BELARUS NAMES FOR ASSET FREEZE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB AND INR/B
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO OFAC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS NAMES FOR ASSET FREEZE


Classified By: DCM CONSTANCE PHLIPOT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Post provides the following information to supplement
that gathered by the Department in consideration of placing
assets freezes on certain Belarusian regime officials.


Natalya Petkevich
--------------


2. (C) Natalya Petkevich: Petkevich was appointed as Deputy
Head of the Presidential Administration in November 2004.
The PA announced she was given the specific assignment to,
"supervise work to improve the legislative basis of the
country, coordinate the activities of the presidential legal
agencies and the judiciary, and maintain contact with the
legislature." A lawyer by training, Petkevich has been in
charge of drafting and getting passed new legislation, as
well as preparing numerous presidential decrees. Since
Petkevich took office Lukashenko has signed a number of
decrees specifically aimed at cutting off financing for
pro-democracy forces and civil society, as well as aimed at
closing political parties, NGOs and independent newspapers.


3. (C) In addition, under Petkevich's direction the GOB has
adopted several new laws aimed specifically against the
democratic opposition, including but not limited to:
restrictive new political party and NGO laws (05 Minsk 884),
an "extremism law" aimed at opposition political activities
(05 Minsk 1363),amendments to the criminal code outlawing
much political activity and making it a crime to "discredit"
Belarus or its government (05 Minsk 1437 and 1537),as well
as several laws aimed to curtail the flow of resources to the
opposition. These laws have been used to jail a number of
pro-democracy activists (specifically Minsk 327, 393 and
205),and to accuse pro-democracy forces of terrorism (Minsk
281). (Note: Presidential decrees in Belarus take precedence
over laws, and do not require confirmation by parliament.
While parliament has the constitutional responsibility to
approve laws, in practice it is a rubber stamp body that
merely approves legislation proposed by the Presidential
Administration. Only
in rare cases has parliament challenged a proposed law, and
then only on relatively technocratic issues (see 04 Minsk
1379).)


Viktor Lukashenko
--------------


4. (C) Viktor Lukashenko: Formally the president's National
Security Advisor, by many accounts Viktor is also de facto
Head of Presidential Security. Reliable sources in both the
Milinkevich and Kozulin camps told us Viktor personally
commanded units involved in the March 24 dismantling of the
protest tent city and the March 25 crackdown on a peaceful
march. In both cases police under Viktor's direct command
beat a number of pro-democracy activists. For instance, on
March 24, OMON commander Yury Podobed could be heard on tape
telling his troops not to mistreat detainees. However,
numerous detainees reported to us and to human rights groups
that they were beaten and abused by Presidential Security
troops under Viktor Lukashenko's command (Minsk 337). Post
has reliably heard that Viktor ordered his troops to use
violence on those dates. Viktor also reportedly holds a
position on the Security Council, which includes supervision
over SOBR, Almaz, Presidential Security and the BKGB. These
units were all use
d to arrest and beat peaceful pro-democracy activists.


5. (C) The president briefly appointed his son Viktor as
deputy head of the newly founded BEST state-owned cell phone
company in 2005 (despite his complete lack of experience in
the field),and Viktor held a senior position in the State
Military Industrial Committee, where he was reportedly
responsible for clandestine arms transfers to the Middle East
(05 Minsk 470).


Dmitry Lukashenko
--------------


6. (C) Dmitry Lukashenko: Given the opaque and secretive
nature of the Lukashenko regime, Post's information on Dmitry
largely consists of hearsay and rumor. However, Post feels
that the wealth of stories of Dmitry's corruption, many from
reliable long-term sources, are indicative that Lukashenko's
sons are both illicitly profiting from their father's rule.
Post strongly argues for inclusion of Dmitry among those
whose assets are being frozen.

7. (C) Post can confirm that Dmitry is Head of the
Presidential Sports Club and lives in the Drozdy compound (a
neighborhood of extremely expensive houses controlled by the
Presidential Administration. Many of these homes were seized
from foreign ambassadors in 1997--05 Minsk 1271). Post can
also confirm that Dmitry is a Lt. Colonel in the Border
Guards. Post cannot confirm if Dmitry is the only example,
but it is extremely unlikely that one as young as Dmitry
could honestly attain such a rank. One reputable source told
Post Dmitry uses his position in the Border Guards to extort
bribes from particularly Lithuanian businessmen attempting to
ship goods across the Belarusian border. Dmitry reportedly
threatens these goods with confiscation if the bribe is not
paid. He is also rumored to own a restaurant frequented by
Minsk's ultra-rich in Minsk's Old Town. Dmitry is known to
drive a black Hummer without license plates. Such a vehicle
is far outside the reach of a Border Guard Lt. Colonel, whose
salary w
ould be under USD 500 a month.


Nikolay Cherginets
--------------


8. (C) Nikolay Cherginets: Cherginets was the head of
Lukashenko's 2001 election campaign. The OSCE observation
mission judged this election as not free and fair. The
OSCE's report on the elections found that Lukashenko's regime
and his executive structures were directly responsible for
major electoral violations. Specific electoral flaws noted
in the OSCE observation report include:

--A political regime that is not accustomed to and does
everything in its power to block the opposition;
--Executive structures with extensive powers, including rule
by presidential decree, that are not balanced by commensurate
legislative controls, and that allow the arbitrary changing
of the electoral environment;
--An election administration system that is overly dependent
on the executive branch of government from the national level
to the local community levels, and is partial;
--A campaign of intimidation directed against opposition
activists, domestic observation organizations, opposition and
independent media, and a smear campaign against international
observers.

In recent Belarusian presidential elections the head of the
incumbent's campaign has wielded tremendous power in
directing the undemocratic conduct of elections. As head of
Lukashenko's campaign in 2001, Cherginets was directly in
charge of the above abuses.


9. (C) Cherginets is also currently leading the fight to
destroy the Union of Belarusian Writers. The UBW is an
independent writer's union that has become actively
pro-democratic. In November 2005 the regime accused the UBW
of becoming involved in politics, so Cherginets (an author of
detective stories) quit the UBW and founded the
pro-Lukashenko Union of Writers of Belarus (UWB). A special
police detachment prevented writers considered to be
insufficiently pro-Lukashenko from attending the UWB's
founding congress. Cherginets personally accused the UBW of
not supporting Lukashenko, and state media launched several
attacks against the UBW. In January the regime told academic
institutions to prevent students and staff from holding UBW
events, but to allow UWB events. The head of the UBW was
fired from his work and stripped of his PhD. Despite
successfully defending itself in court from closure, the
government has kicked the UBW out of its offices and ordered
the organization to pay a massive amount of ba
ck-rent, after the state retroactively raised the UBW's rent.


10. (C) In addition, Cherginets has made a number of public
statements aiding the regime's propaganda. Most egregiously,
he claimed the United States was using chemical weapons in
Afghanistan, and in April 2006 he accused the U.S. of
"returning to the time of the Cold War," and "calling to
overthrow the legally elected authorities in Belarus,"
because of its support for pro-democracy forces.
Krol