Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK588
2006-06-05 12:45:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

TEN PLUS APPROVES TWO-YEAR STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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SUBJECT: TEN PLUS APPROVES TWO-YEAR STRATEGY


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SUBJECT: TEN PLUS APPROVES TWO-YEAR STRATEGY


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1. (U) Summary: The Ten Plus Coalition's Political Council on
May 22 approved a two-year plan aimed at removing Belarusian
dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko and promoting democracy. The
plan concentrates most of its energy in the "For Freedom"
movement, which calls for pro-democratic civil society groups
and NGOs to join forces with the Ten Plus. Although the plan
states that the Ten Plus is to abide by resolutions set forth
by the October Congress of Democratic Forces, former
Coalition presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich and
his team appear to be assuming the executive position in
implementing the plan and controlling the "For Freedom"
movement. United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoly Lebedko
abstained from voting, fearing the plan would weaken the
UCP's internal power structure and Lebedko's position within
the Coalition. End Summary.

"For Freedom" Priorities
--------------


2. (U) On May 22 the Ten Plus Coalition's Political Council
approved the opposition's two-year strategy aimed at removing
Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko from power and
promoting democratic reform via the "For Freedom" campaign.
(Note: The strategy, in Belarusian, is located on
Milinkevich's website http://by.milinkevich.org.) The
campaign's political objective is to shape an independent and
democratic Belarus, prevent Belarus' political and economic
islation, and ensure separate legislative, executive, and
judicial branches that "honor freedom and huan dignity."
The strategy calls for democratic pesidential and
parliamentary elections and peaceful means to force
Lukashenko to resign.

Mobilization
--------------


3. (U) The "For Freedom" campaign begins with opposition
forces identifying and finding solutions to the potential
economic and social consequences following price hikes in
imported Russian energy. The opposition is then to inform
Belarusians about the potential crisis and mobilize the
public should the government fail to alleviate the problems.

The Troops
--------------


4. (U) The two-year strategy relies on three groups to
implement the "For Freedom" campaign. The first group
includes the political parties and civil-society
organizations of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) that

worked "effectively" during the 2006 presidential campaign
and have the "knowledge," "motivated members,"
"administrative resources," and an "established information
distribution system." The second group is former Ten Plus
presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich-who, according
to the strategy, "must be recognized as the alternative to
Lukashenko"--and his campaign team. The final group includes
entrepreneurs, students, contract employees, religious
groups, and others who participated in the elections, but
were not affiliated with the "official" opposition. The
strategy acknowledges that the main obstacle in working with
the last group would be transforming its "protest energy"
into preparedness and coordination (translation: keeping them
under the UDF's control).

New Members
--------------


5. (U) The strategy encourages pro-democratic individuals and
groups to work together with the Ten Plus Coalition. Leaders
of democratic political parties would be invited to join the
UDF and civil society representatives (i.e., Protestants,
intelligentsia, and business circle initiatives) are invited
to serve as advisors. Chairpersons of civil NGOs that
support the "For Freedom" campaign but are not represented at
the Political Council would be invited to a monthly civil
forum.

Continued Support
--------------


6. (U) The campaign stresses the need to provide "rapid and
real" support to victims of GOB repression. The opposition
must continue demanding the release of all political
prisoners, the suspension of politically motivated criminal
cases, and access to independent press and alternative
sources of information.

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Defining the Leadership
--------------


7. (U) The two-year strategy directs the UDF leadership to
abide and operate in accordance to resolutions passed by the
Congress of Democratic Forces, but the Political Council
(currently headed by Milinkevich) would implement the "For
Freedom" campaign. Although the plan orders the Political
Council to elect a leader and committee members by June 15,
it is construed to give Milinkevich a clear advantage,
allowing him to transform his established network of regional
and local election campaign headquarters into branches of the
"For Freedom" executive committee.

A Unanimous Vote(Nearly
--------------


8. (SBU) Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) deputy Ales
Yanukevich on May 24 told Poloff that UCP deputy Aleksandr
Dobrovolsky, Milinkevich campaign team member Viktor
Kornyenko, and leader of the BPF Vintsuk Vyachorka drafted
the strategy. The Political Council reviewed it twice before
passing it almost unanimously. According to Yanukevich, UCP
leader Anatoly Lebedko abstained because he feared the plan
would weaken the UCP's power structure and, most importantly,
his high position within the UDF. The Political Council
voted down Lebedko's motion to hold another Congress of
Democratic Forces to launch the "For Freedom" campaign and
define the Coalition's leadership.

Comment
--------------


9. (SBU) The two-year strategy could be a step forward in
promoting opposition unity, although some observers complain
the strategy should have been adopted much earlier if the
opposition wanted to capitalize on the momentum of the 2006
presidential elections. Milinkevich told Ambassador on May
22 it was disappointing it took the Ten Plus two months after
the elections to formulate a strategy and reach out to civil
society and other pro-democratic groups. The clauses that
more or less consolidate Milinkevich's position as leader of
the Political Council and, hence, the Coalition could fan the
flames of the power struggle between UCP's Lebedko and
Milinkevich, as it is clear Lebedko does not entirely agree
with the adopted strategy and may try to strike out on his
own. Such a division would damage opposition unity at a time
when they need to be consolidating and cooperating. Lebedko
on May 23 told Ambassador, however, that he had no intention
of leaving the Coalition and simply wants to strengthen the
stra
tegy by making it more specific and action-oriented than
hortatory. Our constant message to both Milinkevich and
Lebedko and the opposition as a whole is to remain unified
and not weaken themselves by divisions.

Krol