LOCAL COUNCIL DEPUTIES FACING AN UPHILL BATTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001241

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR INR
KIEV ALSO FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BO
SUBJECT: LOCAL COUNCIL DEPUTIES FACING AN UPHILL BATTLE

REF: MINSK 1056

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Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Pro-democratic local council deputies from the regions
of
Belarus claimed to have high public support within their
districts but doubted it would be enough to win re-election
in
what they predict will be fraudulent local council elections
in
January. Deputies informed Ambassador that GOB harassment
was
worse than what they faced in the 2003 local council
elections.
Despite the relentless pressure, the deputies' commitment to
democratic change and concern for public welfare keeps them
from
giving up. End summary.

High Support Cannot Beat Falsified Elections
--------------


2. (C) On November 24 Ambassador hosted a lunch with 13
regional
independent and opposition local council deputies at her
residence. DCM, Pol/Econ Chief, and Poloff also attended.
Deputies stressed that the GOB had already determined the
results of the local council elections scheduled for January
14,

2007. According to Bobruisk (Mogilev oblast) city council
member Ales Chigir, Minsk officials had already sent regional
and local executive committees lists of pro-GOB local council
candidate hopefuls who were to be "elected."


3. (C) All the deputies claimed to have high public support
within their districts and predicted that they could easily
be
re-elected if elections were free and fair. Grodno city
council
deputy Sergey Antusevich told Ambassador that constituents
understand the value of independent and opposition deputies:
despite limited influence and resources, opposition deputies
make every effort to address the specific concern of
constituents. Constituents from other voting districts often
approach Antusevich with problems that their pro-GOB
representatives ignore.


4. (C) Berezy (Brest oblast) district council deputy Evgeniy
Prokurat told Pol/Econ Chief that independent and opposition
deputies' interests correlated with those of their
constituents
while pro-GOB deputies supported government interests.
Recognizing the need to make some concessions to
constituents,
pro-GOB deputies have worked with opposition deputies to
settle
some domestic issues, but collaboration is limited and
discrete.

Election Code Changes Make Manipulation Easier
--------------


5. (C) The changes in the Electoral Code were another GOB
measure to make election manipulation easier (ref A).
Pukhovichi (Minsk oblast) regional council deputy Ales
Mikhalevich admitted that in most democratic countries, the
elimination of second round voting would be seen as a cost-
saving measure and advantageous to minority parties.
However,
in Belarus the plurality voting system would only work if
authorities actually counted the votes. When asked by
Ambassador, Antusevich claimed the public was well aware of
the
electoral fraud but was not willing to risk their jobs to
contest it.

Job Loss Remains Common Tool of Pressure
--------------


6. (C) Gorodok (Vitebsk oblast) regional council member
Leonid
Gurovoi explained to Ambassador that the authorities' most
common tactic was to use the contract system to threaten

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deputies, candidate hopefuls, their supporters, and family
members with job loss. It is extremely effective in the
regions
because virtually the only sources of employment are
state-run
enterprises or farms. If a deputy or candidate hopeful is
self-
employed, authorities use bureaucracy and government services
(i.e., tax/fire inspections, fines) to force deputies'
private
businesses into bankruptcy, similar to what happened to
Gurovoi's business. Mikhalevich explained that first-time
candidates and new activists suffer the most harassment
because
experienced activists had long since lost their jobs and are
therefore not as susceptible to the authorities' pressure and
blackmail.

Boosting Their Support
--------------


7. (C) The deputies explained that their door-to-door
signature
and information campaigns were the reason for their
relatively
strong popular support. The door-to-door schemes are so
successful that pro-GOB candidate hopefuls were also using
the
same tactics to improve their reputation among voters.
Ambassador noted that this development was a small sign of
democratic change in the GOB mentality of how an election
should
be conducted.

Support For Milinkevich, But Doubts on Congress
--------------


8. (C) Beloozersk (Brest oblast) city council deputies Yuras
Gubarevich and Dmitriy Tretyak, Prokurat, and Verkhnedvinsk
(Vitebsk oblast) regional council deputy Valentina
Kudlatskaya
asserted that coalition leader Aleksandr Milinkevich had
large
support in the regions. His recent campaign to collect
signatures on the behalf of local council candidates had
impressed voters and the state media's negative portrayal of
Milinkevich only helped boost his name recognition. United
Civic Party leader Anatoliy Lebedko and other national
opposition leaders are less known and popular than
Milinkevich
(ref B).


9. (C) The deputies had mixed feelings about convening a
second
congress of democratic forces. Mozyr (Gomel oblast) city
council deputy Leonid Orlov opined that the purpose of the
first
congress had long been realized and a second congress was
needed
to come up with a new plan. Other deputies told Pol/Econ
Chief
that the coalition parties and leaders were genuinely not
interested in working together. Until opposition groups were
serious about cooperating, another congress would likely be a
waste of time and resources, or worse. (Note: The need for
another congress was an issue of intense debate during the
recent conference sponsored by the U.S. NGO NDI for regional
UDF
coalition leaders. The majority of the leaders present at
the
conference in Kyiv formally agreed that the UDF should
organize
another congress following the local elections. End note.)

Nomenklatura In the Regions Skeptical of Lukashenko's
Leadership
--------------


10. (C) According to Gubarevich and Kudlatskaya, 85% of
voters
in their districts believe Lukashenko can pull off a miracle
and
prevent the gas price increases from affecting their lives.
(Note: Approximately 36% of Belarusians nationwide believe
this
as well (ref B). End note.) The nomenklatura, the other 15%,
believes otherwise but do not want to risk their comfortable

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jobs by speaking out against Lukashenko's policies. The same
story exists for regional business leaders who, according to
Kudlatskaya, grudgingly carry out "stupid" economic and
political orders and complain about their decreasing ability
to
make their own decisions. According to Orlov, the elite in
Belarus is fed up with Lukashenko's rule because they are
tired
of being treated like robots and subject to fear and
repression.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Despite the odds against them, the deputies displayed
a
level of charisma and determination that, based on their
stories
and our regional travel, seems to be lacking in their pro-GOB
counterparts. They all seemed to possess a deep sense of
commitment to democratic values and the welfare of their
constituents. According to an independent public survey in
November, 36.5% of Belarusians do not see local councils
affecting their lives. After listening to these deputies, it
is
understandable why; pro-GOB deputies are "elected" to serve
the
GOB's interests, not those of their constituents. All the
deputies expect fraudulent elections and doubt they will even
pass the candidate registration stage beginning on December

4.
However, judging from their personalities, that is not enough
to
stop them from trying anyway.
Stewart