Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK531
2006-05-22 07:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:
DESPITE RHETORIC, MOSCOW NOT TO PUSH MINSK HARD
how-toVZCZCXYZ0012 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHSK #0531 1420747 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 220747Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY MINSK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4420 INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 3293 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3461 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1677 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3680 RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3331 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000531
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG BO
SUBJECT: DESPITE RHETORIC, MOSCOW NOT TO PUSH MINSK HARD
REF: MINSK 479
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000531
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG BO
SUBJECT: DESPITE RHETORIC, MOSCOW NOT TO PUSH MINSK HARD
REF: MINSK 479
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) During a recent conversation with Pol/Econ Chief,
Vladimir Pavlenko, Counselor for Internal Political Affairs
in the Russian Embassy, noted that despite strong statements
from Gazprom, the Kremlin would not allow gas prices to stand
in the way of an "extremely close alliance with Belarus."
2. (C) When Pol/Econ Chief commented that Russia seemed
willing to sacrifice its historically close relationship with
Belarus to exact from Lukashenko economic concessions,
Pavlenko responded that his government would not allow gas
prices to lead to economic instability in Belarus. He
explained that Russia was keenly aware of the relationship
between gas prices and Belarus's economic stability, and
therefore Belarus would face only a moderate rise in the
price to at most USD 72/tcm (up from USD 46.68/tcm).
Pavlenko conceded that Russia is not completely satisfied
with Lukashenko. However, he noted the past elections
"proved" Lukashenko is the undisputed leader in Belarus and
there are no "realistic challengers," thus strongly
suggesting that Russia will continue to support the devil it
knows.
3. (C) Comment: Pavlenko's comments seem consistent with
Russia's long-standing approach to Belarus. Against the
backdrop of the Orange and Rose Revolutions, Russia cannot
afford political or economic instability in another former
Soviet republic, especially in neighboring Belarus. This
fear of "losing" Belarus is likely why Moscow waited until
just after the March elections to announce impending
increases in gas costs. Moscow now seems to find itself in
the delicate situation of trying to extract more revenue from
Gazprom's sales to Belarus, while not causing a collapse in
the Belarusian economy. Putin's widely rumored dislike of
Lukashenko is likely to cause Russia to deal sharply with
Minsk, but at the same time it is doubtful the Kremlin wants
to force Lukashenko from power and risk Belarus following
Ukraine out of Russia's orbit.
Krol
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG BO
SUBJECT: DESPITE RHETORIC, MOSCOW NOT TO PUSH MINSK HARD
REF: MINSK 479
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) During a recent conversation with Pol/Econ Chief,
Vladimir Pavlenko, Counselor for Internal Political Affairs
in the Russian Embassy, noted that despite strong statements
from Gazprom, the Kremlin would not allow gas prices to stand
in the way of an "extremely close alliance with Belarus."
2. (C) When Pol/Econ Chief commented that Russia seemed
willing to sacrifice its historically close relationship with
Belarus to exact from Lukashenko economic concessions,
Pavlenko responded that his government would not allow gas
prices to lead to economic instability in Belarus. He
explained that Russia was keenly aware of the relationship
between gas prices and Belarus's economic stability, and
therefore Belarus would face only a moderate rise in the
price to at most USD 72/tcm (up from USD 46.68/tcm).
Pavlenko conceded that Russia is not completely satisfied
with Lukashenko. However, he noted the past elections
"proved" Lukashenko is the undisputed leader in Belarus and
there are no "realistic challengers," thus strongly
suggesting that Russia will continue to support the devil it
knows.
3. (C) Comment: Pavlenko's comments seem consistent with
Russia's long-standing approach to Belarus. Against the
backdrop of the Orange and Rose Revolutions, Russia cannot
afford political or economic instability in another former
Soviet republic, especially in neighboring Belarus. This
fear of "losing" Belarus is likely why Moscow waited until
just after the March elections to announce impending
increases in gas costs. Moscow now seems to find itself in
the delicate situation of trying to extract more revenue from
Gazprom's sales to Belarus, while not causing a collapse in
the Belarusian economy. Putin's widely rumored dislike of
Lukashenko is likely to cause Russia to deal sharply with
Minsk, but at the same time it is doubtful the Kremlin wants
to force Lukashenko from power and risk Belarus following
Ukraine out of Russia's orbit.
Krol