EUR DAS KRAMER MEETS ANALYSTS, CIVIL SOCIETY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MINSK 000232

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER MEETS ANALYSTS, CIVIL SOCIETY
LEADERS AND STUDENTS

REF: MINSK 192

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Classified By: Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: Visiting EUR DAS David Kramer met with
political analysts, civil society leaders, and students on
February 24 to discuss the upcoming presidential elections
and the accompanying GOB harassment. Analysts noted
Russia,s change in policy from previous campaigns to support
President Lukashenko from the onset of the election campaign
and the opposition,s inability to lead the country in the
slim chance that they would win the election. Civil society
leaders doubted the possibility of protests during the
election due to increasing arrests of opposition activists
and lack of independent media. Students noted the
unprofessional manner of the GOB,s propaganda, but asked DAS
Kramer to explain U.S. criteria in determining whether an
election is democratic and opined that countries must find
their own path to development. End Summary.

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Analysts Speak
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2. (C) On February 24, Kramer met with Belarusian political
analysts Oleg Manaev of the IISEPS sociological polling
center, and Valery Karbalevich and Leonid Zaiko from the
Strategy think tank. Responding to a question from Manaev,
Kramer opened by describing USG efforts to date to engage
Russia on Belarus. He said that the GOR seems to have made
up its mind to support Lukashenko, but Kramer and Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns asked Moscow

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on a recent visit to reinforce with Minsk that any use of
violence is completely unacceptable.

Moscow Supports Lukashenko
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3. (C) Karbalevich commented that Moscow is taking a very
different position than it did in earlier Belarusian
elections. He said that in the 2001 presidential elections,
Moscow took a good look at all the candidates before Putin
decided to support Lukashenko a month before voting. In the
2004 parliamentary elections and presidential term-limit
referendum, Russian press remained critical of the GOB and
the official election results through the process. In
contrast, now Moscow has made it very clear, through pubic
statements and cheap natural gas, that it supports
Lukashenko. Karbalevich argued that Moscow fears a color
revolution in Minsk and will defend Lukashenko to the end,
even if this leads to serious conflict with the West. Zaiko
echoed this argument, claiming that a year ago some in Moscow
supported pro-democracy forces within the former Soviet
Union. Now, Putin is clearly supporting Lukashenko. Zaiko
maintained Russia views the March presidential election as
strategic, hoping it will initiate a conservative wave across
the FSU.

Candidate Strategies
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4. (C) A few days before this meeting state television, as
mandated by the Election Code, allowed each candidate 30
minutes of airtime. Kozulin devoted his time to a fiery
attack on Lukashenko. Karbalevich noted there had been no
official reaction to Kozulin,s broadside, and argued that
Lukashenko was in shock and does not know how to respond. He
said that the politicized public seemed to prefer Kozulin,s
broadcast, but that regular people liked Milinkevich,s
better. Karbalevich criticized Milinkevich for spending his
television time giving concrete answers to questions from the
public, rather than trying to present any alternate program.
Manaev stated this is because Milinkevich has no plan in case
he wins the elections. The United Civic Party, part of
Milinkevich,s 10 Plus coalition, does have detailed economic
plans (libertarian free market). However, other 10 Plus
members, such as the Belarusian Popular Front and the Social
Democrats support more of a statist/Soviet economic model.
If he wins, Milinkevich would have to choose one of these
paths. For now, this fissure is preventing him from being
able to articulate a strong program.


5. (C) Manaev and Zaiko argued that Kozulin is still thinking
of dropping out of the race early. Such a move would be
preferable to trailing Milinkevich in the polls, and would
allow him to remain a credible presidential candidate in the
future. They agreed that Kozulin fancies himself to be the
candidate of Russia and the nomenklatura; however they said

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Russia does not see any serious challenger to Lukashenko.
They also agreed that, despite his campaign smear tactics,
Kozulin is not what Lukashenko was when he was elected in

1994. At that time Lukashenko had spent a year working with
the populace, which Kozulin has not done. Even so, he is
likely to win more votes than will Gaidukevich.

What Economic Miracle?
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6. (C) Zaiko stated that Lukashenko called for early
elections partially because of future economic risks. There
are rumors Russia will raise gas prices for Belarus in
mid-year, and the currently favorable external market could
change. A fall in international oil prices would especially
hurt Belarus. Domestically, he said that consumption is down
and that salaries are high for the region. Belarusian banks
are facing some problems, even if there is no risk of a
meltdown, and January,s cold snap caused the state to spend
too much money on energy.

Repression
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7. (C) Manaev opined that the recent arrests of NGO activists
were just the beginning of the regime,s repression. He
believes the GOB will use targeted strikes against certain
NGOs to destroy the opposition,s ability to observe the
election and challenge official results (reftel). The regime
will ensure that, at least officially, the opposition
candidates get less than 10% of the vote. If they were known
to even reach 30%, that would tell the Belarusian people
there is an alternative to Lukashenko. Such an outcome is
unacceptable to the regime. Karbalevich pointed out that in
2001 three journalists were arrested after the election.
This year he expects many more people to be arrested.


8. (C) Karbalevich predicted that if 3,000 to 5,000
protesters turned out after Election Day, the GOB would not
resort to violence. If more took to the streets, Lukashenko
would feel threatened and would use force. A staunch
Lukashenko supporter, Colonel Pavlichenko, commands a brigade
of police in Minsk that would stop at nothing to defend
Lukashenko,s victory. If exit polling shows that it was
genuinely a close race, then people would protest
falsification. On the other hand, Karbalevich stressed that
no one would take to the streets if it was clear no
opposition candidate got a majority of the votes.

Popularity and the Press
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9. (C) Manaev stated that Lukashenko is likely to receive
around 60% of the vote, and Kozulin and Milinkevich would
together receive around 30%. The rest would be for
Gaidukevich or would be genuinely spoiled ballots. In Minsk,
Lukashenko would get 50% to the opposition,s 40%. He agreed
these numbers could change if the opposition has steady and
continuous access to the media, but they do not. In a recent
success, Manaev explained that Milinkevich,s travels to
Europe were covered by the Russian-language service of
EuroNews. These broadcasts reached an estimated one million
Belarusians, which far outweighs all those reached by
independent newspapers and foreign radio. Manaev suggested
that further EuroNews coverage could be the best way to
advertise for Milinkevich, however he said he understands the
French editor of EuroNews, in Lyons, is against Belarusian
coverage for some unknown reason.

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Civil Society Leaders Doubt Change Possible
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10. (C) Kramer met with ZUBR press secretary Aleksandr
Atroschenkov, Perpektiva NGO leader Anatoly Shumchenko,
Belarusian Helsinki Commission (BHC) Head Tatiana Protko,
Head of the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ)
Zhanna Litvina, and Vitebsk grassroots activist Olga Karach.
Kramer once again condemned violence during Election Day, but
stated that people had a right to demonstrate peacefully.

Belarusians Not Ready for Protests
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11. (C) Karach claimed Belarusians were not ready to contest
election results because if they were not willing to demand
better jobs and lower utility costs, then they were
definitely not ready to demand political rights. ZUBR press

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secretary Atroschenkov disagreed, predicting thousands of

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Belarusian youth would take to the streets, but his comment
was met with laughter from the other civil society leaders.

GOB Has the Media, and Hence, Controls the People,s Minds
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12. (C) BAJ Head Litvina told Kramer that the GOB has
liquidated most of Belarus, remaining independent media,
leaving the opposition candidates limited opportunities to
gain publicity and counter the state media,s smear campaign.
According to recent BAJ monitoring of the state press,
Lukashenko gets most of the coverage and is shown in a
positive light, whereas Milinkevich and Kozulin receive
little coverage, and it is always negative. If the news is
not praising Lukashenko or discrediting the opposition, it is
exploiting Belarus, stability and convincing the population
that the presidential elections will be free and fair.
Karach noted that many Vitebsk citizens had complained to her
about authorities forcing people to sign in support of
Lukashenko. However, the same people who complained still
believe the elections will be democratic. According to
Karach, this is the result of the state-controlled media.

GOB Continues to Detain Activists
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13. (C) The civil society leaders reported an increase in
detentions and arrests of political activists. Atroschenkov
passed Kramer a list of numerous police detentions and
brutalities against ZUBR activists. BHC Head Protko predicted
BHC would be forced to pay a USD 75,000 fine and feared she
would soon be jailed for tax evasion.

U.S. Needs To Pressure Russia
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14. (C) The civil society leaders thanked Kramer for U.S.
support, but claimed that U.S. resolutions and public
statements against Belarus no longer worked. The USG needed
to do more to pressure the Lukashenko regime, including
focusing more attention on the Kremlin,s support of
Lukashenko, if democratic change is to occur in Belarus.
Protko opined that the Kremlin is using Belarus as a testing
ground for political policies that President Vladimir Putin
would later implement in Russia. (Comment: Post has heard
this from several sources.) Litvina cited Russian Defense
Minister Ivan Ivanov,s recent statements that Russia was
prepared to prevent an uprising in Belarus. If the U.S.
wanted to support democracy in Belarus, it would have to
pressure Russia.

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Kramer Meets With Students
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15. (C) Kramer met with university students who had spent a
year in the U.S. in the FLEX student exchange program.
Kramer told the students that they were the future of their
country and that Washington was interested in the development
of democracy in Belarus. He also stressed the U.S.,
condemnation of violence during the elections. Kramer
maintained that the U.S. would continue to support civil
society in Belarus in close cooperation with the EU in order
to end Belarus, self-imposed isolation. He posited that
exposing Belarusian youth to other cultures was important for
the country,s development and for that reason the U.S.
opposes GOB efforts to restrict exchange programs.

Students Want Change
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16. (C) The students explained that the younger generations
wanted change, but the older generations feared it because
state propaganda showed only negative aspects of the West and
the opposition gave no viable option. One student told
Kramer that democracy could not be forced on people and that
every nation needed to find its own path. Kramer admitted
that democracy was not perfect, but it was the best form of
government available. He then explained to the students the
role of free press in democracy and lamented its absence in
Belarus.

What Makes a Democratic Election?
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17. (C) The students asked Kramer how the U.S. would
determine whether the upcoming presidential elections in

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Belarus would be free and fair. Kramer responded that OSCE
observers would determine the election,s legitimacy after
reviewing cases of fraud and abuse, equal access to voters,
freedom to campaign, access to media, vote tallying, and
observer access. Kramer noted that all indications suggested
that the Belarusian authorities are not conducting the
electoral process in a free and fair manner, but stressed
that it was not too late for the GOB to make improvements.
Students mentioned that university officials, using threats
of expulsion, force them to vote early for Lukashenko and
said a similar system existed in the military. Kramer
emphasized that the U.S. was following the situation in
Belarus very closely and that the international community has
not forgotten Belarus.


18. (C) Other topics covered during the roundtable included
the role of big business in supporting un-democratic regimes,
a perceived deliberate exaggeration of the terrorism threat
by the U.S. to use force to clamp down on differing opinions,
and the lack of professional standards in the
state-controlled Belarusian media, particularly their attacks
on the employees of the U.S. Embassy.

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Comment
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19. (C) Kramer,s meetings once again reiterated that the
upcoming presidential elections would not likely yield any
change. The political analysts and civil society leaders
agreed that Russia, not Belarusians who are paralyzed by fear
and manipulated by the state media, is the one column
supporting Lukashenko. Only the students, although they did
not outright express it, gave hope that Belarus would one day
become a democratic country.
Krol