MILINKEVICH DISCUSSES STATE OF THE OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 000460

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH DISCUSSES STATE OF THE OPPOSITION

REF: MINSK 436

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: In an April 24 conversation with Ambassador,
Belarusian opposition leader and former Ten plus Coalition
presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich described
tensions within the democratic forces. He named United Civic
Party leader Anatoliy Lebedko as the strongest dissenter.
Contending Lebedko and his supporters are calling for more
radical, confrontational measures to secure rapid democratic
change, Milinkevich asserted he and the majority of the
coalition partners believe a less confrontational, more
grassroots, information-based approach would prove more
effective in persuading the majority of Belarusians to
support democratic change. Milinkevich assessed his support
among the population at 25-30 percent - still not large
enough to bring about change via large public demonstrations.
He claimed his goal is to build support among the population
that rejects "revolution" but wants change. He was confident
this strategy would see Lukashenko out of office before his
new five year term exp
ires. Milinkevich complained about Lithuanian and Georgian
pressure on the opposition to adopt a more confrontational
approach. He asked the USG to reexamine its democracy
assistance to Belarus to allow more direct assistance to the
opposition in the form of salaries and publication materials
and equipment and less out-of-country seminars, trainings and
conferences. End Summary

Milinkevich Doing Great Abroad(
--------------


2. (C) Belarusian opposition leader and former presidential
candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich asked to meet Ambassador at
short notice on April 24. Milinkevich had just returned from
a two day trip to Norway. He was very satisfied with the
results of this trip noting his meetings with the Norwegian
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and other high-ranking
officials were constructive and received positive press
coverage. He also noted the U.S. Ambassador to Oslo was
gracious enough to host a productive reception for him.
Milinkevich stressed the Norwegians did not need to be
convinced of the need to provide assistance to the Belarusian
opposition; they were focused on hearing from the Ten Plus
leader specific programs and initiatives the Norwegian
government could support. Milinkevich promised the Norwegian
officials the coalition would develop a comprehensive action
plan for promoting democratic change by May 1. Milinkevich
told Ambassador the Norwegians agreed their assistance would
be funneled through th
e Norwegian Helsinki Committee, which has long been active in
Belarus especially in supporting civil society initiatives.

(But Not all Good on the Home Front?
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador noted he had been hearing concern from
some in the coalition that Milinkevich may be spending too
much time abroad and paying too little attention to tending
to domestic scene. United Civic Party leader Anatoly Lebedko
and others had recently told Ambassador they were
dissatisfied with Milinkevich's leadership and the general
direction (or lack thereof)of the coalition following the
March 19 presidential elections (reftel).


4. (C) Milinkevich said he was well aware of these opinions.
He acknowledged internal tensions exist in the coalition,
but claimed the only serious problem is with Lebedko, who he
claimed is promoting a confrontational approach to change.
He asserted the rest of the coalition partners are united
under his leadership and share the same non-confrontational
approach and strategy to promoting democratic change in
Belarus. Milinkevich noted the coalition's political council
would meet later that day (April 24) to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the campaign and agree on a
common strategy ahead. He hoped Lebedko would participate
and noted that since March 19 he and Lebedko had not been
able to meet once as their schedules never could coincide.
He pointed out he had hoped to meet Lebedko in Vilnius last
week but Lebedko did not show up. (Note: Initial press
reports indicate the political council members concluded the
coalition performed satisfactorily before, during, and after
the elections. However
, apparently Lebedko did not participate.)

Milinkevich Satisfied With His Performance
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5. (C) Responding to criticism of his leadership March 19
and afterwards, Milinkevich admitted there were equally valid
points of view on the appropriate level of confrontation with
Belarusian authorities. He noted the more radical wing" of
the coalition promoted ideas such as seizing the Belarusian
TV station or Lukashenko's office building March 19.
However, Milinkevich was convinced he made the right decision
to promote only a peaceful, non-confrontational campaign.


6. (C) Milinkevich believes he won only 25 to 30 percent of
the vote on March 19, and thus the majority of the population
did not support the democratic opposition. He considered it
would be "morally irresponsible" to promote a radical
approach in such a context when the majority of Belarusians
still remain unconvinced about the need for change.
Moreover, Milinkevich assured his supporters in the run up to
the election he would not lead them into open confrontation
with the authorities. He contended the larger number of
people who responded to his call to gather on October Square
March 19 took the risk to participate as a result of his
promise. They would not have followed a call to seize a
building or set up tents. Milinkevich considered this
non-confrontational approach during the campaign had been
particularly successful in encouraging more Belarusians to
lose their fear and support democratic change. He claimed
roughly one-half of the demonstrators on October Square were
from the regions. He attri
buted this to the coalition's focus on meeting with voters
all over the country. Milinkevich maintained he always
viewed these elections as an important catalyst for change
but not the critical event that would topple Lukashenko.

Acknowledging Campaign Deficiencies
--------------


7. (C) Milinkevich commentedthat the majority of people who
voted for him wee really voting against Lukashenko and not
for hm. He admitted his campaign had failed to produce
program that would have convinced key elements n Belarusian
such as the nomenclature, teachers and others that the
democratic opposition is a viable alternative to Lukashenko.
He claimed the coalition would now focus more on developing a
"positive program" for the 2008 local elections.

Relations With Kozulin Remain Strained
--------------


8. (C) Milinkevich acknowledged his rival opposition
presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin and he have
fundamentally different goals and personalities. According
to Milinkevich, Kozulin's main objective is to boost his
popular support ratings in order to be more competitive in
the next presidential elections. Milinkevich, on the other
hand, said his primary concern is to galvanize and broaden
public support for democratic change. He pointed out he had
disagreed with Kozulin's rash decision on March 25 to lead
demonstrators to a violent collision with Belarusian security
forces, despite explicit warnings from Milinkevich. He noted
the coalition would continue to fight for Kozulin's release
from detention, but Milinkevich did not envisage strong
collaboration with Kozulin and his supporters.

Curbing the Vilnius-Tiblisi Axis
--------------

9 (C) Following his assessment of the election campaign and
the coalition, Milinkevich asked that the USG use its
influence to curb efforts by elements in the Lithuanian and
Georgian governments who are pressuring the Belarusian
opposition to conduct confrontational, revolutionary actions
aimed at toppling Lukashenko. Although grateful for overall
Lithuanian and Georgian support, Milinkevich expressed
serious concern that key officials in the Lithuanian and
Georgian governments played a counterproductive, divisive
role in the election campaign and are continuing their
efforts to manipulate the opposition.


10. (C) Milinkevich asserted these two countries made
blatant efforts to export revolution to Belarus, including
pressuring some coalition leaders to seize GOB installations.
Milinkevich said he never wanted to be part of such
activities, and added that he called on the Lithuanian
ambassador in Belarus on the eve of the presidential
elections to urge Vilnius not to promote potentially
incendiary plans that would only discredit the opposition in
the eyes of most Belarusians who are opposed to street
violence and "revolution." Milinkevich contended the
activities planned by elements in Vilnius and Tbilisi did not
materialize mainly because they had recruited "inexperienced,

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unqualified" youth to carry them out.


11. (C) Milinkevich speculated that the recent Russian TV
Channel One expose on alleged intercepted telephone
conversations between Georgian and Lithuanian officials on
possibly assassinating Milinkevich "may not be very far from
the truth." He acknowledged that certain Lithuanian and
Georgian officials are clearly unhappy with the outcome of
the Belarusian elections and with his staunch resistance to
their radical strategies.

Support Direct Assistance
--------------


12. (C) Milinkevich expressed appreciation for USG
assistance to the coalition, noting the U.S. was by far the
largest backer of opposition election efforts. However, with
the elections over, Milinkevich recommended that the USG
reexamine its approach to supporting democracy in a
repressive country like Belarus. He understood current USG
policy prohibits providing direct financial support to
opposition activists but argued this approach is incompatible
with Belarus' reality. Milinkevich stressed that most
opposition activists are or will soon be unemployed, and such
"bleak prospects" serve as a big disincentive to retain and
recruit activists. Milinkevich pointed out he was not
necessarily arguing for an increase in U.S. democracy
support; only that the U.S. consider changing its policy to
allow direct funding of salaries for activists and to
purchase needed supplies and equipment to wage the
information campaign against the regime propaganda machine.
He maintained the Belarusian opposition does not nee
d more out-of-country seminars, trainings and conferences.
They need the means to conduct their activities. On the
information front he asserted the radio projects from Poland
were "utterly useless" and a waste of money as no one in
Belarus could listen to them. He fully understood the
politics behind these radio projects and also felt TV is too
pie-in-the-sky. Support to print media and internet, he
stressed, is still the most cost-effective means to wage the
information war in Belarus.


13. (C) Milinkevich said he would raise these issues during
his encounters with leaders next week in Vilnius. He will
stress to them that Belarus is not the "Czech Republic,
Ukraine, or Serbia," but more like Poland prior to its
democratic transition. (Note: On April 27, Milinkevich was
arrested for organizing an unsanctioned demonstration on
April 26 and was sentenced to 15 days in jail. Thus, most
likely he will not be in Vilnius for the Vice President's
visit.)


14. (C) Ambassador encouraged Milinkevich to think about
creating a Belarusian coordination center abroad perhaps in
Brussels, as the Poles had done after martial law. Such an
office run by a Belarusian with authority within the
opposition could ensure Belarus remains a prominent issue on
the European agenda as well as help coordinate, attract and
organize support from the international community. Currently
donor countries and NGOs continue to compete with each other
and with various opposition factions, although the donor
community has tried itself to develop more coordination. But
the Belarusian democratic opposition needs to take control of
and lead its future rather than look for leadership from
abroad. Milinkevich readily agreed this would be an
excellent development but lamented he could think of no
Belarusian who could run such a center at this time. He
thought he could find some Poles who could perform this
function out of Warsaw but recognized such a center needed to
be run by a Belarusian and
also that Warsaw is not a media capital.

Milinkevich Needs To Take A Break
--------------


15. (C) Milinkevich admitted he was extremely tired. He
hoped to return to Poland in May to continue his
rehabilitation treatment following his early 2005 kidney
surgery and then return to Belarus for a much-needed break.

Comment
--------------


16. (C) Milinkevich appeared in good spirits, optimistic and
realistic about the prospects for change in Belarus following
the elections. He did not seem too terribly worried about a
challenge to his leadership from Lebedko himself but is
worried about Lithuanian and Georgia efforts to undermine him
and split the opposition in favor of Lebedko. He seems to

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have gotten the message on the need to tend to the home fires
more, but it is clear he is physically tired and needs to
recharge his batteries if he is to continue lead the charge.
Interestingly, Milinkevich made no mention of the coalition's
plans to organize and promote the April 26 Chernobyl march.
His point about providing more direct assistance is a valid
one and should be seriously considered.
Krol