KOZULIN MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR, SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000294

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/16
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: KOZULIN MEETS WITH AMBASSADOR, SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT

Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

REF: Minsk 223


1. (C) Summary: In his March 14 meeting with Ambassador,
opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin
presented pictures and names of security service officers
who beat him on March 2 (reftel),and noted a letter of
appreciation to Secretary Rice and his plea to Russian
President Vladimir Putin to stop supporting Lukashenko.
Kozulin stated he was acceptable to Russia (unlike 10+
Coalition candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich) because he could
bring democracy to Belarus and improve relations with the
EU while maintaining Russia's interests. But Kozulin opined
that the only way to garner Russia's support would be for
the U.S. and EU to publicly support him as a candidate.
According to Kozulin, he and Milinkevich agreed to continue
with their own campaigns, but to increase cooperation.
Both teams plan to gather supporters at polling stations
throughout Minsk and march to Minsk's center. Kozulin
predicted that the GOB will provoke the crowds in order to
violently disperse demonstrations. The Ambassador took the
opportunity again to reiterate the need to avoid violence.
Kozulin asked the U.S. to collaborate with the EU and
Russia to issue a statement before the elections condemning
Lukashenko and his tactics. End Summary.

Kozulin Identifies Security Force Attackers
--------------


2. (C) On March 14, Ambassador met with former Belarusian
State University (BSU) rector and opposition presidential
candidate Aleksandr Kozulin at the latter's request.
Kozulin presented Ambassador the March 9 issue of the
independent newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda (KP) that
contained photos of his March 2 beating at the hands of
security services (ref A). Kozulin and his supporters
identified the security service officers depicted in the
photos and gave Ambassador their names, noting that several
of them were former kick boxers (names and further
information in septel). Kozulin said that following the KP
article, the GOB pressured the Moscow editor to tell the
Minsk-based editors to stop printing such information. In
a March 15 meeting, Kozulin campaign member Oleg Volchek
told Poloff that Belarus' Special Forces unit SOBR had been
making physical threats to one of the paper's editors
(septel).


3. (C) According to Kozulin, security forces planned the
beating so as to humiliate him in front of his voters. He
claimed that security service officers were waiting for him
inside the Palace of Railroad Workers and, once he arrived,
locked him and his supporters in. Kozulin has asked the
Prosecutor General's Office to investigate the incident.
At the time of his meeting with Ambassador, Kozulin had no
visible bruises or cuts on his face.

Kozulin is Russia's Man
--------------


4. (C) Kozulin passed Ambassador a list of journalists who
attended his March 14 press conference in Moscow and an
informational CD of his campaign and March 2 beating. He
gave Ambassador a copy of a written appeal to Russian
President Vladimir Putin that Kozulin announced at the
press conference, calling on Putin to support Kozulin and
stop supporting President Lukashenko. Kozulin told
Ambassador that Russia accepts him and not 10+ Coalition
candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich and would only stop
supporting Lukashenko if the U.S. and EU could convince
Russia that they support Kozulin. According to Kozulin,
Russia recognizes Lukashenko's schizophrenic behavior and
at times worries that they will not be able to control him.
Kozulin, meanwhile, is highly educated, "predictable," and
able to simultaneously preserve Russia's interests and work
with the EU.


5. (C) Kozulin believes that a meeting between him and
President Bush or Secretary Rice before or after the
elections would be a signal to Russia that the U.S. is
willing to work with Russia to remove Lukashenko. [Note:
Kozulin later recognized that a meeting with President Bush
and Secretary Rice would probably not be possible.]
Ambassador asked Kozulin why he has not asked to meet Putin
if he is, after all, "Russia's Man," and asked why
President Bush should meet Kozulin if Putin will not.
Kozulin argued that Putin would meet with him only after he
was able to first meet with President Bush.

6. (C) Kozulin then presented Ambassador a letter to pass
to Secretary Rice, thanking the U.S. for its support for
democratic freedom in Belarus. See para 14 for
translation.

Kozulin's Future
--------------


7. (C) Kozulin predicted that he would be arrested after
the election and charged for his actions on February 17 at
the National Press Center and March 2 at the Palace of
Railroad workers. Until then, his goal is to keep the
opposition's momentum going beyond the March 19 elections.
He opined that during the President's March 3 speech at the
Third All Belarusian People's Assembly, Lukashenko took off
his "mask" and revealed to all Belarusians that he is a
king with no clothes. Kozulin confirmed that Lukashenko's
fall is inevitable and it is up to him to decide whether he
wants to leave now and be remembered as Belarus' first
President, or remain in power and be remembered as Europe's
last dictator.


8. (C) Kozulin claimed that he was the future and would be
supported by the nomenklatura, if only they were not so
afraid. His open criticisms of the regime are what
ordinary Belarusians discuss in their kitchens and asserted
that Belarusians around the country recognize him as a
candidate that will not tolerate oppression. "Once they
[Belarusians] breathe free air, they like it, and once they
drink clean water, they will never drink dirty water
again."

Kozulin and Milinkevich to Work Together
--------------


9. (C) Kozulin had presented Milinkevich three ways to
collaborate: 1) They both rescind their candidacy, 2)
decide who is the better suited candidate and the other
bows out of the race, or 3) they both continue with their
campaigns, and work together. On March 14, Milinkevich
phoned Kozulin and agreed to the last option. Kozulin is
okay with this and agreed to have their supporters
congregate at local polling stations on March 19 and then
march to the city's center.

Fears of Violence
--------------


10. Kozulin fears the GOB will provoke the crowd and
possibly arrange drastic measures, perhaps by arranging a
killing of a police officer and blaming it on Kozulin. On
a March 15, Kozulin campaign member Volchek presented
Poloff GOB plans to violently use weapons, gas, and Special
Forces to prevent any gatherings (septel). Kozulin told
Ambassador that he and Milinkevich would videotape as much
as possible should the demonstrations turn violent.
Ambassador stressed to Kozulin that he and the GOB should
avoid violence and any provocations. Kozulin claimed that
Moscow would blame Lukashenko for any bloodshed.


11. (C) Kozulin asked Ambassador for the U.S. and EU to
issue a joint statement before the elections that would
condemn Lukashenko and his tactics. However, he believes
it would be better if the EU and the U.S. could coordinate
a statement with Russia.

Kozulin Was Fired for his Democratic Tendencies
-------------- --


12. (C) Ambassador inquired about Kozulin's dismissal from
the post of rector of BSU in 2003, which had been rumored
to be due to his corruption. Kozulin said that he was the
first rector of BSU democratically elected by most of the
board members and not chosen by the President, which
worried the GOB. Then after the 2001 presidential
elections, the authorities discovered that 82 percent of
BSU students voted against Lukashenko. According to
Kozulin, at this point the GOB offered him a position as
Belarus' permanent representative to the U.N., but since he
did not speak much English and had not been to the U.S.,
the GOB was afraid that the U.S. could easily manipulate
him. Then some problems arose with enterprises connected
to the BSU and the GOB blamed Kozulin. However, unlike
other GOB supporters at the time who were blamed for
similar problems and then granted different posts, Kozulin
was fired and not offered another position. Lukashenko
then passed a decree that gave the President sole power in
choosing and firing the rectors of BSU.
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Kozulin's central message during his meeting with
Ambassador was that he was the better opposition candidate
because Russia supports his candidacy, and therefore, the
U.S. and EU should openly back him if we wanted to see
Lukashenko go. Although Kozulin claimed the GOB will use
force to prevent the opposition from gathering, his and
Milinkevich's supporters still plan to congregate. The
recent wave of arrests and imprisonments of activists
strongly suggest that any attempted large gatherings on
Election Day will be met with stiff GOB resistance. End
Comment.


14. (SBU) Begin unofficial translation of letter to
Secretary Rice.

SIPDIS

To the Secretary of State of the United States of America

Ms. Condoleezza Rice

Dear Ms. Condoleezza Rice,

On behalf of myself and my companions, I would like to
express to you my sincere gratitude for supporting my
people's right to freedom and expression of democratic
vote. I am heartily grateful to you for the principled
stand in relation to the processes occurring in Belarus,
and for your efforts of advocating and developing democracy
in our country.

On March 2, the Belarusian authorities breached the laws,
defied the Constitution, and lowered themselves to beating
me, a presidential candidate, as well as my proxies and
journalists. The first gunshots fired against the peaceful
population were heard in Minsk.

I am convinced that due to your timely and influential
voice on March 2, mass repressions and possibly
assassinations of the citizens of my country were
prevented.

I am hoping that your support in the future will be
significant in terms of building a new free and democratic
Republic of Belarus.

Presidential Candidate

A.V. Kozulin

March 14, 2006

End Translation.

Krol