JESUS ORTEGA: AMLO CAMPAIGN INSIDER OR OUTSIDE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 000536

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: JESUS ORTEGA: AMLO CAMPAIGN INSIDER OR OUTSIDE
LOOKING IN?


Summary


1. (U) On 01/24, Poloffs and WHA/MEX Deputy Director met with
Jesus Ortega, campaign coordinator for Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador (AMLO),to discuss the upcoming campaign agenda, what
effect the continued public infighting between the Democratic
Revolutionary Party's (PRD) Mexico City factions was having
on the party's unity and AMLO's campaign, and what were his
concerns leading into this summer's election. Although he
seemed to have a grasp of the themes covered, it became
apparent Ortega may not be completely informed on all aspects
of the campaign. It is likely, considering the growing
divisions within the party, that Ortega's nomination to
campaign coordinator serves only to placate his faction
within the PRD. End Summary.

Problems? What Problems?


2. (SBU) Poloffs and WHA/MEX Deputy Director were interested
to hear Ortega's position on the public infighting taking
place between the PRD's Mexico City factions. An apparently
sour subject (Ortega lost the party's nomination for Mexico
City mayor to AMLO-protege Marcelo Ebrard),Ortega grudgingly
admitted that the fighting was a concern for the campaign but
that they were working to get it under control. He discarded
any insinuation that the fallout from all the bickering will
split the party or threaten the stability of the PRD's
alliance with the Worker's Party (PT) and Convergence Party
(Convergencia).


3. (SBU) Regarding the campaign itself, a more confident
Ortega explained that AMLO's strong support in Southern
Mexico will shift the campaign's focus to the center and
north of the country. Of the three main contenders, he
claimed, AMLO was in the best position. According to Ortega,
April polls are the most significant of the campaign season.
At that stage, it is practically impossible for the third
place candidate to gain more votes, and the contest becomes a
two-person race with support for candidate number three being
split among the two frontrunners. AMLO cannot lose as long
as he maintains his eight to ten point lead in the polls, he
declared. Ortega continued, stating that Roberto Madrazo of
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) suffers from too
many internal problems and little support from PRI governors
in the North. He believes a growing battle over the party's
candidate list for congress will erupt in April when the
lists are finalized and create a break in the PRI with
conservative members supporting Felipe Calderon and the more
liberal members moving toward AMLO. Finally, Ortega
commented that Felipe Calderon of the National Action Party
(PAN) is running on "fake" support. He noted that Calderon's
opening day campaign rally in Mexico's main bullfighting
ring, where all PAN candidates launch their campaigns, did
not fill the stadium, a bad omen in his view. He accused the
PAN of exagerating Calderon's support, but did admit that of
the two Calderon would be AMLO's biggest threat. For that
threat to materialize, however, Ortega explained that
Calderon must first consolidate his party's support, steal
conservative votes from within the PRI, and focus heavily on
independent voters.

Trail Talk


4. (SBU) Ortega provided a more detailed explanation of
AMLO's three-stage campaign strategy. The first stage, he
said, focuses on AMLO the leader - fully supported by and in
control of his alliance and ready to govern. The second
stage, scheduled for March through May, will focus on AMLO
the team player - appearing at alliance campaign events to
support senate and federal deputy candidates. The final
stage, according to Ortega, will focus on closing the
election out in June. This stage, he explained, is still up
in the air and will be directed primarily by polling results
in April and May.


5. (SBU) Ortega brushed over a few of AMLO's platform
positions, repeating a number of points made by AMLO during
breakfast with the Ambassador the day before, especially
AMLO's immigration/economic proposal (septel). We explained
that immigration, and more importantly the "regularization"
of Mexicans in the United States, was a domestic,
congressional affair and not something that could be
negotiated. We proposed that Mexico's role should be geared
more toward controlling its border and emphasizing all legal
migration tools. Ortega appeared to understand our position
and noted he would discuss it with others.

Comment


6. (SBU) Although he appeared fully briefed on campaign and
platform issues, Ortega was surprised to hear the meeting

MEXICO 00000536 002 OF 002


between AMLO and the Ambassador had already taken place.
This was not the only sign Ortega, as the supposed campaign
coordinator, did not know what was going on. When presenting
his business card, Ortega noted he held a private office
outside the campaign headquarters but offered no further
explanation. He also acknowledged that he was not traveling
with AMLO on the campaign trail nor was he participating in
AMLO's morning television infomercials - a major campaign
component. It is possible Ortega's title serves only to
placate his faction of the PRD (which represents the majority
of the party),and he has no real campaign responsibilities.
According to other PRD contacts, Ortega was asked to step
down in the PRD's most recent election to chose the party
president in order to make room for AMLO-favorite Leonel
Cota. In exchange, Ortega was told he could run unobstructed
for the party's nomination for Mexico City mayor. That was
not to be, however, as party leaders again pressured Ortega
to step aside to make room for AMLO-protege Marcelo Ebrard.
Ortega did not back down, but eventually lost to Ebrard in a
December 4 internal election. It is unclear at this time
what Ortega's role really is within the campaign and whether
or not he will serve as a good point of contact for the
campaign. End Comment.


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GARZA