Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK1141
2006-10-24 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

MILINKEVICH PROMOTES HIS OWN MOVEMENT IN MEETING

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL BO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001141 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH PROMOTES HIS OWN MOVEMENT IN MEETING
WITH AMBASSADOR

REF: A. MINSK 737


B. MINSK 951

C. MINSK 1109

MINSK 00001141 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH PROMOTES HIS OWN MOVEMENT IN MEETING
WITH AMBASSADOR

REF: A. MINSK 737


B. MINSK 951

C. MINSK 1109

MINSK 00001141 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On October 20, Ambassador met with opposition
coalition leader Milinkevich to discuss the status of the
United Democratic Forces (UDF). Milinkevich stressed that
the coalition was generally united despite internal
disagreements on strategy, a second coalition congress, and
UDF leadership. Milinkevich accepted responsibility as UDF
leader for any failures within the coalition, but also
accused some of his UDF colleagues of creating a pro-Moscow
opposition block. He also used the meeting to lobby for his
ambiguous "For Freedom" movement as a non-political campaign
to allegedly engage pro-democratic organizations and
activists disenfranchised with the UDF. However, the nature
of Milinkevich accusations against other UDF leaders and his
complaints of UDF inaction indicated that he appeared to be
more of a contributor to the UDF's internal problems rather
than someone capable of solving them. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador October 20 met with opposition coalition
leader and former presidential candidate Aleksandr
Milinkevich to discuss the status of the UDF and its future
plans. Deputy Chief of Mission and Pol/Econ Chief also
attended. Milinkevich thanked Ambassador for the meeting and
praised the United States' continued and active support for
democratic change in Belarus.

Coalition Remains United, But Has Problems
--------------


3. (C) Milinkevich noted that although UDF leaders do not
agree on all issues, they remain generally united in their
desire for a democratic Belarus. He praised the UDF's unity
in the "Solidarity" program supporting the politically
repressed, but noted the UDF's failure to collaborate with
regional activists or effectively conduct an information
campaign. In addition, political ambitions and disagreements
over strategies and congresses had created a stalemate within
the UDF that has lasted six months, disenfranchising

proactive individuals and organizations in the process.


4. (C) Milinkevich and his support base - primarily the
Belarusian National Front (BNF),small deregistered parties
and NGOs - believe a UDF leader with broader powers is needed
to implement strategy and speed up the decision making
process within the coalition. Milinkevich admitted that
although he was chosen as the UDF presidential candidate, he
had assumed the position of UDF leader out of necessity, but
his initiatives had been hindered by infighting over what the
UDF leader's responsibilities and powers were. According to
Milinkevich, a UDF leadership position needed to be
established with defined powers if the coalition wanted to
move forward. However, the Belarusian Communist Party (BCP)
and United Civic Party (UCP) oppose a more vertical UDF
leadership structure, especially if Milinkevich occupied the
position, and support a coalition ruled by a committee of
leaders of opposition groups.


5. (C) Milinkevich cited the creation of a leftist block
within the coalition as another serious problem (ref A).
Milinkevich accused BCP leader Sergey Kalyakin and his
"leftist" allies (i.e., the UCP and Belarusian Social
Democratic Party (BSDP)) of promoting a pro-Russian strategy,
pitting themselves against Milinkevich and his alleged
"pro-EU" supporters within the coalition. Milinkevich blamed
Russia for the internal conflict, claiming it was funding the
BCP and BSDP to create problems within the coalition. When
Ambassador inquired who in Russia was financing Kalyakin,
Milinkevich pointed to nameless businessmen and politicians,
supported by the Kremlin, seeking to reoccupy Belarus and
Ukraine.

Second Congress For Politicians, Not Activists
-------------- -


6. (C) Milinkevich expressed to Ambassador his clear
opposition to a second congress of democratic forces.
Milinkevich claimed he opposed the congress not because his
position as UDF leader was threatened, but because the time
and resources needed for a congress should be spent on
mobilizing activists and implementing UDF strategies.

MINSK 00001141 002 OF 003


Seconddy, the proposed seT up gf the congress would only
allow politicad parties to participate& Acaording to the
Poditical Council's current plan, delegates to the congress
would be ocalcouncil candidates who gathered 300
signatureS, thereby excluding most pro-democratic NGOs,
reporters, and other civil society. Milinkevich noted that
should this plan be implemented, the congress would not be
one of demkcratic forces, but one of political parties.


7. (C) Note: Immediately following his conVersation with
Ambassador, Milinkevich attended the UDF Political Council
where UDF members agreed to hold a Congress on March 25
(septel). Pol/Econ Chief later learned from BNF deputy
Viktor Ivashkevich that UDF leaders, including Milinkevich,
agreed to restructure the Political Council at the congress
and elect a PC head with some exe#utive responsibilities.
The Political Council also agreed to expand the list of those
allow%d to be congressional delegates, requiring members of
NGOs and civil society organizations not affiliated with the
local elections to gather 300 signatures in support of the
PC-approved general mes3age of freedom. End note.

"For Freedom" Movement Not a Political Party
-------------- % --------------


8. (C) Milinkevich explained to Ambassador that his recently
created "For Freedom" movement was not his personal political
party, but a campaign to reengage activists and non-political
parties frustrated with or excluded by the UDF. Milinkevich
first announced the move-ent to the UDF in March, but after
six months, the coalition still would not ap`rove it.
Therefore, Milinkevich decided to avoid the bureaucracy by
initiating the movement as an individual without the
Political Council's approval. According to Milinkevich, the
political parties in the UDF could have created their own
campaigns similar to the "For Freedom" movement, but they
lacked the support hat Milinkevich has to ake any campaign
succssful. However, Milinkevich noted somewhat
melodramatically that his reputation was on the line and
would remove himself from political lfe if the movement
failed.


9. (C) Ambassador praised Milinkevich's desire to include
more pro-democratic groups in the fight for democracy, but
voiced concern that the movement appeared to be a coalition
of NGOs and civil society groups running parallel, rather
than supporting, the UDF. Milinkevich stressed the political
neutrality of the movement, insisting that it existed to
support and implement UDF strategies, promote action and
unity at the local and national level, and demand free
elections. According to Milinkevich, the "For Freedom"
movement would be open to everyone, including members of
existing political parties. (Note: Also at the October 20 UDF
meeting, Milinkevich agreed to set aside his "For Freedom"
campaign until after the March 25 congress, claiming that it
would take several months to organize the movement.
According to BNF deputy Ivashkevich, Milinkevich and those
colleagues supporting the movement had not fully thought out
its details, nor could they explain how the movement would be
implemented. En$ note.)


Comment
--------------


10. (C) It is ironic that Milinkevich, who seems to prefer
t(e spotlight in European capitals to demonstrating his
leadership at home, is criticizing the UDF for its
inactivity. His earlier pledges to work actively in Belarus
have generally not been fulfilled (ref B). UDF members
continue to criticize openly to Emboffs Milinkevich's
lackluster leadership, his absence at many UDF meetings,
failure to inform colleagues of his multiple trips abroad
ahead of time, and his public introduction of policies and
activities without prior UDF knowledge or consent. His
recent public statements in Prague on the creation of the
"For Freedom" movement were particularly ill-handled and may
have helped bring the other three UDF leaders (who too have
done little to boost UDF activism) closer together (ref C).


11. (C) Milinkevich's apparent willingness to postpone the
creation of his movement at least until after the January
2007 local elections and the party leaders' willingness to
accept some of Milinkevich's conditions for convening a
second congress suggest that the UDF leaders are attempting
to minimize the rift. However, Milinkevich's status as de
facto leader of the opposition coalition remains in jeopardy.
Coupled with his strong and probably unsubstantiated attacks

MINSK 00001141 003 OF 003


against certain UDF members and his seeming inability to stay
in Belarus, Milinkevich gave us the impression that he was
actually contributing more to deepening the coalition's
problems rather than solving them.
Stewart