Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MEXICO3296
2006-06-15 00:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

ENGAGING THE NEW MEXICAN ADMINISTRATION ON

Tags:  PREL PTER MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHME #3296/01 1660044
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 150044Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1652
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 003296 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MX
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE NEW MEXICAN ADMINISTRATION ON
SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA, JR., REASONS; 1.4(B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 003296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MX
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE NEW MEXICAN ADMINISTRATION ON
SECURITY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ANTONIO O. GARZA, JR., REASONS; 1.4(B/D)


1. (C) Summary: This is the first in a series of six cables
on transition issues in Mexico. We have an effective
relationship with Mexico when it comes to counter-terrorism,
particularly on special interest aliens (SIAs) and alien
smuggling. The first transition challenge will be to make
the new administration understand how that relationship works
and why we must maintain it. The second challenge will be to
get the new administration focused on a number of areas for
improvement, including training efforts to increase Mexican
capabilities. In the area of security cooperation with the
Mexican military, we are poised for a significant step
forward provided we can convince the incoming administration
of the importance of taking that step. End summary.


2. (C) The terrorism threat from Mexico appears to be the
potential transit of third country nationals rather than any
indigenous terrorists. For that reason, our focus here is on
detecting special interest aliens (SIAs),the alien smuggling
organizations they might employ, and effectively employing
systems used to detect air passengers of concern.

3. (C) The Fox Administration has established a good record
of cooperation with us on CT issues, and we will want to
encourage the incoming administration to continue that. The
Center for National Security Investigations (CISEN) is a key
agency for CT cooperation, but we also enjoy strong
relationships with the National Migration Institute (INM).
As in law enforcement cooperation, we need to make it clear
that the status quo represents the foundation on which we
should build. We cannot afford to have a new administration
backslide on CT cooperation while it finds its feet.
Although Mexicans still do not regard themselves as targets
for terrorism (despite their proximity to a country that
clearly is a target),there is a strong appreciation here for
the fact that a terrorist attack on the U.S. launched via
Mexico could have devastating consequences for the Mexican
economy.

Information Sharing
--------------


4. (C) As noted, information sharing on CT issues under the

Fox administration has been good, but there are specific
improvements that could be made. This would improve the
clarity of our picture of persons of interest who are moving
into Mexico and help us better understand the alien smuggling
networks used by these people.


5. (C) Engagement: Terrorism should be on the list for every
encounter between senior U.S. officials and incoming Mexican
counterparts during the transition (see septel for a list of
suggested visits). Much was accomplished during the Fox
administration thanks to the designation of a CISEN Director
committed to cooperation with the U.S., sensitive to our
concerns, and with sufficient clout within the administration
to get things done. We should signal early and at the most
senior levels our need for another such person. Although it
will be a tough sell if a new party comes in, we also need to
make a plea for minimal personnel disruption at the lower
levels (say below the director general level).


6. (C) Activities:

-- We should encourage the GOM to share fingerprint and other
biometric data with the FBI to be included in the Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System and other
terrorism databases.

-- We should propose increased liaison with GOM law
enforcement/intelligence agencies to obtain interview results
and seized items (particularly documents, telephone numbers,
etc.) from SIAs.

-- We should encourage exchange of information between INM,
ICE, and CBP on operations that target alien smugglers (e.g.,
Operation Sonora and Plan Sentinel or Centinela).

-- We should signal our desire to increase cooperation on
alien smuggling initiatives along Mexico's northern and
southern borders.

-- We should seek access to INM's database (SIOM) of
passenger entries into major airports in Mexico.

Improving Mexican Capabilities
--------------


7. (C) There are a variety of areas in which Mexican
capabilities need improvement and where, using existing
resources, we could provide a quick boost to Mexican efforts.
As always in such endeavors, we reap the double benefit of
improved host nation capabilities and the stronger working
level relationships that are built in training.


8. (C) Engagement: Mexicans understand an attack on the U.S.
via Mexico would be catastrophic for Mexico. They are less
aware of the danger of an attack in Mexico, but the fact is
that Mexico offers a wide variety of tempting targets for a
terrorist who might want to avoid the scrutiny of U.S.
homeland security officials. Border towns, energy
infrastructure, airlines, American businesses, and tourists
all present themselves. We need to impress this fact upon
the new administration as an introduction to our offer to
help.


9. (C) Activities:

-- The USG shares the no-fly list with Mexico, but a response
capability is lacking. Mexican authorities have approached
us regarding the need to develop a standard joint response
protocol. We should offer the GOM assistance in developing
and implementing an interagency response for handling no-fly
situations.

-- The GOM has been using the Advanced Passenger Information
System (APIS) since 2004. However, the GOM should be
encouraged to work to increase commercial carrier compliance.


-- We should encourage participation in the FBI's WMD
initiative to give the GOM a comprehensive WMD response
capability. This would include training on conducting threat
assessments, handling or neutralizing WMD, and "train the
trainer" courses.

-- We should encourage MANPADS surveys at Mexico's busiest
and most vulnerable airports. Mexico has participated in
MANPADS training and has agreed to conduct a joint
Canada-U.S.-Mexico survey of Mexico City's Benito Juarez
Airport or a border airport under the SPP.

-- USG agencies such as USCG and TSA should begin a dialogue
with the new administration to establish baselines of
existing training in the areas of facilities security and to
prioritize training on infrastructure security.

-- We should offer training at Mexican ports of entry to
improve the capabilities of front-line officials. This would
include interview techniques, baggage search, impostor
identification, fraudulent document detection, etc.

-- The FBI should reiterate to the new government its offer
to increase the number of Mexican candidates sponsored for
attendance at the FBI National Academy.

Military to Military Relations
--------------


10. (C) The Mexican military is key to many CT and law
enforcement functions here. We cannot achieve our security
goals with regard to Mexico without a strong mil-mil
relationship with a capable Mexican military. The good news
is that years of patient work by DOD and USNORTHCOM have
opened the way to more meaningful interaction. We have a
strong relationship with the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) and have
reached the point where the scant resources we allocate to
assistance have become the major limiting factor. More
recently, the frost has thawed with the Mexican Army and Air
Force (SEDENA) as well, and they too have begun to seek
concrete engagement.


11. (C) Engagement: The Mexican military stands somewhat
apart from the civilian agencies in the cabinet, with the

uniformed Secretaries of National Defense and the Navy
reporting directly to the President. That said, if a Mexican
President tells his military to develop closer ties with the
U.S., they will do it. Conversely, the Mexican military
needs that sort of "top cover" for its engagement with us.
It is therefore critical that we make this an issue with the
incoming administration, above all with the new president.
We should bear in mind that the new president and his
civilian advisors will arrive in office knowing very little
about military affairs (few Mexican civilians do). We should
make clear we are not talking about "subordinating" the
Mexican military to USNORTHCOM or pushing Mexico into
peacekeeping operations (although that would be a welcome
step). We are simply talking about establishing a mature
relationship similar to that we have with Canada that will
allow us jointly to defeat common threats. And as with
Canada, a strong mil-mil relationship in no way limits a
government's freedom of action or binds it to the U.S. view
on any international question. The bonus for Mexico is that
a closer mil-mil relationship with the U.S. will increase
Mexican capabilities across the board.


12. (C) Activities:

-- As noted in septel, an August SECDEF visit and the
September independence day events to which we expect CJCS and
USNORTHCOM will be invited are opportunities to discuss these
issues.

-- We should continue to encourage reciprocal visits between
senior SEDENA officers and senior USNORTHCOM officers.

-- We should encourage establishment of a direct
communication link between SECDEF, SEDENA, and SEMAR.

-- We should offer SEDENA and SEMAR increased
counter-terrorism and counter-drug training at the unit level.

-- We should build on the good will of Mexican assistance in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina and propose joint training on
disaster relief scenarios.

-- Resources permitting, we should offer increased logistical
support to both secretariats.


Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity

GARZA