THE MAKING OF THE SHADOW PRESIDENT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 004654

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: THE MAKING OF THE SHADOW PRESIDENT?

REF: A. MEXICO 4465

B. MEXICO 4567

Classified By: DCM LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Several leading Mexican political observers
largely concurred that the evolution of the current political
stalemate would continue to be largely a function of Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador's (AMLO) personality. They believed
that his manner of thinking was so rigid and self-righteous
that he would never be able to admit defeat, even to himself.
At the same time, his powerful charisma ensured that he
would never lack for a core of supporters willing to follow
him "to the final consequences." They suspected -- and
recent press reports increasingly corroborate -- that he
planned to institutionalize his protest movement following
the electoral tribunal's expected certification of Felipe
Calderon as President, perhaps setting up a "shadow
government" that would seek to dog Calderon at every turn.
The significance of this movement may well depend upon how
the PRD responds to the challenge posed by AMLO's tactics and
whether party pragmatists or AMLO partisans prevail. End
summary.


2. (C) This is the second in a two cable series on how
leading Mexican analysts see the current political conflict
evolving (ref A). Over the past week, poloff met with three
leading observers of the Mexican political scene, Luis Rubio
of the CIDAC thinktank; freelance historian Alejandra Lajous,
the author of a book on Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's (AMLO)
tenure as Mexico City Mayor; and Carlos Casillas Ortega, a
professor at Mexico's Anahuac and Iberoamerican universities
and an advisor to PRI Senator Enrique Jackson. They
concurred that the current stalemate was to a large degree a
function of AMLO's personality, in particular, his rigid,
self-righteous way of thinking, which excluded the
possibility of compromise, and his tremendous charisma, which
guaranteed that he would never lack for a core of dedicated
followers.

Getting into AMLO's Head
--------------


3. (C) AMLO's biographer, Alejandra Lajous, emphasized the
importance of understanding his personality as a prerequisite
to understanding his political tactics. She described him as
being insular in his views, utterly convinced of his
correctness, and unwilling to expose himself to potential
critics. She had no doubt he truly believed he had been
cheated out of an election victory, even if the evidence of
fraud offered to date had been unconvincing. She believed
that during the campaign, his hermetic campaign structure
probably kept him far removed from negative news during the
campaign and that up until the election, he continued to
believe PRD-sponsored polls reportedly showing him as many as
ten points ahead, even while neutral polls showed he and
Felipe Calderon in a statistical dead-heat. She believed
that he had made such a huge personal investment both in his
presidential campaign and in the current protest movement
that "his emotional structure would never permit him to admit
defeat."


4. (C) Lajous warned that AMLO was extremely manipulative
and willing to betray long time allies and supporters in
order to advance "his cause." She noted, for example, that
when AMLO first decided to ask his supporters to occupy
Mexico City's Zocalo and Paseo de la Reforma at a July 29
"informational assembly," he did not tell Mexico City Mayor
Alejandro Encinas (PRD) of his plans until 15 minutes before
he announced them publicly, in order to prevent Encinas from
taking any measures to thwart him. Rubio told us that all
last week, Encinas had been requesting a meeting with AMLO,
presumably to discuss the protests. AMLO reportedly ignored
Encinas's repeated entreaties, notwithstanding that it was
Encinas who was paying by far the highest political price for
AMLO's tactics.


5. (C) Lajous said that AMLO's personal charisma should not
be underestimated as a factor in maintaining his movement,
and she expected his hard-core supporters to stay with him
until the bitter end. To illustrate his charisma, she said
the director of a television news program told her that
whenever he sent a journalist to cover AMLO for an extended
period during the campaign, that journalist ended up becoming
a "believer," no matter how cynical his initial views about
AMLO.

MEXICO 00004654 002 OF 003



The Shadow President-Elect
--------------


6. (C) Given AMLO's absolute conviction that he won the
election -- and that his cause is the right cause for Mexico
-- she sees little likelihood that he will stand down in the
near future. She predicted he might try to position himself
as a "shadow president," reminding Mexicans of his "claim" to
Los Pinos, serving as a constant critic of Calderon's
policies, and mobilizing opposition to Calderon's "rightist"
reforms. Indeed, he has hinted at the possibility of forming
a "shadow government;" Casillas believes he would use such a
ploy to undermine Calderon's initiatives at every turn.


7. (C) Both Lajous and Rubio doubted that AMLO would
initiate violence, with Rubio observing that while AMLO had
led other lengthy protest movements in the past, he had
always eschewed violence. Lajous noted, however, that
whether or not AMLO sought to initiate violence, the
mobilization of large numbers of supporters inevitably could
produce violent confrontations with the authorities, an
observation borne out by the subsequent clash between
security forces and AMLO supporters outside the Congress (ref
B).

Taking It to the Streets
--------------


8. (C) Both Rubio and Lajous concurred with the other
analysts we have spoken to recently that many of the
long-term protesters now on the streets are PRD "clients"
such as unlicensed taxi drivers and members of radicalized
unions. Rubio reported that GOM security officials had told
him they had information indicating that among the more
mainstream protesters were members of at least two radical
groups, the Frente Pancho Villa and the Peoples'
Revolutionary Army (EPR). He added that there were rumors
that Mexican oligarch Carlos Slim had paid protest organizers
what amounted to protection money to ensure that his
commercial interests would not be targeted. Both concurred
that the encampments had become more of a media spectacle
than an actual occupation, with many of the tents now
unoccupied overnight, and that AMLO's tactics had already
alienated many of the moderates who had voted for him.

A Party of Revolution or Evolution?
--------------


9. (C) Rubio believed that the short-term future of AMLO's
protest movement would depend in large measure on how the
divisions within the PRD over his tactics played out. He
explained that as a party, the PRD had not yet decided
whether it stood for revolution or institutionality; Lajous
contended that ironically, some of the party's long-term
members resent the radical tactics of defectors from the PRI,
for fear such tactics are undermining the credibility of
Mexico's institutional left, which they had worked for
decades to establish. Rubio said that assuming the TEPJF
certifies Calderon as President, it will fall largely to PRD
President Leonel Cota to decide the extent to which the PRD
will continue to back AMLO in his long-term strategy of
protests. Although the party as an institution had little to
gain from such tactics, Rubio noted that Cota was close to
AMLO and might find it difficult to distance himself.

The Road Ahead
--------------


10. (C) Rubio opined that although Calderon would likely
face a very difficult scenario upon taking office, the
situation was salvageable. He said that the most important
early action for Calderon would be to choose a very
competent, experienced and broad-based cabinet, rather than
one focused on "hard-core" PANistas, as many in his party
would pressure him to do. In addition to sending a signal of
conciliation, he believes that such a cabinet could
contribute significantly to Mexico's governability and
undermine expected PRD efforts at obstructionism. For her
part, Lajous explained that notwithstanding the damage he was
doing, AMLO had made one very important contribution,
focusing the Mexican political debate on the twin issues of
poverty and inequality, an issue Calderon will need to tackle
head-on.

Comment: Partisans vs. Pragmatists

MEXICO 00004654 003 OF 003


--------------


11. (C) The implication of Lajous's and Rubio's analysis is
that AMLO's future strategy is predictable: fueled by a
sense of injustice -- even if ill-founded -- and buttressed
by a core of true believers, he will not voluntarily wind
down his campaign of protests any time soon. Yet while
AMLO's strategy may be a constant, one key variable is his
party's response. AMLO has done a surprisingly good job of
maintaining unity to date, even as most observers believe his
tactics are taking a considerable toll on the party. Most
analysts suspect there are significant internal differences
within the PRD over his tactics, and the degree to which the
party should continue to support them. Once the electoral
tribunal issues its final ruling, these differences may be
amplified, as the interests of AMLO and his partisans diverge
from those of PRD office holders. It remains to be seen
whether even a political operator as skilled as AMLO is
capable of ensuring that all eyes in the PRD remain focused
on the same prize.


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