BORISOV OPPOSITION FACES SEVERE REPRESSION AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 001036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC BO
SUBJECT: BORISOV OPPOSITION FACES SEVERE REPRESSION AHEAD
OF LOCAL ELECTIONS

REF: MINSK 978

Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
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1. (C) Poloffs recently traveled to Borisov to gauge local
preparedness and the degree of cooperation of democratic
forces ahead of the January 14 municipal elections. Despite
blatant surveillance and frequent interruptions by GOB
representatives and state media, Borisov's opposition
political party leaders and independent media candidly
discussed the politically repressive conditions in which they
are preparing their local election campaigns. That said, the
activists in Borisov demonstrated willingness and ability to
work together to bring democratic change to Belarus. End
Summary.

Opposition Pulls Together to Prepare for Local Elections
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2. (C) On September 13, Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met with
representatives of the local chapters of the United
Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition parties, including: United
Civic Party (UCP) Head Lev Margolin; UCP National Political
Council member and entrepreneur Viktor Gorbachev; and
Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) Head Nikolai Barbitsky.
Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Gramada" (BSDP) Borisov
Head Mariya Statkevich also participated in the meeting. The
entire meeting was attended, filmed, and frequently
interrupted by GOB representatives and state media. (Note:
One of the GOB officials was a BKGB agent that has followed
U.S. Embassy personnel on previous regional trips and at
opposition protests in Minsk. End note.)


3. (C) When Pol/Econ Chief asked how many opposition
candidates would run in Borisov during January's local
elections, Margolin responded that it was still too early to
estimate but maintained that UCP planned to run candidates in
all six regions of Belarus, including Borisov. Gorbachev
informed Pol/Econ Chief that UCP would run about 250
candidates throughout Belarus but did not give an exact
breakdown by region. Barbitsky admitted that BPC had met
only three weeks earlier and had not yet designated
candidates.


4. (C) Pol/Econ Chief inquired whether the Borisov chapters
of the opposition parties would sign a cooperation agreement
similar to those recently signed by BSDP and the UDF parties
in other regions of Belarus (reftel). Margolin and
Statkevich responded that a formal agreement at their level
was not likely because Borisov is in the Minsk region and
that the Minsk-based national opposition leadership would
negotiate any such accord. However, all party
representatives observed that local BSDP and UDF party
chapters already cooperate closely on a daily albeit informal
basis. Moreover, Gorbachev added that the local opposition
parties frequently assist not only their partner parties in
their own region but also those in other regions. (Note: On
September 14, Gorbachev, who leads a group of opposition
separately told Poloffs that inter-regional cooperation among
local parties was necessary in part because the coalition's
national leadership withholds much of financial support that
it receives from internation
al sources. End note.)

Repression of Opposition Political Parties
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5. (C) UCP Margolin and BPC Barbitsky observed that their
close cooperation in part resulted from the common GOB
repression they face. Both explained that most jobs in
Borisov's state enterprises are year-to-year contracts. If
the authorities discover an employee is active in opposition
politics, that employee's contract will not be renewed.
MoreovEr, state enterprises will not conduct business with
private enterprises run by opposition activists and
candidates. Barbitsky added that the GOB's repression
extended to opposition party newspapers and independent media
and noted that authorities frequently confiscate copies of
the opposition Communist newspaper "Tovarishch" from their
party members and other readers. The opposition party
activists uniformly identified the lack of access to mass
media as their main obstacle to mounting successful election
campaigns.

Repression of Independent Media

MINSK 00001036 002 OF 002


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6. (C) Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff met separately with
independent journalist Anatoliy Bukas, Editor-in-Chief of the
independent newspaper "Borisovskie Novosti," which began
publishing in 1992. Bukas related to Pol/Econ Chief that his
paper faces numerous distribution problems resulting from
government pressure, including exclusion from the GOB's
newspaper catalogue and kiosk network. He noted that
Borisovskie Novosti's subscriptions have plummeted from
19,000 to 7,000 in recent years. He also detailed how local
officials use economic instruments, such as restrictions on
advertisements and subscriptions and special punitive tax
rates for independent newspapers. (Note: Belarusian Party of
Labor activist and former independent journalist Pavel
Mogilich also attended the Embassy's meeting with opposition
parties leaders and described to Pol/Econ Chief very similar
GOB efforts to repress other independent media in Borisov.
End note.)


7. (C) Bukas highlighted the personal and professional
hardships faced by his six editors and 18 reporters, whom his
paper cannot afford to employ full-time. According to Bukas,
the GOB bars independent journalists from employment in
state-owned companies. Furthermore, independent journalists
are banned from attending official press conferences, local
political, and cultural events and are often prevented from
receiving information from official sources. Bukas mentioned
that the local government had even refused to confirm for him
the official March 19 presidential election results.
Nevertheless, his paper still publishes articles on the
activities of local NGOs, registered political parties, and
election campaigns.

The Local Government: Uncut and Uninvited
--------------


8. (C) The Embassy had sent a letter notifying Borisov's
local government of its visit but had received no response
until Pol/Econ Chief and Poloff exited their vehicle just
outside the local UCP offices. A representative of the
Mayor's office, a member of the GOB security services, and a
state media television crew were waiting for Pol/Econ Chief
and insisted on attending and frequently interrupting both
meetings. Moreover, two police vehicles closely followed the
Embassy's vehicle throughout Borisov despite Pol/Econ Chief's
politely declining the "safety escort."


9. (C) Despite the rude and unwanted escort, Pol/Econ Chief
courteously agreed to a last-minute meeting with Borisov's
Deputy Mayor Valentina Shutko. Shutko conceded that Borisov
has problems akin to those in any community but claimed that
the city and national governments were solving those
problems. She highlighteD accomplishments of govErnment
guaranteed healthcare, education, and programs for the
unemployed. She denied that state enterprises use
discriminatory hiring employment practices or punitive taxes
against opposition activists and dismissed such allegations
as "lies." When Pol/Econ Chief asked what in her opinion
motivates the political opposition, the mayor speculated that
Borisov's relatively high standard of living permits
opposition activists the time and resources to complain about
relatively minor problems.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The level of cooperation among opposition forces in
Borisov is both unusual and encouraging. The unifying
factors seem both to be increased GOB pressure on all
opponents of the regime and the local activists' shared
commitment to focus less on partisan rifts and more on
democratic change. The opposition leaders reminded us that
our trips to the regions send an important signal of support
to the democratic forces and urged us to continue our
efforts.
Stewart