Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MEXICO1889
2006-04-10 19:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Mexico
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S

Tags:  MARR MASS PREL MX 
pdf how-to read a cable
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2006-04-10 19:22:00
06MEXICO1889
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001889

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S
APRIL 17-18 VISIT TO MEXICO


Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

60015
2006-04-10 19:22:00
06MEXICO1889
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001889

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S
APRIL 17-18 VISIT TO MEXICO


Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Mexico is the essential partner in U.S.
homeland defense, and while the Mexican Navy (Marina) has
been an enthusiastic player, the Mexican military (SEDENA)
has only recently begun to acknowledge the benefits of
cooperation. This visit marks the opportunity to realign our
own posture vis-a-vis Mexico to give it the stature it merits
in our own security strategies, but also to build Mexico's
acceptance of its strategic role in North America. What we
do in the coming months is crucial foundation for the
military-to-military opportunities we can forge with Mexico's
incoming civilian and military leaders. End Summary

Two Services, Two Approaches


2. (C) Mexico generally remains cognizant of historical
military confrontations with the U.S. and extremely sensitive
to perceived slights or embarrassments. Within the military
Marina has been most able to overcome that, especially post
9/11, and has quickly embraced the need for close cooperation
on counter-terrorism, narcotics interdiction, potential
interception of weapons of mass destruction, and the range of
missions necessary to keep North America secure. SEDENA has
traditionally been suspicious and aloof, in part to disguise
lack of capability. In recent months, however, we have seen
a new openness within SEDENA to accepting a relationship with
NORTHCOM, observing U.S. military exercises, and of course
providing unprecedented assistance during Hurricane Katrina
relief efforts. This visit gives us the opportunity to
recognize Marina's ongoign partnership and open the door to a
similar relationship with SEDENA. The tools we suggest:


-- Waiver for American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA)/Nethercutt Sanctions: Mexico ratified the Treaty of
Rome in 2005, and as required by ASPA/Nethercutt we have
terminated ESF, IMET and FMF, the latter two targetted
primarily towards Marina. These programs were essential to
Marina's counter-terrorism preparedness which benefits not
only Mexico but the U.S. President Fox, Foreign Minister
Derbez, and both houses of the Mexican Congress have resolved
not to sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. A waiver
directly serves our security interests.

-- Major Non-NATO Ally Status: President Bush met last week
with President Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Harper to
discuss regional security and prosperity. Our regional
security efforts are enhanced if all three partners have the
opportunity and responsibility to be equal players. The U.S.
and Canada are, of course, NATO members. Making Mexico a
Major Non-NATO Ally opens up additional resources for
cooperation, training and engagement. It also provides
Mexico with a status nearer to that of Canada and the U.S. --
and a greater responsibility to improve its capabilities to
meet the common standard. While the foreign Ministry (SRE)
has signalled sensitivty to becoming a formal "ally" of the
United States, careful explanation of what being a Major
Non-NATO Ally entails should help mitigate that. We have
informally raised this with military leaders who have
encouraged us to raise the possibility with President Fox.

-- Joint Political-Military Talks: Mexico is one of the few
countries in the region to still have a military Defense
Secretary, and that is unlikely to change soon. As our

SIPDIS
homeland security, disaster relief and counter-terrorism
missions and scenarios bridge the military and civilian
sectors, we believe building dialogue and cooperation between
civilian and military experts is a valuable tool for both
countries. Mexico has just scheduled Pol-Mil talks with
Canada, setting a precedent we would like to follow.

Non-Proliferation


3. (C) Mexico is generally a strong proponent of
non-proiferation. In January it signed the International
Convention for the Repression of Nuclear Terroist Acts. We
have pressed the Secretary of Foreign Relations to endorse
the Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI),so far without
result although they have no raised specific objections. .

Political Constraints


4. (C) Mexico is in the last two months of an historic
presidential campaign which any one of the three major
parties could win -- polls have them in a technical tie at
this point. The outcome is unlikely to change military
missions dramatically: All three presidential candidates
favor continued military participation in drug eradication
and interdiction, and have postulated an increased military
role in border security. Two of the three candidates would

MEXICO 00001889 002 OF 002


probably continue Mexico's resistance to getting involved in
international peacekeeping operations. If the National
Action Party (PAN) is re-elected it would certainly press for
a greater military role in PKOs. Regardless of who wins,
General Vega will resign and the incoming president will
select a new Secretary of Defense from the ranks of the
lieutenant generals (generales de division). Under General
Vega SEDENA has suggested it is politicians who set
constraints on what the military can do. However, in the
last year NORTHCOM has hosted two Mexican Senate delegations
the members of which seemed very open to increased engagement
with the U.S. A new Mexican Secretary of Defense may provide
us the opportunity to open up unprecedented military
cooperation with Mexico if we have put the tools in place.


5. (C) These are crucial last months of the Fox
administration, as the Mexican President looks to fortify his
legacy as the leader who brought democratic transition and
modernization to Mexico. Fox must be politically cautious
not to "surrender" to the U.S. He is also eager for
recognition for his administration's unprecedented
counter-terrorism and security cooperation with us.
Spiraling violence on the border shadows real progress on
other fronts. The three initiatives suggested above could
find a receptive audience with President Fox, and could lay
the foundation for a new, invigorated military-to-military
relationship with the incoming administration.




Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity

GARZA