LUKASHENKO FIELDS SOFTBALLS FROM RUSSIAN MEDIA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001079

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL BO
SUBJECT: LUKASHENKO FIELDS SOFTBALLS FROM RUSSIAN MEDIA,
HITS FOULS IN PROCESS


Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reasons 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In an extensively covered lengthy press conference
with selected visiting Russian journalists, President
Lukashenko laid all the blame for the latest delay in
Belarusian-Russian integration at the doorstep of the
Kremlin. On the other hand, he claimed an affinity for
Russia, told the audience Belarusians would defend Russia
with their lives, and yet again trumpeted Belarus' continued
economic successes. While Lukashenko presented the press
conference as a means to inform the Russian public about
Belarus, most likely he hoped to once again demonstrate to
the Kremlin that he is a tough bargaining partner when
pushed. End summary.

Russian Press Conference for Local Consumption
-------------- -


2. (C) On September 29, an animated President Lukashenko took
questions for over three hours from a group of over 80
Russian journalists completing a visit to Belarus. Most of
the journalists work for regional press in Russia. In his
opening statement, Lukashenko presented the press conference
as a means to tell the Russian public in the regions the
"objective" truth in order to overcome "distorted"
information Lukashenko attributed to the Belarusian
opposition politicians and "their Western sponsors."
Lukashenko clearly hoped to reach his own subjects as well
judging by the extensive local coverage. The press
conference was broadcast live on Belarusian radio,
rebroadcast almost in its entirety that evening, and
highlights were carried on the major weekly news review
October 1. State press all carried excerpts in their October
2 editions.

I'm Not Against Russia - Lots of My Friends are Russians
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3. (C) Lukashenko claimed he earnestly wished to carry
forward with a referendum on the Union State with Russia, but
was thwarted by unnamed "elites" and people within the
Kremlin. The president said he insisted on full
implementation of the Union Treaty, while Russia sought to
weaken its provisions.


4. (C) Stating he did not want to be the first (sic) and last
president of Belarus, Lukashenko rejected any notion that
Belarus should become part of the Russian Federation.
Lukashenko suggested the end of Belarusian independence would
incite a civil war "worse than Chechnya." Claiming Western
governments paid protesters to incite violence after the
March elections, Lukashenko said armed groups from "camps" in
Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltics, Poland and even the Volga
region would enter Belarus to fight in the event of the end
of Belarusian independence.


5. (C) Lukashenko liberally sprinkled his thinly veiled
attacks on the Russian leadership's commitment to the Union
State with statements about the close relationship between
the Russian and Belarusian peoples. In his most emotional
appeal he told reporters Belarusians "will die for Russia" if
forces ever invade from the West.

The IMF Hates Us because We're so Good
--------------


6. (C) Lukashenko used the occasion to thumb his nose at
liberal economists, noting Belarus' continued economic growth
and rising wages. The president said the IMF has "recognized
the Belarusian model"; he compared Belarus' success to
China's. He downplayed concerns the economy depended on
energy subsidies from Russia, claiming only one percent of
GDP resulted from below-market gas prices. (Note: Marina
Bakanova of the World Bank confirmed at a presentation to
diplomats October 2 that in 2005 Russian energy subsidies
accounted for over ten percent of Belarusian GDP; some
sources put the figure even higher than that. End note.) He
indicated no willingness to compromise on the sale of the
state gas transport monopoly Beltransgaz.

Local Reaction: Messages for Everyone
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7. (C) Igor Shinkarik, Deputy for the United Civic Party
(UCP),told Poloff he did not see much new in the speech. He
referred to an article on the party's website characterizing
the performance as typical Lukashenko in which the president
makes many contradictory statements so all his supporters can
find something they like. Bringing in uncritical "foreign"

MINSK 00001079 002 OF 002


reporters gives Lukashenko a chance to trot out the same old
arguments to an audience that might report them as if they
were new. Valeriy Ukhlanov of the Belarusian Communist Party
largely agreed with this assessment, telling Poloff the
audience probably heard what they wanted.


8. (C) Aleksey Korol, Deputy for the Belarusian Social
Democratic Party - Gramada described the press conference as
a means for Lukashenko to demonstrate his indispensability to
both the Russian public and the West. Lukashenko wanted the
Russian public to believe Russia and Belarus are
interdependent, counteracting the common assumption Belarus
depends on Russia. According to Korol, Lukashenko hopes the
West will take away from the press conference that Putin must
rely on Lukashenko to accomplish anything in Belarus. That
is, Lukashenko's ability to criticize the Kremlin before
Russian journalists shows Putin's limited influence over
Lukashenko, and the West should not hope for Putin to push
for Lukashenko's ouster anytime soon.

Comment: Lukashenko Postures Before Final Gas Negotiations
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Lukashenko timed the press conference for the final
day during which a joint referendum on the Union State could
be called legally in 2006, and less than three weeks before
Putin is due to attend a CIS summit in Minsk. Placing all
the blame for the latest annual failure to move forward on
the Union State on Russia helps inoculate him from criticism
at home. Given the timing of the press conference, it is
likely the main target audience was the Kremlin.


10. (C) Comment continued: It is always debatable how much
Lukashenko really believes his own rhetoric. In any case,
his performance was largely believable. Lukashenko genuinely
seemed resolutely against caving in to Russian pressure on
Beltransgaz. The question remains whether Moscow buys into
the performance, objects to Lukashenko's ravings, or thinks
it's all an act; a good indicator will be Putin's next
interaction with Belarus' dictator later this month in Minsk.
Stewart