Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK264
2006-03-14 13:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:
Kozulin Continues With Campaign, More Violence
how-toVZCZCXRO8116 RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSK #0264/01 0731335 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 141335Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY MINSK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3964 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0940 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 000264
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/16
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: Kozulin Continues With Campaign, More Violence
Feared
REF: Minsk 223
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 000264
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/16
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: Kozulin Continues With Campaign, More Violence
Feared
REF: Minsk 223
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary: Campaign managers for presidential
candidate Aleksandr Kozulin, Aleksei Korol and Oleg Volchek
met with Poloffs on March 6 following Kozulin's March 2
beating at the hands of security forces. Although charged
with hooliganism, Kozulin has continued with his campaign
and his managers doubt the GOB will disqualify him as a
candidate. Volchek presented more information regarding
the shooting of a car belonging to Kozulin supporters and
the increased usage of elite anti-terrorist units to
suppress demonstrations ahead of the elections. Volchek
and Korol noted Lukashenko's anger at (and fear of) the
opposition candidates and the subsequent increase in
violence as elections approach. The campaign managers
appreciated U.S. support, but asked for the U.S. to exert
more pressure on the regime. End summary.
Kozulin Continues to Campaign After Beating
--------------
2. (C) Presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin continues
to campaign after being beaten by security forces on March
2 and then charged with hooliganism (ref A). If convicted
of the charge, Kozulin could be disqualified as a
candidate, but his campaign managers Oleg Volchek and
Alexei Korol doubt this will happen, as the GOB would like
to split the "democratic vote." Kozulin briefly traveled
to Belarusian regional cities on March 4 and spoke to 500
people in Lida, 1,000 people in Grodno, and 500 in Smorgon.
Local authorities, however, continue to harass local
campaign activists with the usual detentions and
confiscations of campaign materials.
3. (C) According to Volchek, Kozulin's recent beating and
television appearances boosted his popularity ratings.
Korol admitted that the manner and tone of Kozulin's
televised speeches resembled those of Lukashenko's in the
early 1990s, but Belarusians respond well to it. Although
comments about Lukashenko's prison guard experience and his
sons' scandals were edited from Kozulin's second TV
appearance, it was enough to spark a sharp rebuttal from
Lukashenko during the Third All Belarusian People's
Assembly. Korol laughed at the President's accusation that
Kozulin contacted him to negotiate a deal, claiming that no
one but Lukashenko's son Viktor and head of the
Presidential Administration Gennady Neviglass were able to
contact the President.
4. (C) Kozulin recently left for a three-day trip to
Ukraine, Germany, and Russia. Volchek and Korol hesitated
to comment on the goals or reasons for the trip, nor would
they comment on the March 4 seizure of 250,000 copies of
independent newspaper Narodnaya Volya's print run of an
issue about Kozulin's beating and campaign.
Military Units Involved in Beating and Shooting
-------------- --
5. (C) Volchek, an Afghan War veteran and former security
service agent, explained that most of the security forces
involved in Kozulin's March 2 beating and the shooting
(reftel) were most likely members of ALMAZ and other elite
military units. Volchek's colleagues in the BKGB strongly
denied being involved in either incident, although BKGB
Chief Stepan Sukharenko was present during Kozulin's
beating and later opined to journalists that Kozulin
deserved it.
6. (C) Volchek said ALMAZ was a highly trained and
secretive anti-terrorist unit controlled by Interior
SIPDIS
Minister Vladimir Naimov. Calling the ALMAZ and security
service personnel "robots" that fulfill orders without
thinking or emotion, Volchek noted the calm faces of the
security services as they beat Kozulin, his supporters, and
journalists and their professionalism in quickly, but
brutally, rounding up and detaining journalists. According
to Volchek, an ALMAZ unit lead by Ignatovich (no first name
or rank given) was directly involved in the 2000
disappearance of Russian journalist Dmitry Zavadsky.
The Trigger Man in the Shooting
--------------
7. (C) Volchek identified Nikolai Karpenkov, commander of
the elite anti-terrorist unit ALMAZ, as the man who shot a
MINSK 00000264 002 OF 003
car belonging to a Kozulin supporter on March 2. According
to Volchek, Kozulin supporter Yuri Radzivil was in his Audi
waiting for his female colleagues who were photographing
security services beating journalists outside the October
police station. When Radzivil saw security agents
confiscating cameras, he and his colleagues tried to leave.
Security agents unsuccessfully tried to open the doors of
the moving car before Karpenkov shot the windshield and
tire. [Note: A photo of the shooting can be found on human
rights NGO Charter 97's website www.charter97.org.
According to Volchek, a BKGB agent shot the photograph and,
disgusted with the authorities' behavior, leaked it to the
press.]
More Violence in the Near Future
--------------
8. (C) According to Korol, President Lukashenko is
extremely angry with Kozulin and 10+ Coalition candidate
Aleksandr Milinkevich for openly criticizing him on their
first television addresses and tarnishing his "iconic"
image among the people. The use of violence, according to
Korol and Volchek, was Lukashenko's attempt to regain his
reputation. Volchek told Poloffs that Belarus had arrived
at a dangerous moment, because Lukashenko was frantic, and
like most dictators, would use all necessary means to
maintain his rule.
9. (C) Volchek fears the elite military units would use
their "sadistic" behavior to quell opposition
demonstrations as the elections draw closer. The General
Prosecutor Office's refusal to charge the units for beating
Kozulin and reporters was the unofficial green light to use
even more violence. Colonel Dmitry Pavlechenko, alleged
triggerman in the disappearances of opposition leaders in
1999 and 2000, has been designated leader of security
services in charge of maintaining public order.
10. (C) Volchek's BKGB sources report that the GOB plans to
cordon off Minsk from the rest of the country on Election
Day to prevent opposition supporters from gathering in
Minsk. Volchek also believes that the BKGB could possibly
detonate a bomb during a demonstration, just as BKGB Chief
Sukharenko predicted on March 1 (septel),to depict the
opposition as terrorists.
After Elections
--------------
11. (C) Volchek fears that once elections are over and
Lukashenko has his victory, the authorities will increase
its pressure on the opposition and "neutralize" its
leaders. By this, Volchek meant arrests and prison
sentences, but did not rule out possible disappearances and
murders.
12. (C) According to Volchek's sources, Lukashenko plans to
retire former head of the Presidential Administration and
current campaign manager Viktor Sheyman and replace him
with his son Viktor after the elections. [Note: Volchek
claims the President has already relieved Sheyman of his
GOB vehicle and bodyguards.] Other rumors indicate that
Lukashenko will reassign Naumov and Prime Minister Sergei
Sidorsky to obscure, low-level positions.
U.S. Help
--------------
13. (C) Volchek and Korol asked if the U.S. could increase
pressure on the GOB and Russia and issue more statements
condemning the electoral process. Poloffs reminded the
campaign managers that visiting EUR DAS David Kramer on
February 23-24 warned GOB officials at the MFA and Central
Election Committee that the U.S. and EU would condemn
Belarus' elections should they be fraudulent and marred
with violence. Poloffs also noted Kramer's March 3
statement condemning Kozulin's beating.
Comment
--------------
14. (C) Volchek and Korol were happy that Kozulin's
criticism, and to some extent his beating, had improved his
image among the population, but neither one has hopes that
Kozulin will win the election. Volchek's prediction of
more violence in the immediate future is not comforting, as
Volchek has previously made predictions to Emboffs that
later play themselves out. Both men were right that
Lukashenko is panicking, which has been obvious in his
MINSK 00000264 003 OF 003
latest interviews and speeches.
KROL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/16
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: Kozulin Continues With Campaign, More Violence
Feared
REF: Minsk 223
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary: Campaign managers for presidential
candidate Aleksandr Kozulin, Aleksei Korol and Oleg Volchek
met with Poloffs on March 6 following Kozulin's March 2
beating at the hands of security forces. Although charged
with hooliganism, Kozulin has continued with his campaign
and his managers doubt the GOB will disqualify him as a
candidate. Volchek presented more information regarding
the shooting of a car belonging to Kozulin supporters and
the increased usage of elite anti-terrorist units to
suppress demonstrations ahead of the elections. Volchek
and Korol noted Lukashenko's anger at (and fear of) the
opposition candidates and the subsequent increase in
violence as elections approach. The campaign managers
appreciated U.S. support, but asked for the U.S. to exert
more pressure on the regime. End summary.
Kozulin Continues to Campaign After Beating
--------------
2. (C) Presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin continues
to campaign after being beaten by security forces on March
2 and then charged with hooliganism (ref A). If convicted
of the charge, Kozulin could be disqualified as a
candidate, but his campaign managers Oleg Volchek and
Alexei Korol doubt this will happen, as the GOB would like
to split the "democratic vote." Kozulin briefly traveled
to Belarusian regional cities on March 4 and spoke to 500
people in Lida, 1,000 people in Grodno, and 500 in Smorgon.
Local authorities, however, continue to harass local
campaign activists with the usual detentions and
confiscations of campaign materials.
3. (C) According to Volchek, Kozulin's recent beating and
television appearances boosted his popularity ratings.
Korol admitted that the manner and tone of Kozulin's
televised speeches resembled those of Lukashenko's in the
early 1990s, but Belarusians respond well to it. Although
comments about Lukashenko's prison guard experience and his
sons' scandals were edited from Kozulin's second TV
appearance, it was enough to spark a sharp rebuttal from
Lukashenko during the Third All Belarusian People's
Assembly. Korol laughed at the President's accusation that
Kozulin contacted him to negotiate a deal, claiming that no
one but Lukashenko's son Viktor and head of the
Presidential Administration Gennady Neviglass were able to
contact the President.
4. (C) Kozulin recently left for a three-day trip to
Ukraine, Germany, and Russia. Volchek and Korol hesitated
to comment on the goals or reasons for the trip, nor would
they comment on the March 4 seizure of 250,000 copies of
independent newspaper Narodnaya Volya's print run of an
issue about Kozulin's beating and campaign.
Military Units Involved in Beating and Shooting
-------------- --
5. (C) Volchek, an Afghan War veteran and former security
service agent, explained that most of the security forces
involved in Kozulin's March 2 beating and the shooting
(reftel) were most likely members of ALMAZ and other elite
military units. Volchek's colleagues in the BKGB strongly
denied being involved in either incident, although BKGB
Chief Stepan Sukharenko was present during Kozulin's
beating and later opined to journalists that Kozulin
deserved it.
6. (C) Volchek said ALMAZ was a highly trained and
secretive anti-terrorist unit controlled by Interior
SIPDIS
Minister Vladimir Naimov. Calling the ALMAZ and security
service personnel "robots" that fulfill orders without
thinking or emotion, Volchek noted the calm faces of the
security services as they beat Kozulin, his supporters, and
journalists and their professionalism in quickly, but
brutally, rounding up and detaining journalists. According
to Volchek, an ALMAZ unit lead by Ignatovich (no first name
or rank given) was directly involved in the 2000
disappearance of Russian journalist Dmitry Zavadsky.
The Trigger Man in the Shooting
--------------
7. (C) Volchek identified Nikolai Karpenkov, commander of
the elite anti-terrorist unit ALMAZ, as the man who shot a
MINSK 00000264 002 OF 003
car belonging to a Kozulin supporter on March 2. According
to Volchek, Kozulin supporter Yuri Radzivil was in his Audi
waiting for his female colleagues who were photographing
security services beating journalists outside the October
police station. When Radzivil saw security agents
confiscating cameras, he and his colleagues tried to leave.
Security agents unsuccessfully tried to open the doors of
the moving car before Karpenkov shot the windshield and
tire. [Note: A photo of the shooting can be found on human
rights NGO Charter 97's website www.charter97.org.
According to Volchek, a BKGB agent shot the photograph and,
disgusted with the authorities' behavior, leaked it to the
press.]
More Violence in the Near Future
--------------
8. (C) According to Korol, President Lukashenko is
extremely angry with Kozulin and 10+ Coalition candidate
Aleksandr Milinkevich for openly criticizing him on their
first television addresses and tarnishing his "iconic"
image among the people. The use of violence, according to
Korol and Volchek, was Lukashenko's attempt to regain his
reputation. Volchek told Poloffs that Belarus had arrived
at a dangerous moment, because Lukashenko was frantic, and
like most dictators, would use all necessary means to
maintain his rule.
9. (C) Volchek fears the elite military units would use
their "sadistic" behavior to quell opposition
demonstrations as the elections draw closer. The General
Prosecutor Office's refusal to charge the units for beating
Kozulin and reporters was the unofficial green light to use
even more violence. Colonel Dmitry Pavlechenko, alleged
triggerman in the disappearances of opposition leaders in
1999 and 2000, has been designated leader of security
services in charge of maintaining public order.
10. (C) Volchek's BKGB sources report that the GOB plans to
cordon off Minsk from the rest of the country on Election
Day to prevent opposition supporters from gathering in
Minsk. Volchek also believes that the BKGB could possibly
detonate a bomb during a demonstration, just as BKGB Chief
Sukharenko predicted on March 1 (septel),to depict the
opposition as terrorists.
After Elections
--------------
11. (C) Volchek fears that once elections are over and
Lukashenko has his victory, the authorities will increase
its pressure on the opposition and "neutralize" its
leaders. By this, Volchek meant arrests and prison
sentences, but did not rule out possible disappearances and
murders.
12. (C) According to Volchek's sources, Lukashenko plans to
retire former head of the Presidential Administration and
current campaign manager Viktor Sheyman and replace him
with his son Viktor after the elections. [Note: Volchek
claims the President has already relieved Sheyman of his
GOB vehicle and bodyguards.] Other rumors indicate that
Lukashenko will reassign Naumov and Prime Minister Sergei
Sidorsky to obscure, low-level positions.
U.S. Help
--------------
13. (C) Volchek and Korol asked if the U.S. could increase
pressure on the GOB and Russia and issue more statements
condemning the electoral process. Poloffs reminded the
campaign managers that visiting EUR DAS David Kramer on
February 23-24 warned GOB officials at the MFA and Central
Election Committee that the U.S. and EU would condemn
Belarus' elections should they be fraudulent and marred
with violence. Poloffs also noted Kramer's March 3
statement condemning Kozulin's beating.
Comment
--------------
14. (C) Volchek and Korol were happy that Kozulin's
criticism, and to some extent his beating, had improved his
image among the population, but neither one has hopes that
Kozulin will win the election. Volchek's prediction of
more violence in the immediate future is not comforting, as
Volchek has previously made predictions to Emboffs that
later play themselves out. Both men were right that
Lukashenko is panicking, which has been obvious in his
MINSK 00000264 003 OF 003
latest interviews and speeches.
KROL