BAHRAINI POLITICAL SCENE PART II: ROYAL FAMILY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000907

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KMPI BA BILAT POL REFORM
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI POLITICAL SCENE PART II: ROYAL FAMILY
CONSERVATIVES TIGHTEN REINS ON POLITICS

REF: A. MANAMA 0891

B. MANAMA 0869

C. MANAMA 0765

Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) At a time when the Bahrain's King and ruling family
should be congratulating themselves for having successfully
maneuvered major opposition society Al Wifaq into deciding to
end its boycott and participate in this year's parliamentary
elections, recent developments suggest that at least some in
the top echelons of the royal family are apprehensive about
where this is heading and are looking for ways to protect
royal family power. Manifestations of apparent royal
skittishness include efforts to curtail NDI and Bahrain
Transparency Society activities (Ref A),and a series of
trial balloons that could, if implemented, diminish Shia
participation in the elections. Sources say that two
well-placed Al Khalifa brothers - Minister of State for
Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah and President
of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah - have
been leading the effort to contain the electoral process.
Sources also indicate that royal court elements have had a
direct hand in a scathing press campaign launched by Arabic
daily Al Watan against NDI, other NGOs, and even the U.S.
Embassy. The King himself appears to have remained above
the fray, even publicly welcoming Al Wifaq's decision to
participate in the elections, and not all in the royal
family, or the government leadership more broadly, support
the hardball approach we have seen lately. But there can be
no doubt that regional developments - Shia empowerment in
Iraq, belligerent rhetoric and actions out of Iran, unhappy
election experiences in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority,
concerns about Shia advancements enunciated publicly or
privately by key allies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia - have
frightened or emboldened those in Bahrain who want to protect
traditional Sunni power and privileges. End Summary.


2. (C) The May 12 departure of National Democratic Institute
(NDI) program director Fawzi Guleid is but one manifestation
of an apparent strategy by elements within the ruling Al
Khalifa family and government to attempt to control the
political scene and influence the results of the upcoming
parliamentary and municipal elections. According to
well-placed sources, there are those who advocate continued
reform and openness while others want to circle the wagons to
protect their authority against moves by oppositionists to
develop a power base within the elected lower house of
parliament. Part I of this two-part series looks at GOB
harassment of civil society groups supporting political
reform, and the press campaign against them (Ref A). Part II
explores dynamics within the royal family as it reacts to the
political challenge posed by opposition participation in the
elections.

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Hardliners Act to Preserve Power
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3. (C) Although King Hamad and the government have
consistently called for full participation in the 2006
parliamentary and municipal elections, the long-expected
early May decisions by formerly boycotting political
societies Al Wifaq (Shia opposition) and Al Waad (secular
socialist) to participate (Refs B, C) has prompted elements
in the royal family and government to act to protect their
power from the challenge posed by oppositionists. In
reference to intra-family dynamics, MFA Assistant Under
Secretary Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa (strictly

SIPDIS
protect throughout) told the Ambassador in an
"off-the-record" conversation that there was a battle between
two camps inside the regime, between hardliners seeking to
clamp down and those advocating greater openness. (Note: He
placed himself and Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid in the
latter group.)


4. (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that Minister of the Royal
Court Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was supposed to be
the decision maker for the Palace on a range of political
issues, including NDI's status in country. He is strongly
influenced, however, by two "reactionary" brothers --
President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah
Al Khalifa and Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and
President of the Central Informatics Organization Shaikh
Ahmed bin Attiyatallah Al Khalifa. These two brothers, who
use their personal relationships with the King and their
official positions to leverage their influence, want to
"throttle" civil society and the opposition, in Shaikh Abdul
Aziz's view. Referring to the Ministry of Social
Development's harassment of BTS, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said the
two brothers had pressured ministers to take decisions with
which the ministers did not personally agree.

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Wrath of the Reactionaries
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5. (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that he had personally
experienced the wrath of the two brothers in early 2006. In
a press interview, he had made remarks in support of
transitional justice, the term used locally to address the
issue of the government assisting victims of torture at the
hands of security forces during the 1990s. He stated
publicly that Bahrain should learn from the experience of
other countries that had dealt with similar issues, and
should conform to international standards. He said Shaikhs
Mohammed and Ahmed came down on him so hard that he had
offered his resignation to the Foreign Minister. He
weathered the controversy but learned the lesson not to get
involved in this matter or others related to domestic
political affairs. He said that when local NGOs organized a
conference on transiTQFE4ct),who is a political
advisor to President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin
Attiyatallah and acts as a liaison between the Court and his
fellow Shia, confirmed to Pol/Econ Chief that Shaikh Mohammed
and Shaikh Ahmed play an influential role within the regime.
(Note: Another brother, ShaikH8N'At Bahrain cannot get too
far out in front of its GCC partners. According to Al Aali,
Saudi Arabia reacted negatively when the King appointed women,
a Christian, and a Jew to the upper house Shura Council in 2000.
The Saudi leadership opposes open elections in Bahrain for fear that
the Shia would gain too much power. In Al Aali's view, every
GCC leader is worried that if one regime falls, they could
all fall, commenting that the regimes "are weak at the core."
He also cited a specific concern of the Bahraini government.
Understanding a conflict is brewing with Iran, the
government wants to be firmly in control of the domestic
political environment. Strong Shia opposition representation
in parliament could result in "unpredictable reactions and
consequences."

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King - PM Interests Aligned
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8. (C) Shura Council member Faisal Fulad told Pol/Econ Chief
that Royal Court Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa
is "one of the most powerful figures in the country." He
confirmed the influence of the "bin Attiyatallah" brothers
and commented that Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman
Al Khalifa shares their policy views vis-a-vis the Shia. A
common analytical paradigm in Bahrain often pits the King and
Crown Prince against the PM on issues related to political
and economic reform. On the immediate issue of Shia+
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Living "Among Monsters"
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9. (C) In a late April meeting covering several subjects,
the Ambassador asked Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs
Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah about his views of the upcoming
elections. In stark contrast with the first half of the
meeting, Shaikh Ahmed became defensive. He said there is
talk that the government is trying to keep the opposition out
of parliament, but there is no truth to this. "They only
want to say that the government is bad and is working against
the interests of the people," Shaikh Ahmed stated. He
claimed there are 17 "Iran-friendly" satellite television
channels broadcasting into Bahrain that "lead" the views of
the Shia opposition. He argued that Bahrain is at the center
of a dangerous triangle encompassing Iran, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia. Other countries in the region including Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, 1P`Q0ain's leadership. "We are a small country," he
said, "and it is hard to live among monsters."

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Proposals Could Diminish Shia Representation
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10. (C) In the view of many observers, in particular those
in the opposition, the government is proposing or floating
amendments to the election laws that could result in
diminishing Shia participation in the elections and
representation in the lower house Council of Representatives
(COR). Some of these actions include:

- (a) Denying the vote for a period of ten years to people
who had been sentenced for a crime punishable by at least six
months in jail, even if a special pardon had been issued.
This would directly impact former Shia exiles who received a
royal pardon upon their return to the country in the late
1990s and early 2000s;

- (b) Unifying the 40 constituencies for the COR with the 50
constituencies for the municipal councils. When this idea
was first floated in early April, oppositionists immediately
interpreted it to mean that the lightly populated (Sunni)
Southern Governorate would gain additional seats in the COR
at the expense of the more densely populated (and Shia
dominated) Northern and Capital Governorates, thus skewing
the Council's balance further in favor of the minority Sunni.
Although this negative interpretation may not be valid, the
trial balloon was widely interpreted in this way;

- (c) The government withholding announcement of the dates
for the parliamentary and municipal elections. Accepted
wisdom has it that municipal elections should take place
between July and September, and parliamentary elections
between September and December. The government has not yet
made an announcement. Further complicating the issue, there
is talk the two elections could be held at the same time;

- (d) Amending the municipality election law to allow the
Prime Minister (who is responsible for implementing the
municipal elections) to postpone eections for up to six
months, thus bringing the law into line with the
parliamentary election law, which already allows the King to
delay elections for up to six months;

- (e) The Central Informatics Organization, which falls under
MinState Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah, withholding any
census or demographic data from parliamentary or municipal
council candidates, despite their repeated requests. This
type of solid information drives the development of voter
communications and policy platforms addressing the concerns
of constituents;

- (f) Authorizing e-voting over the Internet. Central
Informatics Organization Director for Elections Shaikha
Muneera bint Abdullah Al Khalifa publicly confirmed May 20
that Bahrain would employ e-voting, including over the
Internet, in the next elections. Al Waad President Ibrahim
Sharif found it "strange" that Shaikha Muneera would announce
the plan to use an e-voting system without engaging with the
groups that had expressed concern. MP Fareed Ghazi said
publicly that "e-voting could allow mistakes to occur. Even
if we rule out tampering, we cannot rule out mistakes when
using this mechanism."

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Off-Balance Politicians
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11. (C) While none of the preceding issues presents a
fundamental challenge to the integrity of the electoral
system, their net effect to date is to keep politicians
off-balance. Some of the proposals (a, b) seem to directly
target Shias while others (c, d, e) hurt candidates who are
new to politics and are unfamiliar with their districts or
have never run a campaign before, including the former
boycotters. By changing the rules, withholding information,
and delaying an announcement on the timing of the elections,
the government will be in a position to exert more control
over the elections process. Al Waad President Sharif
commented publicly May 21 on possible attempts to influence
election results. He said, "It seems that the situation will
not calm down until the government has guaranteed the outcome
of the next elections." Although he was referring
specifically to a canceled NDI program for Bahraini political
leaders to be held in Morocco, the sentiment reflects the
broader suspicions of oppositionists.

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Columnists Criticize GOB Actions
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12. (SBU) Arabic daily Al Wasat Editor-in-Chief Mansour Al
Jamri Qb$Qiof the State Security Law while the second is a
hopeful world that values freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,
NGOs, freedom of thinking, criticism of official parties, and a
spirit of human dignity and sustainable development. On May 15, he
hoped that what has happened recently in Bahrain did not mark
a retreat in the progress of the King's reform plans. He
said the King can bring hope back to the hearts of Bahrainis
by "pushing away the ruthless people who want to strangle the
citizens." On May 14, in reference to the government forcing
out NDI Director Guleid, he said, "the methods of the past
are so painful. The majority of Bahrainis who have recovered
from their pains and support the King and his reforms hope
that the ways of the past do not return to Bahrain."


13. (SBU) Al Watan columnist Sawsan Al Shaer, demonstrating
her independence from the paper's usual hardline Sunni
editorial stance, wrote on May 14 that those who are calling
for election monitoring are concerned about the best
interests of the country and are not interested in carrying
out some kind of coup. She says, "My advice to those who are
close to decision-makers is to take it easy on themselves.
The stability of the regime is not in imminent danger. We
should not exaggerate our concerns and in return show the
regime as fragile and confused, and make it appear as if the
government is about to take illegitimate actions during the
elections."

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Comment
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14. (C) Conservatives in key positions in the royal family
and government are playing political hardball to confront the
challenge posed by oppositionists. Not content to allow the
elections to play out naturally, they are trying to place
obstacles in the way of the opposition while circling the
wagons to protect traditional Sunni power and privileges.
Having viewed the results of elections in Iraq, Egypt, and
the Palestinian Authority, and heard the public or private
warnings from key allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the
regime is skittish and likely wants to avoid an outcome that
would place its interests at odds with newly empowered
oppositionists, who could comprise the largest bloc in the
elected lower house Council of Representatives. The recent
decision by the Kuwaiti Amir to dissolve parliament and call
for new elections serves as a close-to-home reminder of the
potential power of opposition forces in an elected chamber.
The government may also believe that the West's attempts to
build a coalition (to include the GCC countries) to confront
Iran may result in some tolerance if Bahrain slow rolls its
democratic reform as the elections approach.

MONROE