Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK275
2006-03-15 10:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

DAS Kramer Discusses Elections with Kozulin's

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR BO 
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INFO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3608
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3388
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 1616
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000275 

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: DAS Kramer Discusses Elections with Kozulin's
Campaign Team

Ref: A) Minsk 192 B) Minsk 191 C) Minsk 223 D) Minsk 200

Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000275

SIPDIS

KIEV FOR USAID

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: DAS Kramer Discusses Elections with Kozulin's
Campaign Team

Ref: A) Minsk 192 B) Minsk 191 C) Minsk 223 D) Minsk 200

Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS David Kramer met with opposition
presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin and his campaign
team during his recent trip to Belarus. Kozulin claimed
the authorities are afraid and are working to increase the
level of fear among the population. Kramer underscored the
need for all parties to refrain from using violence, but
Kozulin said he would do whatever is "expedient" and
"unpredictable" to marshal public support for his
candidacy. Kozulin boasted of the energizing effect his
first televised speech had on the country. Kozulin
criticized Lukashenko on several fronts and complained
about the Central Election Committee's decision not to
force Lukashenko to take a leave of absence during the
campaign. Kozulin described his close ties to Moscow and
his hope to be a candidate who is acceptable to both Moscow
and the West. Kramer reiterated U.S. interest in Belarus,
stressed the united position of the U.S. and EU on the
elections and pledged U.S. engagement with Belarusian
society regardless of the outcome of the election. End
Summary.


2. (C) On February 24, EUR DAS David Kramer, accompanied
by Ambassador and Embassy note takers, met with Belarusian
Social Democratic Party "Hramada" presidential candidate
Aleksandr Kozulin, his campaign manager Myacheslav Grib,
and Alexei Korol, who is responsible for developing
Kozulin's campaign platform.

Kozulin Notes Level of GOB Preparedness For Opposition
-------------- --------------
Protests
--------------


3. (C) Kozulin claimed that the authorities have taken
extraordinary measures to prevent street demonstrations and
are trying to increase the level of fear in the population.
According to Kozulin, the special services and police have
divided the city into sections, have started patrolling and
planning response scenarios, and will be on high alert as
of March 10. Kozulin claimed that if the police feel
threatened, they would not stop short of using violence.

Kramer Emphasizes the Importance of Non-Violent Elections
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Saying he was passing this message to all parties,
Kramer strongly underscored the importance of the elections
being concluded without any resort to force or violence.
Kramer said he told the GOB that Belarus should abide by
its OSCE obligations and allow its people to peacefully
protest if they so desire. Kramer holds the activists to
the same standards Q they can protest and make their
opinions known, but they must do it in a peaceful manner.


5. (C) Kozulin agreed with Kramer but stated that the GOB
has already started to use violence, citing the recent
spike in arrests and detentions of opposition activists and
Kozulin's struggle with the authorities at the National
Press Center on February 17 (refs A and B). Kozulin
claimed that the authorities are afraid which is why they
have already started arresting and using violence.

Kozulin's Election Strategies
--------------


6. (C) When Kramer asked if Kozulin planned to remain in
the race until the end, Kozulin responded that he will
remain a candidate for as long as the Belarusian
authorities allow him. Kozulin noted the situation in
Belarus is dynamic and he will do whatever is "expedient"
when it is "expedient" to do it. Kozulin promised to act
in an "unpredictable way" and noted he planned on gaining
access to the March 2-3 All-Belarus Assembly. [Note: On
March 2, Kozulin attempted to attend this Assembly and was
detained and beaten by police before being released later
in the day (ref C). He now faces criminal charges for
"hooliganism."]



7. (C) Kozulin identified possible scenarios for the
opposition if it became evident prior to Election Day that
Lukashenko would engage in gross fraud to secure an
election victory. Kozulin first proposed to Milinkevich
that Milinkevich and he withdraw from the race
simultaneously. Another alternative that Kozulin mentioned
was holding another round of elections on July 16, the
originally scheduled date for the presidential elections.
Kozulin also suggested that Lukashenko may appoint him
prime minister if Kozulin receives a significant number of
votes.


8. (C) Kozulin said that he does not support joining
forces with Milinkevich. He opined that they will receive
more votes separately than if they combined forces because
Kozulin claimed that not all of his followers would vote
for Milinkevich. Kramer stressed that the U.S. supports a
democratic process of free and fair elections and not any
one candidate.

Kozulin's Television Debut
--------------


9. (C) When Kramer asked about Kozulin's first televised
remarks, the candidate boasted that his "charged and
dynamic" speech overturned the whole country. [Note: On
February 22, Belarusian state television aired Kozulin's
first 30Qminute pre-recorded presidential candidate speech,
which in part slandered Lukashenko (ref D).] Kozulin
likened the country to an "open beehive" buzzing with
excitement over his remarks. Kozulin claimed that his
campaign headquarters was flooded with a storm of phone
calls following the television spot.


10. (C) When Kramer asked how the GOB responded to
Kozulin's remarks, Kozulin said the GOB was deeply
disconcerted about his speech. He claimed the regime held
a meeting after the speech to assess its impact. Kozulin
also claimed that the Central Election Committee (CEC) did
not know what to do about his first television message.
Before the broadcast, Kozulin said that the CEC was not
sure whether they should allow the piece to run as is, edit
it, or not show it at all. In the end, Kozulin said that
they showed it in its entirety. [Note: Kozulin's second 30-
minute pre-recorded message on March 2 was edited.]
According to Kozulin, the GOB also debated the question of
initiating criminal charges against him and the CEC
disqualifying him on those grounds. [Note: On March 4, CEC
secretary Nikolai Lozovik told Pol/Econ Chief that Kozulin

SIPDIS
will likely remain a candidate given that the criminal
charges against him are not sufficient grounds for
disqualification. See septel.]

Kozulin Bashes Lukashenko, Election Process
--------------


11. (C) Kozulin claimed that Lukashenko has violated
election rules by not taking a leave of absence during his
re-election campaign as required by Article 77 of the
Election Code. [Note: Article 77 rule states that any
candidate campaigning for President must take a leave of
absence from work after being registered.] The law
specifies, however, that presidential incumbents seeking a
second term are exempt from the rule. Kozulin pointed out
that Lukashenko is seeking a third term, not a second, and
therefore he should be required to take a leave of absence.
[Note: CEC President Lidya Yermoshina's rejected Kozulin's
demand, noting that while the law specifically mentions a
second term and not a third, the "spirit of the law"
implies that Lukashenko does not have to take a leave of
absence. This position contradicts Yermoshina's and the
CEC's prior rulings where they have closely followed the
letter of the law, and not the spirit.]


12. (C) Kozulin challenged Lukashenko's supposed strong
popular support base, stating that the "icon (i.e.
Lukashenko) has fallen." The candidate asserted that 60-80
percent of GOB officials in reality support him, and not
Lukashenko. Kozulin described how easy it was for him to
collect signatures during the nomination campaign, even at

Mogilev University (i.e. Lukashenko's alma mater). Kozulin
claimed Lukashenko has fewer people to trust, citing the
President's decision to appoint former Presidential
Administration Head Victor Sheiman as his campaign manager.
Referring to Sheiman's likely participation in the 1999-
2000 disappearances of prominent opposition activists when
he was Minister of Interior, Kozulin said both Lukashenko
and Sheiman have nothing to lose since Sheiman's hands are
"already covered in blood." Kozulin asserted that the only
options left for Lukashenko are to shuffle people around
the government or to hire corrupt people. Kozulin added
that Lukashenko is preparing his two sons to be his
successors.

Kozulin Claims Close Relations with Moscow, Not With Europe
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Kozulin stressed he maintained good relations with
Moscow. Kozulin told Kramer that he hopes to position
himself as a candidate favorable to Russia and the West.
He reminded Kramer that Belarus cannot ignore its political
and economic interests in Moscow. Kozulin noted his plans
to have high-level meetings with members of the Russian
Duma, although he acknowledged concrete dates have not been
scheduled. Kozulin also claimed that a meeting with
Russian President Vladimir Putin would not be out of the
question except that the current political situation in
Russia does not allow it.


14. (C) When Kramer asked why Kozulin has not traveled more
to Europe, Kozulin responded that he is not able to set up
meetings because "the other candidate" (i.e. Milinkevich)
has effectively branded Kozulin as a GOB decoy. Kozulin
mentioned that he would like to meet with German Chancellor
Merkel in Berlin to enlist her help in using Germany as a
moderator between Russia and the West's conflict over
Belarus. [Note: Kozulin is now in Germany but is unlikely
to meet Merkel according to the Germany Embassy.]

Relations with U.S.
--------------


15. (C) Kozulin noted that although he is personally
favorably inclined toward the U.S., it is not particularly
wise in Belarus to be seen as supportive of the U.S. The
Belarusian electorate is still suspicious of the U.S.
Nevertheless, he said he would welcome a meeting with
President Bush or Secretary Rice before the elections to
show he has the respect of the U.S. Kozulin noted that
unfortunately the West has little leverage over Belarus
except trade and that the West is not making effective use
of this tool. Kozulin stressed that trade sanctions could
bring about necessary political reform in the country.


16. (C) Noting that the U.S. and E.U. are reviewing all
their policy options, Kramer reiterated that the U.S. and
EU remain committed to promoting democratic change in
Belarus. Kramer stated that regardless of the outcome of
the upcoming elections, the U.S. and EU will continue to
support Belarusian civil society.


17. (U) DAS Kramer did not review this cable.

KROL