Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MINSK1109
2006-10-13 14:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR REINFORCES UNITY MESSAGE TO OPPOSITION
how-toVZCZCXRO9768 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSK #1109/01 2861421 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 131421Z OCT 06 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY MINSK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5209 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU PRIORITY 0136 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1299 RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001109
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REINFORCES UNITY MESSAGE TO OPPOSITION
REF: A. MINSK 1102
B. MINSK 1061
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MINSK 001109
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REINFORCES UNITY MESSAGE TO OPPOSITION
REF: A. MINSK 1102
B. MINSK 1061
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) On October 11, Ambassador met with three senior
leaders of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition
coalition: Belarusian Party of Communists leader Sergey
Kalyakin, United Civic Party leader Anatoliy Lebedko, and
Belarusian Popular Front Vintsuk Vyachorka. UDF leader
Aleksandr Milinkevich was participating in an international
conference in Prague and not able to attend the meeting. The
leaders responded positively to Ambassador's call to work as
a team, stressing that they were genuinely interested in
working out their differences in time for the January 2007
local elections. They appealed to the U.S. and EU to ratchet
up the pressure on the Lukashenko regime following an
increase in politically motivated imprisonments. End summary.
Ambassador Meets Opposition Coalition Leaders
--------------
2. (C) Following her October 9 courtesy call on Belarusian
Foreign Minister Martynov (ref A),Ambassador convened her
first meeting with the senior leadership of the United
Democratic Forces (UDF) on October 11. Present at the
meeting were Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) leader
Sergey Kalyakin, United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoliy
Lebedko, and Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) leader Vintsuk
Vyachorka. UDF leader Aleksandr Milinkevich was not able to
attend because he was participating in an international forum
in Prague. After underscoring the United States' commitment
to supporting the opposition's struggle for democratic change
in Belarus, Ambassador asked the party leaders for their
assessment of the coalition and the political situation in
Belarus.
Lebedko Links Second Democratic Congress to Local Elections
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Lebedko described two crises within the coalition: a
crisis of ideas and a crisis of action. He attributed these
crises to the coalition's structure, which was designed for
presidential elections. Lebedko told Ambassador that the UCP
presented a plan to the UDF Political Council for
restructuring the coalition during a second opposition
congress after the local elections. The plan would allow
organizations that collect signatures for potential UDF
candidates for the local elections to nominate delegates to
the congress.
4. (C) Stressing that all coalition candidates and parties
must communicate a single message, Lebedko also argued that
the make up of the congress that would draft the opposition's
national platform should reflect the performance of the
parties and other organizations during the local election
campaigns. He noted that only 25 percent of the Belarusian
population actively supports democratization and civil
society in Belarus and viewed the local elections as an
important opportunity to interact with voters.
Lebedko and Kalyakin on the Same Page
--------------
5. (C) Kalyakin was also receptive to a second congress for
the same reasons. He strongly denounced suggestions by some
coalition members to boycott the local elections and echoed
Lebedko's comments regarding the importance of the local
elections as a chance to deepen contact with voters.
6. (C) When asked by Pol/Econ Chief, Lebedko and Kalyakin
denied press reports that disgruntled parties within the UDF
formed a separate body to coordinate cooperation among
opposition parties in the regions (ref B); Vyachorka, whose
party is apparently against the separate coordinating body,
remained noticeably quiet during this exchange. Lebedko
noted such centralized oversight would not be possible in
many regions due to a lack of opposition activists. Kalyakin
cautioned Ambassador not to believe in the press and
encouraged Emboffs to "talk to the source." Ambassador
agreed that the press accounts are not always accurate but
noted that Emboffs remain in regular contact with senior and
working-level opposition party officials.
Vyachorka Hedges on Congress and BSDP
--------------
MINSK 00001109 002.2 OF 003
7. (C) Vyachorka agreed that local elections are an
opportunity to interact with voters and expand the coalition.
He supported the idea that the coalition should choose
candidates on the basis of signatures collected but also
insisted that the number of volunteers should be a factor.
Vyachorka doubted whether Lukashenko would allow another
Congress to convene in Belarus and asserted that the issues
among the parties could be resolved without a congress.
However, he agreed that the coalition must communicate one
message and needs restructuring.
8. (C) When Ambassador asked the parties' leaders about their
views on including former opposition candidate Aleksandr
Kozulin's Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Hramada" (BSDP)
in the coalition, Lebedko noted that the UCP restructuring
plan is designed to expand the coalition to include BSDP. He
and Kalyakin noted strong BSDP interest in joining the
coalition after the local elections and mentioned that BSDP
representatives would attend a coalition meeting scheduled
later that day. (Note: Press reports confirm that BSDP and
coalition leaders, minus Milinkevich, met later on October 11
and agreed to coordinate their local election campaigns. End
note.) Vyachorka, an opponent of including BSDP in the UDF,
remained quiet.
Growing Dissatisfaction with Milinkevich?
--------------
9. (C) Ambassador inquired about Milinkevich's views on
these controversial issues in the coalition. Vyachorka and
Lebedko were reluctant to offer their opinions. A frustrated
Kalyakin related his recent conversations with Milinkevich in
which he told the UDF leader that opposition activists were
unwilling to work for the "image of Milinkevich." Kalyakin
also noted that Milinkevich's positions on a second congress
and other issues facing the coalition were not entirely
clear.
Message to EU: Expand Visa Ban and Avoid Hollow GSP Threats
-------------- --------------
10. (C) Vyachorka and Kalyakin noted an increase in the
regime's political imprisonments, citing the recent arrests
of Malady Front leaders Dmitry Dashkevich and Pavel
Krasovskiy (septel). Vyachorka urged the international
community to continue to focus attention on the political
prisoners. He lauded the U.S. visa ban and requested that
the United States press the EU to expand the visa lists.
Vyachorka explained that expanding the EU list would have
greater impact than the U.S. bans since targeted GOB
officials most frequently travel to EU countries. Vyachorka
added that the U.S. should encourage the EU to introduce a
"positive visa policy" by not raising the cost of visas for
Belarusians.
11. (C) Kalyakin asserted that one of the UDF's top
priorities was to support victims of political repression and
their families. Citing the recent repression against
prominent Protestant churches as an example (septel),
Kalyakin and Vyachorka stressed that the GOB was violating
the U.N. Charter on Human Rights and requested the United
States to highlight such violations. Kalyakin agreed with
Vyachorka on the need for the EU to expand its visa ban but
counseled the U.S. and EU against making threats that they
cannot deliver. Kalyakin noted the EU's thus far
unsuccessful efforts to remove GSP trade preferences for
Belarus and advised the EU against making future threats that
they cannot carry out because such actions damage the
international community's credibility and further embolden
the Lukashenko regime.
Russia
--------------
12. (C) Vyachorka alone responded to Ambassador's inquiry
into relations between Belarus and Russia. He claimed that
the personal relationship between Putin and Lukashenko has
not improved but the Kremlin was not interested in supporting
democracy in Belarus. Vyachorka asserted that Russia could
precipitate changes in Belarus just by raising gas prices.
Comment
--------------
13. (C) Despite Milinkevich's absence from the meeting and
the subtle discord between Lebedko and Vyachorka, the meeting
was generally upbeat. When Ambassador commented that the
coalition seemed stronger today than after the 2004
MINSK 00001109 003 OF 003
parliamentary elections, all three leaders quickly agreed.
Hopefully, the UDF leaders can resolve their differences in
time to engage in a unified dialogue with Belarusian voters
during the upcoming local campaigns.
Stewart
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REINFORCES UNITY MESSAGE TO OPPOSITION
REF: A. MINSK 1102
B. MINSK 1061
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) On October 11, Ambassador met with three senior
leaders of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition
coalition: Belarusian Party of Communists leader Sergey
Kalyakin, United Civic Party leader Anatoliy Lebedko, and
Belarusian Popular Front Vintsuk Vyachorka. UDF leader
Aleksandr Milinkevich was participating in an international
conference in Prague and not able to attend the meeting. The
leaders responded positively to Ambassador's call to work as
a team, stressing that they were genuinely interested in
working out their differences in time for the January 2007
local elections. They appealed to the U.S. and EU to ratchet
up the pressure on the Lukashenko regime following an
increase in politically motivated imprisonments. End summary.
Ambassador Meets Opposition Coalition Leaders
--------------
2. (C) Following her October 9 courtesy call on Belarusian
Foreign Minister Martynov (ref A),Ambassador convened her
first meeting with the senior leadership of the United
Democratic Forces (UDF) on October 11. Present at the
meeting were Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) leader
Sergey Kalyakin, United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoliy
Lebedko, and Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) leader Vintsuk
Vyachorka. UDF leader Aleksandr Milinkevich was not able to
attend because he was participating in an international forum
in Prague. After underscoring the United States' commitment
to supporting the opposition's struggle for democratic change
in Belarus, Ambassador asked the party leaders for their
assessment of the coalition and the political situation in
Belarus.
Lebedko Links Second Democratic Congress to Local Elections
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Lebedko described two crises within the coalition: a
crisis of ideas and a crisis of action. He attributed these
crises to the coalition's structure, which was designed for
presidential elections. Lebedko told Ambassador that the UCP
presented a plan to the UDF Political Council for
restructuring the coalition during a second opposition
congress after the local elections. The plan would allow
organizations that collect signatures for potential UDF
candidates for the local elections to nominate delegates to
the congress.
4. (C) Stressing that all coalition candidates and parties
must communicate a single message, Lebedko also argued that
the make up of the congress that would draft the opposition's
national platform should reflect the performance of the
parties and other organizations during the local election
campaigns. He noted that only 25 percent of the Belarusian
population actively supports democratization and civil
society in Belarus and viewed the local elections as an
important opportunity to interact with voters.
Lebedko and Kalyakin on the Same Page
--------------
5. (C) Kalyakin was also receptive to a second congress for
the same reasons. He strongly denounced suggestions by some
coalition members to boycott the local elections and echoed
Lebedko's comments regarding the importance of the local
elections as a chance to deepen contact with voters.
6. (C) When asked by Pol/Econ Chief, Lebedko and Kalyakin
denied press reports that disgruntled parties within the UDF
formed a separate body to coordinate cooperation among
opposition parties in the regions (ref B); Vyachorka, whose
party is apparently against the separate coordinating body,
remained noticeably quiet during this exchange. Lebedko
noted such centralized oversight would not be possible in
many regions due to a lack of opposition activists. Kalyakin
cautioned Ambassador not to believe in the press and
encouraged Emboffs to "talk to the source." Ambassador
agreed that the press accounts are not always accurate but
noted that Emboffs remain in regular contact with senior and
working-level opposition party officials.
Vyachorka Hedges on Congress and BSDP
--------------
MINSK 00001109 002.2 OF 003
7. (C) Vyachorka agreed that local elections are an
opportunity to interact with voters and expand the coalition.
He supported the idea that the coalition should choose
candidates on the basis of signatures collected but also
insisted that the number of volunteers should be a factor.
Vyachorka doubted whether Lukashenko would allow another
Congress to convene in Belarus and asserted that the issues
among the parties could be resolved without a congress.
However, he agreed that the coalition must communicate one
message and needs restructuring.
8. (C) When Ambassador asked the parties' leaders about their
views on including former opposition candidate Aleksandr
Kozulin's Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Hramada" (BSDP)
in the coalition, Lebedko noted that the UCP restructuring
plan is designed to expand the coalition to include BSDP. He
and Kalyakin noted strong BSDP interest in joining the
coalition after the local elections and mentioned that BSDP
representatives would attend a coalition meeting scheduled
later that day. (Note: Press reports confirm that BSDP and
coalition leaders, minus Milinkevich, met later on October 11
and agreed to coordinate their local election campaigns. End
note.) Vyachorka, an opponent of including BSDP in the UDF,
remained quiet.
Growing Dissatisfaction with Milinkevich?
--------------
9. (C) Ambassador inquired about Milinkevich's views on
these controversial issues in the coalition. Vyachorka and
Lebedko were reluctant to offer their opinions. A frustrated
Kalyakin related his recent conversations with Milinkevich in
which he told the UDF leader that opposition activists were
unwilling to work for the "image of Milinkevich." Kalyakin
also noted that Milinkevich's positions on a second congress
and other issues facing the coalition were not entirely
clear.
Message to EU: Expand Visa Ban and Avoid Hollow GSP Threats
-------------- --------------
10. (C) Vyachorka and Kalyakin noted an increase in the
regime's political imprisonments, citing the recent arrests
of Malady Front leaders Dmitry Dashkevich and Pavel
Krasovskiy (septel). Vyachorka urged the international
community to continue to focus attention on the political
prisoners. He lauded the U.S. visa ban and requested that
the United States press the EU to expand the visa lists.
Vyachorka explained that expanding the EU list would have
greater impact than the U.S. bans since targeted GOB
officials most frequently travel to EU countries. Vyachorka
added that the U.S. should encourage the EU to introduce a
"positive visa policy" by not raising the cost of visas for
Belarusians.
11. (C) Kalyakin asserted that one of the UDF's top
priorities was to support victims of political repression and
their families. Citing the recent repression against
prominent Protestant churches as an example (septel),
Kalyakin and Vyachorka stressed that the GOB was violating
the U.N. Charter on Human Rights and requested the United
States to highlight such violations. Kalyakin agreed with
Vyachorka on the need for the EU to expand its visa ban but
counseled the U.S. and EU against making threats that they
cannot deliver. Kalyakin noted the EU's thus far
unsuccessful efforts to remove GSP trade preferences for
Belarus and advised the EU against making future threats that
they cannot carry out because such actions damage the
international community's credibility and further embolden
the Lukashenko regime.
Russia
--------------
12. (C) Vyachorka alone responded to Ambassador's inquiry
into relations between Belarus and Russia. He claimed that
the personal relationship between Putin and Lukashenko has
not improved but the Kremlin was not interested in supporting
democracy in Belarus. Vyachorka asserted that Russia could
precipitate changes in Belarus just by raising gas prices.
Comment
--------------
13. (C) Despite Milinkevich's absence from the meeting and
the subtle discord between Lebedko and Vyachorka, the meeting
was generally upbeat. When Ambassador commented that the
coalition seemed stronger today than after the 2004
MINSK 00001109 003 OF 003
parliamentary elections, all three leaders quickly agreed.
Hopefully, the UDF leaders can resolve their differences in
time to engage in a unified dialogue with Belarusian voters
during the upcoming local campaigns.
Stewart