Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK185
2006-02-21 12:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

YOUTH GROUPS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0016
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSK #0185/01 0521257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211257Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3819
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 3136
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3327
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 1560
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 3547
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 3204
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0879
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU PRIORITY 0043
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000185 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
KIEV FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: YOUTH GROUPS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
DESPITE MYRIAD OF OBSTACLES

REF: A. A) MINSK 0056


B. B) MINSK 0179

C. C) MINSK 0106

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
KIEV FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: YOUTH GROUPS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
DESPITE MYRIAD OF OBSTACLES

REF: A. A) MINSK 0056


B. B) MINSK 0179

C. C) MINSK 0106

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: While many youth remain reluctant to wander
far from President Lukashenko's camp of supporters, some
Belarusian youth groups are actively participating in a
number of civic initiatives and/or directly supporting
opposition candidates Aleksandr Milinkevich and Aleksandr
Kozulin in the lead up to the March 19 presidential
elections. These youth groups are involved in such
activities as launching pro-democratic change information
campaigns, mobilizing voters to participate in street
protests in the likely event of falsified elections, and even
serving as bodyguards for Milinkevich. Belarusian security
forces, perhaps sensing the potential upset of stability in
Belarus, are cracking down on youth activists with
increasingly more arrests and detentions. Many independent
youth leaders recognize that there is still considerable
infighting in the opposition camp and that most voters still
appear too scared or too content with the regime's economic
policies to demand democratic change in the immedi
ate future, but they nonetheless remain cautiously optimistic
that the upcoming elections will serve as a rare opportunity
to stir up popular demand for reform. End Summary.

Youth Groups That Actively Support Opposition Candidates
-------------- --------------


2. (C) While youth group Zubr is focused more on attempting
to unite opposition through the Day of Solidarity and "Jeans"
campaigns, youth groups Malady Front (MF) and Right Alliance
(RA) stand firmly behind the 10 Coalition candidate
Aleksandr Milinkevich. (Note: See refs A and B for the
latest activities of Zubr.) These two groups have collected
signatures and have launched information campaigns on behalf
of Milinkevich. According to RA representative Yuri
Karetnikov, his organization, whose supporters number around
200, posted Milinkevich's biographical information and
portraits on highly-trafficked places during rush hour to
increase public recognition of Milinkevich. MF vice-chairman

Sergei Lisichonak recently told Poloff that MF, whose numbers
range from 1,000-2,000 members, works out of the Milinkevich
campaign team headquarters and leads regional campaign
offices.


3. (C) RA's Karetnikov remarked to Poloff on February 8 that
the youth with whom he has spoken at universities are afraid
to support any candidate other than Lukashenko. Karetnikov
admitted that he was shocked because this reaction was not
what he expected from the youth. (Note: Belarusian Popular
Front representative and Milinkevich campaign team member
Alex Yanukevich told Poloff on February 7 that the current
mentality of students also startled Milinkevich's team.
According to Yanukevich, youth under the age of 25 are not
actively seeking alternatives to Luakshenko for two reasons:
they either do not want problems with the authorities or they
openly support Lukashenko and his policies. The latter
reason, which could be attributed to the GOB's ideology
campaign, was practically unheard of three years ago when
supporting Lukashenko was akin to saying one liked the
police.)


4. (C) According to Third Way (TW) youth group leader Pavel
Morosev, Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Hramada" leader
Aleksandr Kozulin, appeals to the youth as the best candidate
for moderate change without violence because Kozulin is more
in the middle - somewhere between the "repressive Lukashenko"
and the "liberal Milinkevich." Morosev told Pol/Econ Chief
and Poloff on January 30 that Kozulin, the former rector of
Belarus State University (BSU),is more pro-Moscow and has
the support of the nomenclature in Belarus. The TW
representative opined that young people want change, but they
are against violence and do not want bloodshed or a
revolution. When P/E Chief noted that Kozulin has yet to
reach Milinkevich's ratings of name recognition and popular
support in the latest independent (and state-controlled)
polls, Morosev countered that Kozulin's reportedly low
ratings are not accurate. He called into question the
quality of polls conducted in a repressive environment like

Belarus and the impartialit
y of U.S.-financed opinion polls.


5. (C) RA leader Karetnikov admitted that Kozulin may have
some popularity in Minsk, given his former position as BSU
rector. However, Karetnikov noted that since Kozulin was a
government official, many people also see him as a puppet for
the Lukashenko regime. Karetnikov went on to assert that the
youth who want change without bloodshed are "cowards" and
suggested that significant risk and sacrifice always
accompany significant change. That said, Karetnikov
recognizes that the level of fear in Belarusian society must
decrease in order for the opposition to have a chance to
defeat Lukashenko now or in the future.

Milinkevich's Minsk Maidan
--------------


6. (C) Karetnikov told Poloff that RA is helping
Milinkevich's campaign team to orchestrate a Minsk "Maidan"
on Victory Square on Election Day. Karetnikov said a maidan
is only possible in the capital; the people in the regions
are not ready to come out en masse. In order to conduct as
safe a demonstration as possible, Karetnikov explained RA is
supposed to determine via observation and personal law
enforcement contacts where the greatest concentration of the
police forces will be on Election Day. Karetnikov also told
Poloff that it was RA's responsibility to surround
Milinkevich with as many people as possible before escorting
him to October Square to ensure his safety.


7. (C) Karetnikov suspects that the GOB will close the metro
station next to October Square and will reroute public
transportation away from the square to make it more difficult
for people to congregate. Karetnikov has proposed to the
Milinkevich campaign team that people meet at three nearby
locations and walk en masse to October Square. (Note: RA has
not received Milinkevich's decision on their proposal.)


8. (C) According to Karetnikov, two conflicting
announcements about the Maidan have been released. The first
announcement instructs people from the regions to travel
immediately after voting to Minsk so that they can
participate in the Maidan. The second announcement, which
came from Milinkevich campaign head Sergei Kalyakin, advised
people to go to their local polling stations at 8:00 p.m. on
Election Day to learn the official results in their
respective stations and then to proceed to Minsk. Karetnikov
said that Kalyakin's plan would be ineffective, given that
most people in the regions would not be able to reach Minsk
until the following day and part of the momentum of the
Maidan campaign would be lost.

Youth Begin to Cooperate, But Friction Remains
-------------- -


9. (C) On February 14, Zubr spokesperson Aleksandr
Atroschenkov told Poloff that the leaders of the Day of
Solidarity/Jeans campaign, the "Enough" campaign and the "I
am for Freedom" campaign have all officially agreed to
maintain separate campaigns but to work together to
simultaneously promote all three campaigns. (Note: This
agreement seems to be the first indication of cooperation
between these campaigns.)


10. (C) MF's Lisichonak claimed that the "Enough" campaign -
i.e., the initiative to create a series of "mini-maidans"
throughout Belarus - was originally MF's idea. According to
Lisichonak, MF created an "I Love Belarus" campaign to
mobilize Belarusian youth in an attempt to try to recreate
Kiev's Maidian Square. Then, an unnamed colleague stole the
idea, changed the name of the campaign to "Enough" and found
separate donors. Lisichonak claimed the campaign has been
manipulated to fit the personal interests of individuals in
municipal elections, which apparently further upset MF and
the Milinkevich team.


11. (C) While RA's Karetnikov told Poloff that approximately
10-15% of RA members participate actively in "Enough" by
distributing information about the campaign, Karetnikov
believes that the Day of Solidarity campaign is floundering.
(Note: Karetnikov's comments were made before the February 16

Day of Solidarity event on October Square. See ref B for
more details.) Karetnikov said that RA had supported the Day
of Solidarity campaign by posting information about the
initiative on their website instructing supporters to light a
candle on the 16th of every month, but decided not to
participate when overall enthusiasm for the campaign waned.


12. (C) Karetnikov dismissed Zubr's Jeans Campaign - an
initiative to encourage the demonstration of solidarity
through wearing denim (ref B) - as an ineffective initiative
whose primary audience is the West. Morosev echoed
Karetnivkov sentiments and added that, "just like McDonalds,
Zubr has a product to sell, which is why Zubr exaggerates the
impact of and the level of participation in the Day of
Solidarity and the Jeans campaigns." (Note: Morosev stated
that he views his organization as a "neutral" youth group
that is able to be honest and objective.)

Youth - A Cheap Resource for the Milinkevich Team?
-------------- --------------


13. (C) TW's Morosev opined that the youth occupy a low place
in Milinkevich's campaign. Morosev predicted that
Milinkevich will use the youth as a "cheap resource" - that
is, making them take risks and do dangerous things, like
leading riots and protests. (Note: Emboffs have heard
similar criticism against the Milinkevich team from prominent
women's organizations in Belarus (ref C).)


14. (C) MF's Lisichonak told Poloff on January 10 that
Milinkevich's campaign team wants MF to organize street
campaigns during the election. According to Lisichonak, MF
wants to work with people, spread information, and most
importantly, mobilize Belarusians for protests in the post
election period. Without this preparation, Lisichonak feared
that the number of people on the streets would be as small as
the number after the 2001 elections - 150-200 people
according to some estimates. However, Lisichonak said that
he and MF head Dmitry Dashkevich were upset with
Milinkevich's decision to delegate conducting protests to MF
because it puts the MF members in greater danger. Lisichonak
said they had already heard rumors that several MF members
could be arrested before the elections begin.


15. (C) Karetnikov told Poloff that RA plans to offer its
service as Milinkevich's security detail when he travels
around Belarus after he is registered. Four RA members will
accompany Milinkevich at all times as his bodyguards. (Note:
Right Alliance provided security services at the October
Congress of Democratic Forces.)

Police Crackdown on Youth Activists
--------------


16. (C) Despite the overall lack of activism among the youth,
harassment, arrests and detention of this demographic by
police has intensified in the lead up to the elections. On
February 17, four Zubr members were sentenced to 10-15 days
in prison for "petty hooliganism" after police arrested them
for standing in the street with a lighted candle in their
hands at the Day of Solidarity demonstration on February 16.
On February 13, a local court fined MF youth activist Yevgeny
Skrabutan USD 135 for illegal electioneering and distribution
of materials after police detained him the day before and
confiscated 5,000 wallet-size calendars featuring
Milinkevich. Zubr spokesman Atroschenkov presented to Poloff
a document detailing hundreds of examples of arrests and
detentions of Zubr activists in the past five months. Since
the start of the Day of Solidarity campaign on September 16,
191 Zubr activists were detained by police for participating
youth group related activities and seven were sent to prison.



17. (C) Atroschenkov noted that the police are careful not to
charge youth activists with political offenses; instead, they
use minor charges against the youth like hooliganism, an
offense which is punishable by up to two years. Atroschenkov
described a recent example where on February 13, Zubr
activist Yevgeny Afnagel was charged with hooliganism,
detained overnight, and sentenced to 15 days in prison for
using foul language in public. Atroschenkov also mentioned a
youth activist who was detained and faces up to six years in


prison for removing a Belarusian flag from the Minsk City
Executive Committee Building on January 18 and faces.

--------------
Comment
--------------


18. (C) Emboffs repeatedly hear from opposition party leaders
and civil society activists all over the country that
Belarusian youth, in general, are either too scared or too
content with the current regime to support any candidate
other than Lukashenko. However, there are some youth who
seem committed to using the upcoming elections as a rare
opportunity to motivate people to seek democratic change.
Currently, youth-backed civic initiatives, such as the Day of
Solidarity or Enough, receive more attention abroad than in
Belarus, but with the official start of the campaign on
February 17, opposition candidates and civil society will
have more direct and frequent access to voters - in theory.
Krol