MILINKEVICH ON THE LEBEDKO PROBLEM, RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000537

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH ON THE LEBEDKO PROBLEM, RUSSIAN
PRESSURE, AND A NEW STRATEGY

REF: MINSK 520

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: On May 22, Ambassador met with leader of the
unified opposition Aleksandr Milinkevich. Milinkevich had
just completed a long-delayed talk with Anatoly Lebedko, a
likely contender for Milinkevich's position. Milinkevich
stated this talk convinced him Lebedko would not quit the
coalition, and presented only a "medium" problem. Also on
May 22, Milinkevich's 10 Plus coalition is likely to adopt a
post-election strategy, which will guide the coalition in its
relations to NGOs, its attempts to apply pressure on the
regime, and for the distribution of independent information.
The strategy will also stress efforts to defend Belarusian
independence against Russian pressures for unification.
Milinkevich said if necessary he would even work with
Lukashenko to defend Belarus' independence. Meanwhile the
opposition faces continued pressure from the regime and even
some allies. A Milinkevich activist in Schuchin is being
falsely charged with terrorism, Milinkevich was summoned to
the prosecutor over
a Polish newspaper interview, and he privately noted the
Lithuanian government is angry with him for thwarting their
plans to "export" revolution to Belarus. End summary.


Lebedko a "Medium" Problem
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador opened the meeting by explaining that
rumors the USG supports potential rival 10 Plus leader
Anatoly Lebedko (who traveled to Washington the week before
with IRI) are false. The USG advocates there be a single
united opposition. Milinkevich stated he just finished a
one-and-a-half hour private talk with Lebedko, the first in
many months. After this meeting Milinkevich acknowledged the
coalition had some differences with Lebedko and his United
Civic Party, but that this is a "medium" rather than a major
problem. The main difference, Milinkevich claimed, seems to
be that Lebedko insists the 10 Plus hold a new Congress of
Democratic Forces, possibly for October, to decide on new
leadership and a strategy for the coalition. Milinkevich
argued the coalition needs a new strategy now so as not to
lose the momentum and the people it gained during the March
elections. On May 22 the 10 Plus will vote on a
post-election strategy; Milinkevich thought nine of the
coalition's ten member groups (exce
pting the UCP) would support the plan.


3. (C) Milinkevich stressed that he can work with Lebedko,
even though Lebedko has his own ambitions. He did not fear
Lebedko would attempt to quit the coalition. Claiming some
want to dissolve political parties into one movement,
Milinkevich argued that the parties must continue to exist
because once Belarus becomes democratic it will need various
parties for parliament. However, the existence of competing
parties has made it hard to run the coalition and divvy up
high-level positions within the opposition.


The New Strategy
--------------


4. (C) Promising to privately present the opposition's new
strategy once it is approved, Milinkevich hinted at what the
coalition might be doing. He admitted the coalition did a
poor job working with NGOs during the election campaign, with
too many party leaders unsuccessfully trying to give orders
to NGO activists. The 10 Plus will now try meeting monthly
with interested NGOs, through the Association of Democratic
NGOs, to see where they can work together, as a means of
bringing them into the coalition while still allowing the
NGOs their independence. Milinkevich is also trying to build
cooperation with newly forming youth groups, particularly
those responsible for recent flash mobs. He stated that the
coalition now realizes NGOs can operate in ostensibly
non-political fields and still promote democratic development.


5. (C) Under the new strategy the 10 Plus will undertake
three broad campaigns. First, they will seek to increase
pressure on the regime, both domestically and
internationally. In Belarus the coalition is trying to
create conditions to impeach Lukashenko, and will support

strikes in some businesses. Second is distributing
independent information. The coalition is working with
donors to expand access to free radio and newspapers.
Milinkevich claimed the Polish government recently approved
USD 1.5 million for television broadcasting to Belarus (out
of USD 7 million in total aid). The coalition will
strengthen its negative campaign against the regime,
something Milinkevich said was done poorly during the
elections, will distribute leaflets and posters "Za Svabodu"
(For Freedom),and will try to unite workers opposed to the
contract system. Last, he said the coalition will campaign
for "independence." This includes independence from threats
-- for example defending activists who face regime pressures,
as
well as independence for Belarus.


Russia Threatens Belarus' Independence
--------------


6. (C) Milinkevich stated that Russia is applying heavy
pressure on Belarus to join the Union State, and he fears
Russia wants to incorporate Belarus into the Russian
Federation. He said that the vast majority of Belarusians
are against full union with Russia. While a majority might
support economic union, only around 5% actually want to
surrender Belarusian independence. Most Belarusians know
that people live worse in Russia than in Belarus.
Milinkevich said that he has contact with many in the
nomenclatura, and they are against union with Russia as it
would erode their authority. Milinkevich even admitted if
necessary he would even work with Lukashenko to preserve
Belarusian independence, although he admitted Lukashenko
would never initiate such contact, as it would be a sign of
weakness. Arguing that people cannot freely vote without
free information, Milinkevich asked the USG to not recognize
any future referendum on the Russia-Belarus union.


Problems with Some Donors
--------------


7. (C) Responding to Ambassador's question, Milinkevich said
many donors are being very helpful, particularly the
Norwegians, who recently pledged to give a large sum of money
(Milinkevich guessed at USD 1 million) to the Belarusian
opposition. These donors do not have to give support
directly to the 10 Plus, but can give it to other groups who
still support a single democratic strategy. He stressed the
importance of donor coordination. However, Milinkevich
complained at length that many unspecified "imitators" among
international donors cause problems. Without naming names,
he maintained some problem donors are more interested in the
act of providing aid than in seeing any good come from their
assistance.


Differences with Kozulin
--------------


8. (C) Milinkevich plans to meet soon with one of rival
presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin's deputies. He
thinks he can work together with Kozulin, but stated Kozulin
has different goals. This difference is most clearly seen in
the names of the campaigns. Milinkevich explained he is the
leader of a coalition, an "instrument of change," but it is
not his personal coalition, unlike Kozulin whose main aim is
more power, not democratic change. Moreover, Kozulin and his
supporters are more "radical," while Milinkevich favors
"peaceful," non-violent change.


Local Activist Charged with Terrorism
--------------


9. (C) Milinkevich explained that the head of his campaign
team in Schuchin (Grodno district) has been charged with
terrorism and goes to court on May 25. Milinkevich stated
that before the March elections a young man asked the
campaign team if he could campaign on Milinkevich's behalf in
Schuchin, which he subsequently did. However, police
arrested this person for allegedly fighting with a police
officer and stealing construction material. In custody the
young man allegedly told police that Milinkevich's local

campaign team was preparing to conduct terrorist attacks.
Poloff may attend the trial. (Note: Post believes these
charges to be falsifications by the regime to pressure the
opposition. There is no known or suspected connection
between the Belarusian opposition and terrorist acts or
groups.)


10. (C) Milinkevich is not without his own legal problems.
He explained that he had to go to the prosecutor's office
after his meeting with Ambassador to most likely receive a
warning. He said this stems from an interview he gave to a
Polish newspaper, where he said the March beating death of a
Polish diplomat in Grodno was suspicious.


Vilnius Mad at Milinkevich
--------------


11. (C) Milinkevich mentioned privately that he knows the
Lithuanian government is angry at him because he spoiled
their plans to create a revolution in Minsk. He claimed (and
Post has heard from several other sources) that members of
the Lithuanian government were pushing the Belarusian
opposition to use the crowd that came out Election Night in a
bold gesture, such as storming state television or marching
on Lukashenko's office, feeling such a move would ignite
popular feelings against the regime. Milinkevich believes
such actions could only have ended in ruin and bloodshed, and
resisted this pressure. He believed Belarusian society was
not ready for such revolution, and needs more work.


Comment
--------------


12. (C) Despite many successes in unifying and campaigning,
several problems continue to threaten opposition unity. The
main problem continues to be the internal power struggle
between Milinkevich and Lebedko. Their differences however
seem surmountable, although there will be strains. Shortly
after Milinkevich departed the Embassy Lebedko contacted Post
asking for a meeting. Ambassador will once again stress to
him, as he has several times to Milinkevich, the vital
importance of unity. Influenced by the Lebedko-Milinkevich
divide, but also a symptom of a poorly organized and
inexperienced coalition, the 10 Plus failed to work with many
groups that wanted to help during the campaign and wasted two
months developing a post-election strategy. It remains to be
seen if the strategy to be approved May 22 will finally allow
the opposition to take maximum advantage of the opportunities
presented by Lukashenko's clearly falsified electoral
victory.
Krol