ANALYSTS PREDICT A LONG SEASON OF PROTESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 004465

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: ANALYSTS PREDICT A LONG SEASON OF PROTESTS

REF: A. A) MEXICO 4368

B. B) MEXICO 4311

Classified By: DCM LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Three prominent Mexican political analysts
believe that Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) is likely to
continue his protests for the foreseeable future. All three
expect AMLO to pursue increasingly aggressive tactics in the
days leading up to the electoral tribunal's (TEPJF) decision,
and possibly thereafter, assuming the TEPJF declares Felipe
Calderon the winner. All three believe that AMLO and his
core supporters may try to interfere with the investiture of
the new Congress (and President Fox's address thereto) on
September 1, and even the presidential inauguration on
December 1. Although none of our contacts expect AMLO to
initiate violence, all agreed that as the protesters take
increasingly provocative actions, violence could be an
unintended consequence. Two of the analysts expect fissures
to emerge within the PRD and predict that over time -- and
particularly in the aftermath of the TEPJF's final ruling --
more moderate elements of the PRD will seek to dissociate
themselves from AMLO, who is likely to become increasingly
isolated and surrounded primarily by hard-core supporters.
The third analyst, however, believes that PRD moderates will
find it difficult to distance themselves from AMLO, given his
authoritarian persona and control of the party. Our contacts
believe that while the current stand-off will produce many
losers, over the longer term, the biggest loser will be the
Mexican left, which has all but lost its hard won veneer of
reasonableness and moderation. End summary.


2. (C) Over the past week, poloff met with three leading
Mexican political analysts to solicit their views on how the
current political stand-off is likely to unfold. The
analysts included Professor Soledad Loaeza, a political
scientist at the prestigious Colegio de Mexico, Sabino
Bastidas, a columnist for Excelsior and an analyst at the
CIDAC think-tank, and Oscar Aguilar Asencio, a political
advisor at the Secretariat for the Environment and Natural
Resources, an adjunct professor of political science at
Iberoamerican University, and a collaborator on a recent
biography on AMLO. This is the first in what we expect will
be a two part series seeking to set forth both the points of
convergence and divergence in how Mexican experts view the
current situation.

A Long Season of Protests Ahead
--------------


3. (C) All three analysts believe AMLO's current campaign of
protests is unlikely to end soon. Loaeza saw little
possibility that AMLO would stand down before the before the
Tribunal issues its final decision and certifies a winner,
which must take place by September 6. She said that her own
contacts believed that AMLO had decided to undertake more
radical protest tactics (i.e., blocking Paseo de la Reforma)
earlier than many observers had predicted, because he felt
that his lawyers' July 28 audience with the TEPJF's had gone
poorly, with some of the magistrates reportedly appearing
unreceptive to their legal arguments. (Note: The TEPJF's
recent ruling (ref A),ordering a partial recount of
approximately 9 percent of precincts nationwide, is
consistent with this view. End note.)


4. (C) All three analysts concurred that AMLO and his
supporters would adopt increasingly radical tactics,
particularly as the TEPJF's final decision approached.
Bastidas said that in an August 2 conversation, PRD Senator
Jesus Ortega told him that radical PRD members were urging
increasingly aggressive measures, including blockading the
stock exchange (which occurred on August 3, the day after
that conversation took place, ref B),the presidential
residence at Los Pinos, the Federal Electoral Institute,
federal offices, foreign embassies, and the residences of
such leading PANistas as Felipe Calderon and Senator Diego
Fernandez de Cevallos. (Note: On August 8, AMLO supporters
blockaded a federal office -- the Secretariat of Agriculture
-- for the first time. End note.) Also under consideration
is an occupation of the terminal at Mexico City International
Airport, and possibly a symbolic occupation of the National
Palace. Ortega told Bastidas that PRD radicals might seek to
play upon socioeconomic tensions by leading a march through
an affluent, residential neighborhood, or by occupying one of
the luxury condominium developments under construction in
Mexico City.

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5. (C) Aguilar was more pessimistic than Loaeza and Bastidas
with respect to the longer term panorama; he believes that
AMLO will seek to cast a permanent shadow on the Calderon
presidency. He predicted that although AMLO's movement may
wax and wane throughout the Calderon sexenio, AMLO would
manipulate the media to ensure that his movement maintained a
constant presence, much as Subcomandante Marcos had done
during the Zedillo Administration. He believed that AMLO
would not hesitate to redefine his struggle when politically
expedient. For example, should Calderon pursue such
controversial reforms as opening the energy sector to private
investment, AMLO would likely seize upon it as a new basis
for political activism.

Divisions in the PRD
--------------


6. (C) Loaeza and Bastidas emphasized that the PRD was
hardly a monolithic movement and that significant differences
over AMLO's tactics were emerging within the party, between
those who supported AMLO uncategorically and those who feared
that his increasingly aggressive tactics would cost the PRD
dearly. Bastidas observed that ironically, some of those
advocating moderation -- such as Senator Ortega -- were
lifelong leftists, while some of the more radical influences
were former PRIistas such as Manuel Camacho Solis and Ricardo
Monreal. He said that many lifelong leftists understood that
the left had gained nothing from "revolutionary" tactics and
had gained a great deal from working within the system. They
were loathe to jeopardize that progress.


7. (C) Loaeza largely agreed with Bastidas, adding
particularly after the TEPJF's final decision, AMLO might
become increasingly isolated within the party hierarchy, even
while he maintains a core of supporters outside the
hierarchy. Many in the party may conclude that while AMLO
helped them to achieve their historic results in the
legislative elections, he could take the party no further.
She doubted that incoming PRD legislators would decide as a
group not to take office on September 1. (Note: With
federal Senators and Deputies earning well over USD100,000
per year, the financial incentive to take office should not
be underestimated. End note.)


8. (C) Aguilar saw internal PRD dynamics differently than
the others, arguing that most senior PRD members were loyal
to AMLO, who he said had come to dominate the party. Aguilar
compared AMLO to a crime boss whose followers were afraid to
confront him with the folly of his ways. Implying that few
in the party would be willing to alienate AMLO, he added
"there's no witness protection program in Mexican politics."
He strongly emphasized that AMLO did not think in rational
political terms and was not concerned about the damage his
tactics may be doing to the PRD's political future; his only
concern was standing up for his principles, no matter how
ill-founded. (Note: None of the three analysts believed the
election was marred by widespread fraud. End note.)

Who are the Protesters?
--------------


9. (C) Loaeza said she believed some of the protesters were
PRD employees, including many from outside Mexico City, while
others were supporters from "proletariat neighborhoods"
within the city. Bastidas said that PRD elected officials,
including ward chiefs in Mexico City and federal deputies and
senators, were being tasked with bringing in protesters from
their respective constituencies. He suspected that many
protesters were being compensated. Aguilar surmised that
many of the protesters were PRD "clients," i.e., those who
had benefited from PRD policies or social programs and who
had been called upon to repay that favor.

AMLO Prefers Victimization to Violence
--------------


10. (C) Loaeza saw little possibility that AMLO would
resort to violence, even in the wake of an unfavorable final
TEPJF decision. She said that throughout his political
history, AMLO has been most comfortable exploiting the role
of victim and she doubted that he would respond violently
even if GOM forces used force first. Indeed, she added "he
wants to be repressed," which would enhance his image on the
left as a moral leader. She noted, however, that as
political tensions increased, so did the possibility that a

MEXICO 00004465 003 OF 003


chance encounter between AMLO supporters and opponents could
spark an isolated violent incident. She also noted there
were armed groups in the Mexico City area -- she cited the
Frente Pancho Villa -- who were sympathetic to AMLO's cause
but not under his control. She could not rule out that they
would seek to exploit the current situation.


11. (C) For his part, Bastidas also doubted that AMLO would
resort to violence, but added that he already had been
surprised by AMLO's recent tactics and therefore would be
reluctant to rule anything out. Aguilar said that while he
doubted AMLO would seek to initiate violence, it was possible
that he would encourage tactics that provoked a forceful
response by public security forces, in the hope that the
media would record his supporters being "suppressed."

Biggest Loser: The Mexican Left
--------------


12. (C) Both Loaeza and Bastidas concurred that over the
longer term, the biggest loser from the current stand-off is
likely to be the Mexican Left. Loaeza noted that the PRD had
worked very hard since its founding in 1988 to overcome the
"revolutionary" image that long tainted the Mexican Left and
that its results in this year's legislative race demonstrated
that it had made tremendous progress. She believed that the
increasingly radical tactics being adopted by AMLO and his
supporters was destroying the PRD's hard-won image of
moderation with potentially grave implications for the
party's political fortunes. (Note: Our own casual
conversations with Mexican acquaintances suggest that the
party's tactics are alienating middle class Mexicans who
voted for the PRD for the first time this year, seeking a
change from "politics as usual." End note.)

Comment: No Exit???
--------------


13. (C) Aguilar may have captured the situation best when he
described the current stand-off as one in which modern
electoral institutions had fallen hostage to a pre-modern,
tribalistic political culture. He urged us not to project
upon AMLO the expectation that he would pursue the same
calculations as a "rational politician," reiterating that
although AMLO was skilled at calculating his day-to-day
tactics, his overall vision of the current situation was
divorced from reality.


14. (C) At this point, the confrontation appears to be
settling into a stalemate; AMLO has not moderated his
demands, even as the Tribunal has demonstrated that it will
not respond to political pressure and as the election moves
one step closer to legal resolution. We believe the best
opportunity for an exit will arise when the TEPJF issues its
final decision, which is required no later than September 6,
but could happen earlier. That decision will give many in
the PRD a pretext for distancing themselves from AMLO, if
they are wise enough to seize it. As for AMLO himself, one
vaguely hopeful note was his comment on August 7 that at this
point the protests are not only about the election, but also
about transforming Mexico's institutions. By redefining the
terms of his protest, he could provide himself with an exit
from the present stalemate, even if he plans to continue a
protest movement in some form, as we believe he will. It
remains to be seen, however, whether he is prepared to
exploit this possible exit.


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