CONTEMPLATING A MADRAZO FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000956

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: CONTEMPLATING A MADRAZO FOREIGN POLICY

REF: MEXICO 251

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS:
1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: If elected, we believe Roberto Madrazo
would seek to conduct a foreign policy that falls somewhere
between the U.S.-centered policy advocated by the Fox
administration and the "non-aligned" policy traditionally
maintained by presidents from the Revolutionary Institutional
Party (PRI). Madrazo has been harshly critical of President
Fox's foreign policy, charging that he has failed to deliver
on the strategic alliance Fox promised with the United
States, while alienating Mexico from its traditional Latin
American partners. Like Fox, Madrazo considers the
U.S.-Mexico relationship to be Mexico's top foreign policy
priority and he has emphasized his willingness to work
closely with the U.S. on a range of issues, from trade to law
enforcement to counter-terrorism. Unlike Fox, however,
Madrazo will not pin virtually his entire foreign policy on
improved relations with the U.S. A Madrazo administration
would be a pragmatic partner on bilateral issues to the
extent that domestic political considerations permit; it is
unlikely to be a principled partner, however, willing to take
risks on politically charged issues. A Madrazo
administration would be a consistent advocate for
multilateralism and an enhanced role for the United Nations
in conflict resolution, and is unlikely to be a reliable ally
on politically sensitive global issues such as Iraq. Under a
President Madrazo, Mexico would seek to play an expanded
diplomatic role in Latin America, particularly in search of
new trade opportunities. While we suspect that the
relatively non-ideological Madrazo is wary of both Castro and
Chavez, he believe he will seek to maintain far less
confrontational relations with them than has the Fox
administration. End summary.

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Diagnosis: Stalemate to the North, Setbacks to the South
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2. (SBU) Madrazo has harshly criticized the Fox
administration's foreign policy, accusing it of abandoning
decades of continuity in Mexican foreign policy by betting
the ranch on an unrealistic vision of U.S.-Mexican relations,
while ignoring Mexico's traditionally strong relations with
its Latin American partners. He has criticized Fox for
expecting that Mexico's democratic breakthrough in 2000 would
bring a "democratic bonus," i.e., a "strategic alliance" with
the United States that would include a sweeping accord on
immigration. Madrazo has argued that the terrorist attacks
on 9/11 changed U.S. policy priorities, dashing any
possibility of such a strategic alliance, and undermining the
central tenet of Fox's foreign policy. Madrazo has been
equally critical of what he has characterized as Mexico's
abstention from Latin American affairs, and in particular of
Fox's confrontational posture towards Venezuela and Cuba.
Indeed, earlier this week he called for the resignation for
Foreign Secretary Derbez, arguing that his inconsistent
handling of relations with Cuba, Venezuela and other
countries has undermined Mexico's diplomatic credibility.

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A Pragmatic Approach to U.S.-Mexican Relations
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3. (C) Madrazo's vision for the U.S.-Mexico relationship
appears to be a pragmatic one, recognizing that the
U.S.-Mexico relationship must remain Mexico's foreign policy
priority. The candidate demonstrates little of the reflexive
suspicion towards the United States that PRIistas
traditionally have harbored, even if he recognizes that the
relationship remains far from Fox's goal of a partnership
among equals. Madrazo's platform calls for "a mutually
beneficial relationship with the United States, taking into
account the asymmetries between the two countries." He has
repeatedly advocated cooperation on a broad range of issues,
including counter-terrorism, organized crime and drug
trafficking, in the case of the latter, "recogniz(ing) the
demand existing in the United States and Mexico's role
principally as a transit country." His platform also calls
for increased technical cooperation against money laundering,
and USG assistance to develop the investigative capacity of
the Mexican police. However, while we expect that Madrazo
generally would be open to continued close cooperation on law
enforcement issues, both he and some of his closest political
allies are rumored to have associated with individuals linked
to organized crime and drug trafficking; we cannot discount
that these associations would compromise his willingness to
cooperate in particular cases.


4. (SBU) Madrazo strongly supports NAFTA, although he has

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said he would consider seeking to renegotiate certain of its
agricultural provisions if the U.S. and Canada were amenable,
adding, however, that a unilateral effort to reopen trade
negotiations would not serve Mexico's interests. He has said
that with the opening within NAFTA of free trade in corn,
beans, milk and sugar in 2008, Mexico should invoke "tools"
contemplated by NAFTA to minimize the impact of this opening
on the Mexican agricultural sector. He has called for a more
integrated agricultural market within NAFTA, the creation of
a permanent NAFTA dispute settlement tribunal to replace the
ad hoc panels now in use, and the consideration of a single
external tariff. He also proposes revisiting the issue of
shared water resources, taking into account the criteria of
"proportionality" and "justice."


5. (C) A President Madrazo might pay occasional lip service
to the anti-USG views held by many Mexicans, as is expected
of Mexican leaders. Nevertheless, Madrazo himself has
lifelong ties with the United States and we see no evidence
of an anti-American attitude. Indeed, one advantage of his
pragmatism -- many would say his lack of principles -- is
that he appears not to be captive to the antiquated views of
many on the Latin American left. While he is unlikely to
view the United States as the strategic partner sought by
President Fox, we expect that he will seek, to the extent
possible, to keep gratuitous antagonisms out of the
relationship.

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Migration: Less Than the "Whole Enchilada" Will Do
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6. (SBU) Madrazo calls for a "responsible" approach to the
issue of migration, that seeks a more orderly and controlled
flow of migrants, taking into account both the demand in the
U.S. for Mexican labor and the imperative of protecting the
human rights of expatriate Mexican workers. According to
foreign policy advisor and former Ambassador to the U.S.
Jorge Montano Martinez (reftel),he understands that the sort
of sweeping immigration accord sought by President Fox early
in his administration is unrealistic and hopes to reach a
compromise with the U.S. that nevertheless permits increased
Mexican immigration to the United States. He supports
President Bush's proposed temporary worker program, and seeks
a bi-national social security agreement that accounts for the
contributions of expatriate Mexican workers in the U.S., as
well as greater labor mobility between the countries.
According to Victor Arreaga, the PRI's Deputy Director of
International Affairs, Madrazo also believes that the three
North American partners should jointly formulate development
programs targeted at those Mexican states that are the
principal sources of migrants, in order to create the
conditions necessary to deter migration. Contacts in the
Madrazo camp have called for a major development assistance
program similar to the one that the EU established in the
1980s for Spain and other southern European countries.

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Renewed Emphasis on Latin America
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7. (C) Madrazo has criticized Fox for overemphasizing the
U.S.-Mexican relationship at the expense of other bilateral
relationships, particularly those with other Latin American
countries, calling for expanded trade relations in the
region, including possibly a closer relationship with
Mercosur. Although Madrazo expressed support for Fox at the
time of Mexico's diplomatic row with Venezuela, stating that
all citizens should rally around the President during
international disputes, he has criticized Fox for injecting
unnecessary tensions into its bilateral relations. As a
pragmatist rather than an ideologue, we do not expect Madrazo
to court either Castro or Chavez, but he will seek to
normalize the currently tense relationships with those
countries. Outside of this hemisphere, he has proposed
expanding trade relations with the EU, the PRC and the other
countries of the Pacific Rim.

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A Return to Multilateralism
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8. (C) Although a President Madrazo would be reasonably easy
to work with on the main issues on our bilateral agenda, we
expect him to be less supportive of U.S. positions on global
issues than has been President Fox. Madrazo agrees with the
traditional PRI preference for "non-intervention" and
"self-determination," and Mexico would likely reemphasize its
traditional posture as a "non-aligned" country in
international fora. A draft PRI policy paper shared with the
embassy emphasized the party's preference for
multilateralism, urging that the international community

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strengthen the United Nations's role in conflict prevention
and resolution. The policy paper implicitly criticized U.S.
policy towards Iraq when it declared: "We have the obligation
to avoid establishing new rules in international law by
accepting preventive war as a norm."

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Comment: In Praise of Reduced Expectations?
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9. (C) That Madrazo's expectations for U.S.-Mexican
relations are somewhat more modest than those held by
President Fox at the outset of his administration is an
advantage: his reduced expectations are less likely to
produce the disappointments and tensions witnessed in the
first years of the Fox administration. Yet just like his two
rivals for the presidency, Madrazo has not always proven
adept at understanding the political climate in the United
States, and his advisors at times seem unwilling to hear the
messages that we have reiterated. For example, like his
rivals, Madrazo has the perhaps unrealistic expectation that
the USG would be willing to negotiate even a partial
migration accord with Mexico, that the number of immigrants
to be accepted by the USG each year has somehow become a
matter for bilateral negotiation. Likewise, Madrazo and
other members of the political class -- many of whom are
traditionally jealous of Mexico's national sovereignty --
seem to believe that they will be able to influence U.S.
congressional deliberations over immigration enforcement
measures. And Mexicans across the political spectrum,
including Madrazo, seem to believe that the United States
(and possibly Canada) would be prepared to establish a major
development assistance program for Mexico. Certainly, even
with a pragmatist in Los Pinos, plenty of potential bilateral
pitfalls remain. End comment.


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KELLY