Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK1222
2006-11-24 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

FREED MP CALLS FOR SHADOW GOVERNMENT, UNSC DEBATE

Tags:  PFOV PHUM PREL BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1203
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSK #1222/01 3281443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241443Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5361
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1351
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001222 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PFOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: FREED MP CALLS FOR SHADOW GOVERNMENT, UNSC DEBATE

REF: A. MINSK 172


B. MINSK 965

C. MINSK 1204

MINSK 00001222 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001222

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PFOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: FREED MP CALLS FOR SHADOW GOVERNMENT, UNSC DEBATE

REF: A. MINSK 172


B. MINSK 965

C. MINSK 1204

MINSK 00001222 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador recently met with former opposition MP and
political prisoner Sergey Skrebets following his release on
amnesty. While Skrebets described the prison conditions he
and fellow hunger striking political prisoner Aleksandr
Kozulin faced as somewhat better than the general prison
population, Skrebets noted that authorities rePeatedly denied
him and Kozulin contact with their families and attorneys.
Noting that he will represent Kozulin at the upcoming
congress of Belarusian opposition forces, Skrebets called on
the opposition to create a shadow government and on the
United States to raise the human rights situation in Belarus
at the UN Security Council. Although suc( actions are
probably impracticable, Skrebets' efforts to unify Belarus'
social democrats behind the cause of liberating Belarusian
political prisoners is laudable. End Summary.

Skrebets on Amnesty and Prison Conditions
--------------


2. (C) On November 21, Ambassador met with former opposition
MP and political prisoner Sergey Skrebets, whom the
Belarusian Supreme Court convicted on February 14 on
politically motivated charges of securifg an illegal loan for
his business and illegally managing a company while serving
as an MP (reftel A). (Note: The court sentenced Skrebets to
30 months in prison, minus nine months served in pre-trial
detention in connection with a bribery charge, of which
Skrebets was acquitted.) On November 15, Skrebets was
released on what authorities called an amnesty. However,
while meeting with Ambassador, Skrebets emphatically objected
to anyQmplication of GOB clemency on the grounds that he was
legQy entitled Q amnesty as early as March and because of
his treatment in the Vitsba-3 prison.


3. (C) While conceding that medical and sanitation
conditions for political prisoners are in general better than
those of the general prison population, Skrebets decried the
unusual psychological abuse and isolation that he and his
fellow prisoners of conscience endure. He noted that the

prison administration repeatedly denied his wife permission
to visit him, even on his birthday. Skrebets added that
while he staged a 40-day hunger strike during his pre-trial
detention authorities continually refused him legal counsel.

Kozulin's Hunger Strike and Isolation
--------------


4. (C) Referring to imprisoned opposition Belarusian Social
Democratic Party "Gramada" (BSDP) Chair and former
presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin, Ambassador asked
Skrebets whether such isolation is typical for hunger
striking political prisoners (ref B). Skrebets responded
affirmatively but intimated that the authorities are applying
unusually high pressure on Kozulin by denying him contact
with his family and lawyers until Kozulin ends the hunger
strike that he began on October 20 to protest the start of
President Lukashenko's fraudulently elected third term (ref
C). (Note: Skrebets had again been on hunger strike for
nearly three weeks prior to his release as a demonstration of
solidarity with Kozulin. End note.)


5. (C) Skrebets confirmed reports that Kozulin's wife Irina
Kozulina had attempted to visit her husband at Vitsba-3 on
November 16 but again had been turned away by prison
authorities. Skrebets also related that Kozulin attorney
Igor Rynkevich had told him just before meeting with
Ambassador that authorities had again refused Rynkevich a
meeting with Kozulin on the false grounds that the prisoner
did not want to meet with anyone.


6. (C) Noting that he had daily contact with Kozulin since
Kozulin's imprisonment at Vitsba-3, Skrebets reiterated to
Ambassador his earlier public statement that Kozulin has lost
about 20 percent of his body weight (ref C). When Ambassador
asked whether Kozulin would continue his hunger strike to the
end, Skrebets responded that Kozulin would make that decision
when he has lost 30 percent of his body weight because
Kozulin believes that he can still recover fully from the
effects of his hunger strike until that time. According to
Skrebets, Kozulin would base his decision to continue or end

MINSK 00001222 002.2 OF 002


the strike on the response of the Belarusian opposition and
the international community to Kozulin's call for action
against the Lukashenko regime.

Shadow Government to Force Opposition to Put Up or Shut Up
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Skrebets reiterated and endorsed Kozulin's call upon
Belarus' opposition to convene a large-scale meeting of the
leaders of the major parties of the United Democratic Forces
(UDF),the Belarusian diaspora, and members of the 13th
Supreme Soviet, which Lukashenko disbanded in 1996, with the
purpose of forming a shadow government. This shadow
government would proclaim sovereignty and request
international recognition. According to Skrebets, Kozulin
believes that such a meeting on the formation of a shadow
government would force UDF leaders to prove their courage and
commitment to democratic change in Belarus or make way for
new leaders willing to do so. When Ambassador asked Skrebets
whether he sees new leaders ready to step forward, he replied
that the support shown for Kozulin, especially among young
people, had revealed the existence of such potential
leadership.

Requests UN Security Council Debate on Belarus
-------------- -


8. (C) Seeming to recognize the ambitiousness of Kozulin's
proposal, Skrebets' suggested a somewhat more modest action
from the international community by requesting that the U.S.
"raise the possibility of raising the issue of Belarus" at
the UN Security Council. When Ambassador mentioned past U.S.
sponsorship of UN General Assembly resolutions on Belarus and
noted that the GOB recently seemed to be more adroit in its
dealings with the UN, Skrebets conceded that an actual debate
in the Security Council about Belarus was not likely but
insisted that the U.S. could send a powerful message to the
Lukashenko regime by proposing such a debate.

Skrebets' Future Plans
--------------


9. (C) When Ambassador asked Skrebets about his plans for
the future, Skrebets responded that he would focus on rest
and recuperation and that he had not decided whether to
return to politics. However, Skrebets noted that he would
speak on behalf of Kozulin at the second UDF congress
following the January 14 local elections. Moreover, he
mentioned that he had already met with internally exiled
former BSDP leader Nikolai Statkevich and former Head of
State Stanislav Shushkevich in an effort to unify Belarusian
social democrats behind the cause of emancipating Kozulin and
other Belarusian political prisoners.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Skrebets' objections to interpreting his "amnesty"
as GOB clemency are quite right. The reasons and conditions
of his politically motivated imprisonment constitute an
egregious violation of his basic human rights and those of
the Belarusian people. Although his calls for a shadow
government and Security Council debates are probably
unrealistic at this time, his participation on Kozulin's
behalf at the upcoming UDF congress and his efforts to unify
the various BSDP factions and personalities could contribute
to holding the Belarusian opposition together in the run-up
to next year's parliamentary elections.
Stewart