want Lukashenko
in power on the eve of the 2008 Russian presidential
elections. According to Kalyakin, Putin wants to squelch
once and for all Lukashenko's longstanding ambition to become
a leader of Russia. Kalyakin added that Russia finds
Milinkevich unacceptable as a leader and is looking for a
successor within the regime.


10. (C) Ambassador asked Kalyakin how Russia perceives him.
Kalyakin responded that generally the Russians accept him and
treat him well, but he claimed the Communist Party in Russia
has a poor reputation and thus the title of his party,
Belarusian Party of Communists, also draws a negative
reaction in many Russian circles. When Ambassador inquired
whether Kalyakin had ever considered changing the party from
Communist to Social Democrat, Kalyakin responded that he is
open to it, but does not expect his party activists to
approve such a proposal. Kalyakin referred to the further
splintering of the Social Democratic party when it had
attempted to unite with the Communist party in the past.

UDF Looking to Expand, Not Disband
--------------


11. (C) Kalyakin told Ambassador that rumors about a crisis
within the UDF Coalition are exaggerated. Kalyakin admitted
that the leaders have different opinions on important issues
but that no one wants to leave the coalition.


12. (C) When Ambassador inquired about expanding the UDF to
include Aleksandr Kozulin's party Belarusian Social
Democratic Party (BSDP) - Gramada, Kalyakin responded the UDF
would like to explore ways to bring BSDP into the coalition.
With Kozulin still in prison, the UDF leaders are trying to
discuss options with BSDP deputies including Anatoliy
Levkovich. While UDF would like to fold the BSDP party into
the UDF, Kalyakin admitted that personal issues between
Milinkevich and Kozulin and internal BSDP factions could make
the union difficult, if not impossible. The UDF would like
to pursue parallel actions if union is not possible.

Kalyakin Recognizes the Importance of Domestic Travel
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Kalyakin told Ambassador that the UDF plans to focus
more on travel within Belarus. Kalyakin did not see the
usefulness of a lot of travel by the opposition leaders
outside of Belarus; coalition efforts need to work to engage
Belarusians, not foreign peoples.


14. (C) According to Kalyakin, U.S. NGO IRI's local
representative in Vilnius Trygve Olsen has planned a trip for
Kalyakin, Milinkevich, Lebedko and Vyachorka to the U.S. from
July 22-27. Kalyakin told Ambassador that he is not keen
about the trip; he believes that the UDF needs to focus on
Belarus and that a trip to the U.S. would not be the best use
of this time.

Kalyakin's Party Will Not Unite with GOB Counterpart
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Kalyakin dismissed the regime's proposal to hold a
conference on July 15 to combine the pro-government Communist

Party of Belarus and Kalyakin's Belarusian Party of
Communists as a project of the Presidential Administration.
Kalyakin believes that this conference is a construct of
Presidential Administration first deputy head Anatoly
Rubinov. He pondered whether Lukashenko even supported the
idea.

U.S. Travel and Financial Sanctions Have Symbolic Value
-------------- --------------


16. (C) Kalyakin praised the U.S. financial sanctions on
members of the Belarusian regime as a symbolic gesture, but
predicted that they will not have much practical impact since
GOB authorities do not have U.S. bank accounts or travel
often to the U.S. Kalyakin cautioned against widening the
sanctions too broadly for fear they would turn supporters of
change within the regime into hardcore regime supporters.


17. (C) Kalyakin encouraged the USG and EU to continue to
invite local GOB officials and Parliament members to meet
their western counterparts. Kalyakin described the exchanges
as invaluable exposure and learning experiences. Continuing
to engage officials shows these Belarusians that there are
alternatives to what the regime preaches.

Lukashenko Losing Control?
--------------


18. (C) According to Kalyakin, since the elections
Lukashenko has "lost his edge." He claimed that Lukashenko
no longer has so much personal control over all aspects of
the government as before and that officials now receive their
instructions from people other than Lukashenko. Kalyakin
asserted that decisions previously made by Lukashenko himself
are now being made by Presidential Administration first
deputy head Rubinov or State Secretary of Belarusian Security
Council Viktor Sheiman.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) Kalyakin appeared to be optimistic, despite the
obvious problems within the UDF hierarchy. According to
Kalyakin, the regime is facing grave internal problems, the
countryside is tired of the regime, and Lukashenko's
unpredictability weighs heavily on many GOB officials. We
have heard from Milinkevich that Kalyakin had come back from
several trips to Moscow "a changed man" - more pro-Moscow and
less of a personal supporter. This conversation confirms
some of Milinkevich's suspicions, but frankly we heard
nothing new in the position Kalyakin described. Kalyakin has
always been less prone to attack Moscow and as a party leader
he too views Milinkevich not as his boss, but as a fellow
leader and possible rival.


20. Begin Text of Unofficial Translation of UDF Action Plan


GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FORCES
FOR July 2006-July 2007


I. Increase the effectiveness of the UDF's actions

-Form a positive image of the UDF as a unified, strong,
patriotic coalition;
-Widen the membership of the UDF;
-Perfect the structures and competence of the UDF's working
departments;
-Increase the popularity of the UDF leader among the
population;

II. Create a positive and attractive image of the future
Belarus after change (of government)

-Prepare a program of development for Belarus;
-Organize a large public discussion on the future Belarus.
Collect and analyze citizens' suggestions for the program of
development of the country;
-Inform society about the program and organizational and
personnel alternatives to the current government;
-Form a team to run the country and create a positive image
of this team;
-Write legislative bills;
-Analyze the current and possible crises and negative

tendencies in Belarus' future. Create an anti-crisis program
for the UDF;

III. Declare the current power illegitimate

-Work on the Belarusian citizens' denouncement and abolition
of the March 19 2006 election results;
-Inform citizens of the authorities' malicious violations of
law and citizens' rights and how they ignore citizens'
interests;
-Inform the population about the negative tendencies in
Belarus' current development and the lack of prospects for
the existing political and social-economic course;
-Criticize the authorities' actions;

IV. Penetrate the information blockade

-Support and develop existing information sources and create
new ones (i.e., Internet, local computer sites, mobile
telephone connections, TV and radio broadcasts, newspapers,
magazines, booklets, books, leaflets, audio-video cassettes
and discs);
-Create public sites of information product distribution;
-Specifically inform important population groups (i.e.,
students, teachers, doctors, pensioners, entrepreneurs,
religious groups, women, soldiers, workers of non-government
enterprises, large factories, government apparatus, judicial
organs, etc.);
-Hold meetings between UDF representatives and the population;


V. Public mobilization "Volunteers of Freedom"

-Prepare and distribute mobilization messages, signs,
armbands, t-shirts, flags, stickers, placards, and calendars.
Hold local demonstrations (similar to flash-mobs);
-Sign up people to the "Volunteers of Freedom" in party
offices and NGOs, at mass events, pickets, and at apartment
entrances;
-Organize the liquidation of illiteracy among the "Volunteers
of Freedom" (by educating them) on the history and culture of
Belarus, political science, geopolitics, etc.;
-Hold training sessions with activists on different courses
of action and organization for their practical jobs;
-Campaign to gather resources in Belarus;

VI. Protect people from repression and provide assistance to
overcome the consequences

-Formulate instructions and hold training sessions for
activists;
-Provide legal assistance in the courts and punitive
government departments;
-Help the families of the oppressed;
-Find jobs for those fired;
-Ensure the possibility for those expelled from educational
institutions to continue their studies;
-Organize health recuperation for victims of oppression;
-Create a "black list" of human right violations and bring
the charges to the public's attention;
-Carry out a campaign to free political prisoners, called
"Solidarity in the Name of Freedom";
-Work with international human rights organizations and
philanthropy organizations;

VII. Organize political campaigns during local council
elections

-Formulate and implement a strategy for the campaign;

VIII. Conduct the campaign by collecting citizens' signatures
under political and social-economic demands

-Assess the actual problems that would be the reason to
collect signatures;
-Organize a signature collection campaign;

IX. Mass demonstrations of pressure and protest

-Develop and realize a prospective plan of general mass
actions;
-Organize a discussion in the independent press about the
possibility of organizing in 2007 a countrywide, peaceful
protest and a mass manifest demanding free elections;


X. Monitor public-political and social-economic processes and
public opinions in Belarus

XI. International action

-Pass UDF messages to the international community;
-Work with other governments, their institutes, parliaments,
civil societies, and embassies;

XII. Congress of Democratic Forces

-The Congress of democratic forces would convene if
necessary.

End Text.
Krol