Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK1283
2006-12-15 14:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

LUKASHENKO, UNDER RUSSIAN PRESSURE, TRIES TO SHORE

Tags:  PGOV PREL EPET BO RS 
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VZCZCXRO7335
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSK #1283/01 3491403
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151403Z DEC 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5440
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1380
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001283 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET BO RS
SUBJECT: LUKASHENKO, UNDER RUSSIAN PRESSURE, TRIES TO SHORE
UP OFFSHORE ECONOMY

REF: A. MINSK 1234


B. MOSCOW 12711

Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001283

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET BO RS
SUBJECT: LUKASHENKO, UNDER RUSSIAN PRESSURE, TRIES TO SHORE
UP OFFSHORE ECONOMY

REF: A. MINSK 1234


B. MOSCOW 12711

Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) News Russia would begin charging full export duties on
oil shipments to Belarus effective January 1 caught
Lukashenko off guard, necessitating a hastily planned
December 15 visit to Moscow. Although the GOB has downplayed
the significance of the decision, the imposition of 100
percent of the export duty would risk seriously damaging the
Belarusian economy by ending its de facto status as an
offshore destination for Russian oil companies. Possible
outcomes from the Moscow meeting range from Belarus achieving
a partial rollback on the duty to 70 percent of the standard
to Lukashenko deciding to declare an end to the bilateral
customs union. End summary.

Fradkov's Multi-Billion Dollar Signature
--------------


2. (C) A December 12 article in Kommersant, viewed in Belarus
as the semi-official newspaper for Gazprom, quoted sections
of a decree signed by Russian Prime Minister Fradkov
subjecting oil exports to Belarus to 100 percent of the
duties charged to all other exports. Such a decree would
cause a direct loss of roughly USD 2 billion to the
Belarusian budget by ending opportunities to import oil at an
approximately 50 percent discount and sell refined oil
products at world market prices. Yaroslav Romanchuk,
Director of the Mises Research Center, estimated the total
losses to the Belarusian budget -- including harm to
state-owned enterprises depending on subsidized energy
resources -- would amount to USD 3.5 to 4 billion, which is
up to 15 percent of the GOB's budget.


3. (C) Irina Tochitskaya, Deputy Director of the Institute
for Privatization and Management, told Acting Pol/Econ Chief
the overall budgetary consequences would significantly exceed
USD 2 billion, but would not hazard a more precise forecast.
She suggested that in such case the GOB would likely devalue
the Belarusian ruble (BYR) in an attempt to prop up the
already limited competitiveness of Belarusian exporters.

Such a strategy would entail the risk of a loss of confidence
in the BYR, especially given already low foreign currency
reserves. Aleksandr Zaborovskiy, an energy economist at the
Academy of Sciences, tried to toe the usual government line
that the Belarusian economy was resilient, although even he
admitted that an end to oil preferences from Russia would
have serious consequences by 2008.

Public Reaction Muted
--------------


4. (C) The GOB has so far successfully downplayed the
economic impact of the decree. The GOB argues that Russia's
decision would affect Belarus' budget, but would not greatly
influence the life of the ordinary Belarusian citizen or have
a significant effect on gasoline prices. However, in the
last three weeks gasoline prices have increased on two
occasions, the last witnessing a four percent increase. The
Belarusian population has taken price increases in stride,
with no signs of lines at gas stations. Utility bills in the
last month increased by over ten percent.

Lukashenko Changes Course to Try to Save the Day
-------------- ---


5. (C) According to Romanchuk, the decree goes back on a
framework that would have imposed a export duty at 70 percent
the standard rate, preserving a limited offshore status for
Belarus. Likely Lukashenko got wind of the decision early,
thus explaining the sudden cancellation of his visit to
Vietnam scheduled to begin December 11. The fact the decree
came from the Prime Minister (rather than Putin) and was not
released publicly gave him at least some hope of softening
the blow.


6. (C) Political analyst Vladimir Podgol told Poloff until
recently Lukashenko believed Moscow was bluffing, but
Fradkov's decree may have changed his mind. Romanchuk told
us the most Lukashenko can hope to achieve this trip is Putin
reverting to the status quo ante of a 70 percent duty. Even
in this case, Moscow would likely insist on collecting the
duty directly, rather than relying on Belarus charging an

MINSK 00001283 002 OF 002


export duty and splitting the revenues with Moscow. Moscow
no longer trusts anything Lukashenko says, according to
Romanchuk, and will not provide concessions today in return
for more Belarusian promises.


7. (C) Zaborovskiy noted Fradkov's decree called into
question the Belarus-Russia customs union, the cornerstone of
integration efforts, a claim also reported in state media.
Romanchuk said if Lukashenko believes his lobbying efforts
are to no avail, he could declare an end to the union. This
would position him as a defender of Belarusian interests
against a mercantilist Russia bent on profit at the expense
of Slavic brotherhood.

Comment: Will Lukashenko Run Out of Delaying Tactics?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Lukashenko's manipulations of Russian sympathies has
allowed him to perpetuate a system allowing Belarus to use
rising energy prices to its advantage. He has matched his
delay tactics in negotiations with Russia with attempts to
lessen energy dependence on Russia in the long-term (Ref A).
In fitting in an extra bilateral with Putin ahead of the CIS
summit in Astana (Ref B),Lukashenko hopes once again to push
moves by Russia to end subsidies well into the future. The
haste with which the visit was planned suggests Lukashenko at
last genuinely fears threats from Russia; given Moscow's
disdain for him, it's also interesting that Putin is
receiving Belarus' dictator on short notice.
Stewart