40 DAYS TO ELECTION DAY: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 000131

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: 40 DAYS TO ELECTION DAY: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE REMAIN IFFY

REF: MINSK 108

Classified By: Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: With presidential elections only a month
and a half away, the campaign "process" is well underway, but
more in form than substance. Incumbent President Lukashenko,
10 Coalition candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich, former
Belarusian State University rector Anatoly Kozulin, and
pro-Lukashenko Liberal Democratic Party leader Sergey
Gaidukevich remain the most likely candidates. However, most
Belarusians hardly feel presidential elections are just
around the corner, given the calculated lack of information
reaching the public about any of the candidates or issues but
Lukashenko and his successes. Recognizing its chances of
dislodging Lukashenko are slim, the opposition hopes these
elections will help expand their base of support and
encourage more Belarusians to defend their political
freedoms. But most Belarusians appear apathetic or even
satisfied with the regime's economic policies. Still, polls
show a significant number of Belarusians would prefer an
alternative to Lukashenko if one existed
. But, so far, one has not appeared. Lukashenko's support
remains substantial but could be vulnerable to unexpected
events. Russian support remains key but underlying economic
weaknesses threaten Lukashenko's long-term hold on Belarus.
End Summary.


40 Days Out, Opposition Making Itself Known
--------------


2. (C) President Lukashenko, 10 Coalition candidate and NGO
leader Aleksandr Milinkevich, former Belarusian State
University rector Anatoly Kozulin, and pro-Lukashenko MP
Sergey Gaidukevich recently submitted the minimum number of
signatures of voter support to contest the March presidential
elections (reftel). Central Election Committee (CEC)
officials announced they will verify the signatures and
register the candidates by February 19. (Note: Milinkevich
and Kozulin defied expectations and exceeded the 100,000
signature threshold, but their campaign leaders acknowledge
that Lukashenko may still give the order to disqualify one or
both of the remaining opposition contenders.)


3. (C) The latest Lithuanian Gallup polls (financed by U.S.
NGO IRI) indicate that the name recognition ratings of
"single" candidate Milinkevich soared from 59 percent in
November 2005 to 79 percent in mid-January, and his popular
support ratings went from nine percent in November to 17
percent in mid-January. (Note: Lukashenko's support ratings
hover around 54 percent. Civil society leaders around the
country dispute that Milinkevich's name recognition has
reached 79 percent. They say that Milinkevich is only
beginning to be a familiar name to voters.)


4. (C) Opposition figure Anatoly Kozulin chose not to
participate in the single candidate process and launched his
own presidential campaigns. Kozulin continues to receive low
polling numbers -- less than 3 percent of popular support in
the Gallup poll. However, the former state university rector
and Social Democratic Party leader may appeal to Belarusians
(and Russian backers) who do not like Lukashenko voters but
support strong ties with Russia. Kozulin may also appeal to
those who support gradual reform and fear Milinkevich is a
Belarusian nationalist trying to rush Belarus into Western
arms. Kozulin recently announced that he was against all
"destabilizing activities" organized by some elements of the
opposition.


5. (C) Although Milinkevich has offered to join forces with
Kozulin, the latter seems intent on going alone or only under
his single leadership. Suspicions continue that Kozulin, who
once considered himself a Lukashenko protg, may be playing
a double game for his old boss in trying to divide or buy the
opposition.


Opposition Knows Elections Will Be A Sham
--------------


6. (C) Both Milinkevich and Kozulin campaign teams view the
elections more as a rare opportunity to establish contact
with voters and broaden support for long-term changes. While
they still hope for the best, they recognize the chances of a
clear opposition election victory or a popular rejection of
falsified elections results are remote. Many opposition and
civil society leaders around the country lament that voters,
in general, either know little to nothing about the

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opposition, accept the GOB view of the opposition as greedy,
anti-Belarus insurrectionists, or are resigned to the belief
that the opposition is incapable of ousting the regime.


Lukashenko Regime Still Strong
--------------


7. (C) Lukashenko has been able to remain in power for 12
years. His staying power rests on several key factors:

-- Information Monopoly: The regime has successfully
eliminated or severely limited independent media. TV and
radio are solidly under state control and even Russian
channels are censored. Belarusian state media focuses
relentlessly on promoting Lukashenko's success in turning
Belarus into a model of stable prosperity while crudely
lambasting the opposition and the U.S. and western countries
as failing states out to destabilize Belarus. There will be
no public debate between Lukashenko and the other candidates;
not even the names of opposition figures are mentioned in
state media. Over the last few weeks, state media has
devoted significant attention to the Third All Belarusian
National Assembly, which is scheduled to take place in early
March. The Assembly is taking on all the Soviet-style
trappings of a pro-Lukashenko political convention. (See
septel for details on the Assembly.) Judging from the media,
one would not think a presidential election is only a month
and a half away.

-- Loyal Security Forces: Lukashenko most recently stressed
in a January 27 interview that, "if there is any bodily
movement toward destabilization of our situation, we'll twist
the necks of those who will do that and those who will
encourage and finance(. Too much is at stake in these
elections." The regime has put into law a number of measures
aimed to prevent any kind of "colored revolutions" and
security forces appear ready to execute Lukashenko's command
to prevent protesters from even starting to gather. However,
we have judged the security organs would not likely use
lethal force if significant numbers of Belarusians would
actually succeed in entering the streets. (Note: See septel
for a more detailed assessment of the likely GOB reaction to
possible civic disturbances.)

-- Economic Growth and Stability: Even Lukashenko's
opposition concedes that the economic situation in Belarus,
based mainly on subsidized energy supplies from Russia and
high world energy prices, favors Lukashenko staying in power.
Belarusians remember the economic chaos of the 1990s,
observe (through Belarusian state media) apparent economic
turbulence in Georgia, Ukraine and Russia, and breathe a sigh
of relief that their economy is not "unstable" as their
neighbors'. Meanwhile, state media touts that in Belarus
salaries are regularly raised and pensions are paid on time.

-- Russian Support: Putin's December 15 decision to continue
providing Belarus with ridiculously low energy prices - USD
47 per 1000 tbc - confirmed for most Belarusians Moscow's
support for Lukashenko's bid to stay in power. Moscow has
refrained from any criticism of Lukashenko and has hosted him
at high-level meetings in Moscow and St Petersburg, visually
demonstrating to Belarusian voters their tacit embrace.
Lukashenko knows most Belarusians believe Belarus cannot
survive without strong ties with Russia. Russia may have
gotten Lukashenko's agreement to sell Belarus' strategically
important gas and oil pipelines as a quid pro quo for
continued support, but the wily Lukashenko may succeed as he
has so often in the past in evading paying back all his debts
to Mother Russia.

-- Absence of a Viable Alternative: Despite its considerable
progress in achieving greater internal unity, Belarus'
political opposition has so far been unable to reach out to
the broader population and project a realistic alternative to
Lukashenko. Furthermore, the announcement of early
presidential elections significantly reduced the opportunity
for the opposition to develop its campaign. The opposition
political parties present few new, fresh or diverse faces.
Efforts by some civil society activists to develop popular
street campaigns have garnered more foreign than domestic
notice and support.


But Prospects for Change Also Strong
--------------


8. (C) Political and economic change in Belarus is
inevitable over time, but a regime change in March appears

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highly unlikely unless Lukashenko makes a miscalculation that
costs him popular, nomenclature, and/or Russian support, or
if one of the opposition candidates start to "catch fire"
with the public. The pillars underlying Lukashenko's regime
are all subject to change. While appearing strong now, they
could crumble if faced with a real external or internal
challenge or some unexpected event.


9. (C) Lukashenko does not act like a confident man. He is
increasingly isolated and there are indications that his
economic "miracle" may not be sustainable much longer after
the elections. Russia has already served notice Belarus will
soon have to pay market prices for gas and oil and Belarusian
products are starting to lose ground in the developing
Russian market. Plans to broadcast independent radio and
television programs into Belarus could impact the information
monopoly the regime currently enjoys. The March elections
could destroy the current generation of political opposition
leadership but they might provide the opportunity for new
faces and approaches to emerge to challenge a regime growing
increasingly brittle and isolated in a dynamic, globalized
region and world. Finally, Lukashenko, his circle and Russia
know Lukashenko cannot last forever. He will have to focus
at some point on his future and his legacy or face the
inevitable fate of other authoritarian leaders who thought
they could ha
ng on forever.


U.S.: Staying the Course
--------------


10. (C) Belarusians have repeatedly thanked the United
States for remaining a steadfast partner in promoting
democracy in Belarus, but encourage us to maintain our
commitment to Belarus even if the March elections fail to
motivate enough Belarusians to demand change. The regime's
policy of self-isolation and cruel political repression will
eventually catch up to Lukashenko. Meanwhile, the U.S.
should continue to work with its partners, especially the EU,
in facilitating the inflow of independent information,
strengthening civil society, and expanding contacts with
Belarusian society, reaching out beyond the known opposition
to the youth and the increasingly frustrated but vulnerable
nomenclature. The U.S. should continue to shine the
spotlight on Belarus before, during and after the March
elections and encourage others to do so as well. The U.S.
should also be wary of Russia's relentless efforts to bind
Belarus yet more tightly in violation of Belarus' true
sovereignty and independence.
Krol