Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MEXICO792
2006-02-14 14:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

LEADING POLLSTER ANALYZES PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHME #0792/01 0451434
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R 141434Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8913
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000792 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: LEADING POLLSTER ANALYZES PRESIDENTIAL RACE

REF: MEXICO 618

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R
EASONS: 1.4(B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000792

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: LEADING POLLSTER ANALYZES PRESIDENTIAL RACE

REF: MEXICO 618

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR WILLIAM H. DUNCAN, R
EASONS: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: One of Mexico's most respected pollsters,
Maria de las Heras, told us that according to her own data,
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO),presidential candidate of
the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD),remained the
candidate to beat in Mexico's July 2 presidential election,
although for the moment, all three candidates remain
competitive. She believes that with polls showing him in the
high 30s, AMLO is at the ceiling of his possible support.
She believes that Felipe Calderon of the National Action
Party (PAN) has lost his momentum and will have trouble
breaking out of the low 30s unless he is able to redefine
himself to appeal to voters other than PAN loyalists.
Although Roberto Madrazo of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) is running a close third to Calderon, and while
the PRI enjoys a potential base much larger than that of the
PRD or PAN, de las Heras asserts that Madrazo has run an
error-prone campaign that has repelled more voters than it
has attracted. She believes that unless Madrazo is able to
use the party's forthcoming legislative lists to consolidate
the party's base -- an uncertain prospect at best -- she
believes he may miss his last chance to pull even. While we
largely agree with de las Heras's analysis, we would add the
caveat that with nearly five months to go, there remains
plenty of time for scandals or dirty tricks that could
quickly change the dynamic of the race. End summary.

Race Remains AMLO's to Lose
--------------


2. (C) On February 8, poloff met with Maria de las Heras,
one of Mexico,s most respected pollsters and an advisor to
the Madrazo campaign. According to de las Heras, her polling
continues to show that this tight, three-way race remained
AMLO's to lose. At the moment, AMLO continues to poll in the
high 30s, with Felipe Calderon polling in the low 30s and
Roberto Madrazo polling 1-2 percentage points behind
Calderon. She said that most polls were fairly consistent
with her own data, with any differences falling within the

margin of error. She explained that the small number of
outlying polls did not seek to predict the vote of undecided
voters, and therefore did not add up to 100 percent, which
might account for their disparity with mainstream polls. She
noted that current trends suggest the 2006 election would see
significantly lower voter participation than in recent
presidential elections; such a dynamic could favor the party
with the strongest "get out the vote" operation, the PRI.

AMLO's Challenge: Hold On To Uncommitted Voters
-------------- --


3. (C) De las Heras told poloff that while at the moment,
AMLO was the clear leader, he was near his "ceiling" of
possible support, with little possibility for further growth.
According to her polling, AMLO,s loyal base of support was
approximately 30 percent and his 7 percent of additional
support reflects swing voters leaning towards him. AMLO,s
challenge in the campaign was to hold on to those swing
voters.

Calderon Needs Distance from the PAN
--------------


4. (C) Although Felipe Calderon's enjoyed early gains in the
polls after he won his party's nomination, de las Heras
believes he will have trouble surpassing his current level of
support unless he redefines himself. Unlike President Fox,
who during his 2000 campaign was perceived as an agent of
change and unbeholden to the PAN, Calderon has neither
advantage in his favor. He is widely viewed as representing
the PAN's traditional, conservative ideology, which alienates
many Mexicans. She predicts that unless Calderon succeeds in
redefining himself to appeal to a broader swath of the
electorate, his poll ratings will see little additional
upward movement.

Madrazo Struggling to Win Back Former PRI Voters...
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Although a loyal PRIista and Madrazo advisor, de las
Heras was less than optimistic about Madrazo's chances,
seeing no sign that he had turned the corner in what she
characterized as a blundering campaign. She argued that
while Madrazo potentially enjoyed the largest base of
reliable voters, he had squandered a considerable portion of
this potential support through poor strategic moves. She
noted the PRI had won 14 million votes in the 2003 midterm
elections and that if Madrazo were able simply to hold on to

MEXICO 00000792 002 OF 003


those voters, he would be assured of victory. She observed,
however, that Madrazo was considerably less popular than the
PRI itself. She said that many who had voted for the PRI in
the past did so out of the conviction that the PRI knew how
to maintain stability and get things done. She opined that
Madrazo's ham-handed handling of his conflicts with teachers'
union leader Elba Esther Gordillo and PRI rival and former
Mexico State Governor Arturo Montiel cost him one million
loyal PRI voters, for whom these disputes raised questions
about his basic competence.

...While His "Last Chance" Approaches
--------------


6. (C) De las Heras was particularly critical of Madrazo's
strategy of seeking to win over non-PRIistas before he had
consolidated his support among the party's base. For
example, she noted that Madrazo had promised a
disproportionate number of spaces on the party legislative
lists to the PRI's alliance partner, the Green Party, largely
in the hope of winning the youth vote. Yet as far as she
could discern, the Greens had contributed virtually nothing
to Madrazo's support. De las Heras opined that the
elaboration of the PRI's legislative lists represented
Madrazo's "last chance" to jump-start his campaign, as it
provided the last opportunity for him to consolidate the
PRI's base, by ensuring that the party's regional and local
bosses had a stake in the campaign.


7. (C) Yet de las Heras remained unconvinced that the
candidate would succeed in using this opportunity to his
advantage. She noted that breaking with PRI tradition,
Madrazo had decided to allocate spots on the party's
district-by-district lists by polling, according the
nomination to the candidate who polled highest in the state
or district. (Note: Some congressional seats are filled
through head-to-head races in each district or state; others
are filled on a proportional basis from each party's national
list. Candidates prefer a place on the national list,
because a high place on the national list virtually
guarantees their election, without having to campaign. End
note.) She noted that those candidates who polled highest
months before the election were not always those who were
most able to unify the party at the local level, and that
this tactic would leave a number of regional party bosses out
in the cold.


8. (C) Note: Other contacts have also criticized this
element of Madrazo's strategy. Recent PRI defector Deputy
Laura Reyes-Retana complained to poloff that in preparing the
PRI's electoral lists, the Madrazo camp appeared to be
ignoring numerous local party leaders (like herself) who,
while not national figures, commanded considerable loyalty in
their home districts, and had played an important role in the
PRI's past electoral successes. She said the PRI planned to
delay release of its legislative lists until after the PAN
and PRD had finalized theirs, to prevent defections by those
PRIistas who were not offered a place on the party's lists.
Not surprisingly, Federico Madrazo, son of the candidate and
a member of the Chamber of Deputies, had a different take on
his father's strategy. He told poloff that his father was
asking well-known party members to take advantage of their
popularity and run for competitive seats in their districts,
rather than seeking a secure place on the national list; he
believed this would increase Madrazo's vote totals in those
districts. He said his father planned to reserve spots on
the national list for little-known technocrats who could not
win a competitive seat, but whose expertise was needed in
Congress. End note.

Winning May Be Easier than Governing
--------------


9. (C) De las Heras confessed to being less concerned about
who would win the presidency and more concerned about how the
eventual winner would be able to govern. She noted that
while PAN candidate Felipe Calderon had pledged to form a
coalition if his party did not win a majority in Congress,
she suspected he would have as little success in governing by
coalition as President Fox has had. She noted that unlike
Fox, who was something of a pragmatist with few fixed policy
principles, Calderon was far more committed to the party's
conservative principles, which would likely lead to conflict
with the other congressional factions. She added that AMLO
was considerably more popular than his party, and that she
saw no chance that the PRD would win a majority in Congress,
complicating his ability to govern. Finally, she intimated
that Madrazo could face problems governing because the PRI
had lost much of its party discipline. Referring to the
candidate as a "failed Machiavelli," she said that Madrazo's
tendency to manage disputes in a heavy-handed and
self-interested manner continued to contribute to the party's

MEXICO 00000792 003 OF 003


factionalization.

Comment: Battling for the Swing Vote
--------------


10. (C) Given that de las Heras is a close advisor to
Madrazo, we were surprised at how critical she was of his
campaign. On the other hand, she emphasized that Madrazo had
failed to heed much of her advice, and it may be that she
wants to distance herself from what may well be a losing
enterprise. If de las Heras's analysis of the race is
largely accurate -- and we suspect it is -- then ultimately
the election will turn on which of the candidates is most
successful in winning (or holding on to) the 15-20 percent of
the electorate that is not yet firmly behind one of the
candidates. Such a battle over the swing vote may well
produce a race to the political center by the three
candidates. While for the moment AMLO seems to have
consolidated his lead, the elections remain nearly five long
months away. This provides plenty of opportunity for
scandals, dirty tricks and other unforeseeable events that
could quickly change the dynamic in this race.


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KELLY