Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAMA873
2006-05-18 14:08:00
SECRET
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-BAHRAIN MILITARY CONSULTATIVE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ASEC BA REGION BILAT 
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DE RUEHMK #0873/01 1381408
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181408Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4745
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM CCJ5 - PERSONAL FOR MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000873 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF PASS TO //USDP/ISA//

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ASEC BA REGION BILAT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-BAHRAIN MILITARY CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE, 23-24 MAY

MANAMA 00000873 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for Reasons 1
.4(b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000873

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SECDEF PASS TO //USDP/ISA//

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ASEC BA REGION BILAT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-BAHRAIN MILITARY CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE, 23-24 MAY

MANAMA 00000873 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for Reasons 1
.4(b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Long, we
warmly welcome you and the U.S. Delegation to the 13th Annual
U.S.-Bahrain Military Consultative Committee (MCC) 23-24 May.
We have requested meetings with the Minister of Defense,
Lieutenant General Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Bahrain
Defense Force Chief of Staff Major General Duaij Salman Al
Khalifa, the Director of the Bahrain National Security Agency
Khalifa bin Ali Al Khalifa, and Vice Admiral Patrick Walsh,
Commander of the Fifth Fleet stationed here in Bahrain.


2. (S) U.S. relations with Bahrain are strong and positive,
anchored by the long and welcomed presence of NAVCENT/Fifth
Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Bahrain has consistently
supported U.S. policy in the region, most notably on Iraq and
Iran, and greatly values the U.S. as a friend and ally.
Economic/commercial relations are soon expected to receive an
important boost with the implementation of the U.S.-Bahrain
Free Trade Agreement (FTA),the first FTA we have signed
with a Gulf country. This is not to say that there have not
been some issues of contention between our two countries.
NAVCENT sent home more than 900 dependents in 2004 in the
wake of concerns about the GOB commitment to deal with a
small cell of Sunni terror suspects; counterterrorism
cooperation has since improved significantly, although we
remain concerned about Sunni extremist activity on the
island, however small in scale. While we have regularly
praised Bahrain for the important steps it has taken in
introducing democratic reform, we were not pleased when
Bahrain recently forced the departure of NDI's
representative in Bahrain, effectively closing the NDI office
here. On the Bahrain aside, press coverage of the remaining
three Bahraini detainees at Guantanamo has been has been

heavy and critical, putting some pressure on the Government
to resolve, or be seen as trying to resolve, this issue with
its good American friend.


3. (C) There are three issues of paramount importance to the
Bahraini leadership and people at the current time: Iraq,
Iran, and the upcoming parliamentary elections. The fact
that Bahrain, with a Shia majority population, sits on the
fault line of Sunni-Shia sectarian relations in the region,
plays into each of these issues. On Iraq, Bahrain's Shia
welcomed the fall of Saddam and were no doubt encouraged by
Shia successes in Iraq there as they made the decision to
participate in Bahrain's upcoming elections. While the
Government has fully supported our policy on Iraq,
developments there have raised concerns among some Sunni
about the potential threat of Shia empowerment in Bahrain and
the region. On Iran, Bahrain's leadership is deeply
concerned about Iranian interference in Iraq, Iran's nuclear
program, and President Ahmadi-nejad's bellicose rhetoric.
The government supports our policy on Iran, but worries about
Iran's ability to interfere with Bahrain's Shia community.
It understands that Bahrain could be a prime target if Iran
sought to retaliate for increased pressure on its nuclear
program. All this comes in the context of upcoming
parliamentary elections. The main Shia opposition political
society, which boycotted the 2002 elections, recently
announced that it will participate in this year's election.
Although Shia opposition participation has long been a stated
goal of the King, recent moves, such as the hard-line the
government has taken on USG-funded NDI programming, seem to
reflect uneasiness among at least some in the leadership as
we head into the election season.

--------------
DEALING WITH IRAN
--------------


4. (C) . Bahrain is watching developments in Iran closely
The Crown Prince has requested several times U.S. or NATO
consideration of a formal security umbrella for Bahrain in
the event of a nuclear threat. During his May 8 meeting with
CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, the CP inquired about
obtaining Patriot missiles. State Department Counselor
Zelikow, Under Secretary Joseph, and an interagency
delegation led by Assistant Secretary Hillen visited Bahrain
recently and raised the concept of a U.S.-GCC strategic
dialogue addressing regional threats, especially Iran. The
Foreign Ministry has told us Bahrain intends to endorse the
Proliferaton Security Initiative (PSI) and will formally
confirm this shortly. Bahrain has been invited to
participate in the PSI Anatolian Sea Exercise later this
month..

MANAMA 00000873 002.2 OF 004




5. (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex. The
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian
intentions regarding Bahrain and often sees an Iranian hand
in incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which
comprises some 70 percent of the country's citizens. They
are convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and
assert its influence around the region. At the same time,
Bahrain faces the reality that it must live with its large
neighbor across the Gulf. The Iranians, angered when Foreign
Minister Shaikh Khalid accused elements from Iran of "playing
with fire" in the Gulf, have been actively pursuing
engagement with Bahrain, including most recently a May 8
visit by FM Motakki, a recent Ahmadi-Nejad phone call to the
King, and a visit by NSC Secretary General Larijani. Trade
relations are reportedly growing. It is not clear that the
Bahraini leadership has come to grips with how it will handle
efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran if that includes,
for example, calls for cutbacks in trade and engagement. The
Foreign Minister recently told us Bahrain will have no
problem applying sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council.

--------------
NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ
--------------


6. (C) The GOB has issued public statements in support of
each step in Iraq's political development. We have urged the
government to look for ways to show public and tangible
support for the new Iraqi government once it is announced.
You can reinforce this message during your visit.


7. (C) The Bahraini leadership is concerned about the
spillover of sectarian tensions in Iraq to Bahrain. Tens of
thousands of Bahrainis, Sunni and Shia, marched peacefully to
protest the Samarra mosque bombing in February, and there has
been no spike in inter-communal friction. However, some in
the Sunni community worry about Shia political empowerment in
the run-up to parliamentary and municipal council elections
later this year.

-------------- --
DOMESTIC POLITICS HEATS UP
-------------- --


8. (U) The government has yet to set a date for the
elections (anticipated this fall),and some rumored
amendments to the election law may be designed to inhibit
Shia participation in the elections. Leading Shia opposition
society Al Wifaq held a press conference May 3 to announce
formally that it will field candidates in the parliamentary
elections, and opposition society Al Wa'ad has also announced
its intention to participate. Both societies boycotted the
2002 parliamentary elections.


9. (C) During the month of March, there were repeated
clashes between small groups of Shia men and security forces.
The incidents typically began with young masked men burning
tires or trash dumpsters on the edge of a village, and
throwing Molotov cocktails at police vehicles when security
forces responded. Police routinely employed tear gas to
disperse protesters. Villagers caught in the middle demanded
that the youth stop provoking the police, as small children,
the sick and elderly were harmed by the gas. Following
public statements by Shia leaders calling on the instigators
to stop, the incidents subsided. The clashes were likely
organized by the breakaway hard-line Shia Haq Movement, which
is in competition with Al Wifaq for the support of the Shia
community. In this case, it appears that Haq overreached and
provoked a backlash that could damage its longer term support.


10. (C) In a recent development, an explosive device that
newspapers referred to as a "stun grenade" or "sound bomb"
exploded the evening of April 26 in the upscale commercial
district of Adliya. There was no damage or injuries, but
word of the incident hit the international news, including
CNN. A police patrol vehicle carrying two officers was hit
by Molotov cocktails on April 29, and seven other vehicles
were burned the same night. The Embassy is in close contact
with the Ministry of Interior about these incidents. The
confrontations appear to be a further extension of Shia
extremists' activities against the government. There is no
indication that American or Western interests are being
targeted.

--------------
U.S. NAVY

MANAMA 00000873 003.2 OF 004


--------------


11. (U) The U.S. Navy has worked closely with Bahrain for
more than fifty years. Bahrain is the only country in the
region that hosts a permanent component command headquarters,
specifically, headquarters facilities for the Commander of
Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT).
COMUSNAVCENT directs naval operations in the Arabian Gulf,
Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden in support of Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, CJTF Horn of Africa, as
well as Maritime Interception Operations to enable freedom of
navigation and to prevent oil smuggling, piracy and various
other operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism.
Bahrain's relatively stable and secure political environment
allows deployed U.S. Navy ships to stop, replenish supplies,
and provide crews much needed onshore rest and recreation
opportunities. In 2004, 421 U.S. Navy ships called at Manama
while 377 ships called in 2005. Additionally, U.S. military
and military-contracted air traffic at Bahrain's
International Airport and other local facilities encompassed
3521 landings in 2004 and 3415 landings in 2005.

--------------
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
--------------


12. (U) The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) maintains an
infrastructure capable of handling U.S. deployments in
support of our regional policies and forms the first line of
defense for the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet.
To continue to be an effective coalition partner, the BDF,
which deployed its navy in support of Operations Enduring and
Iraqi Freedom, must be fully compatible with the U.S.
military. Maintaining this capability has become
increasingly expensive, stressing a BDF budget that is
already insufficient to purchase the advanced U.S. hardware
needed to achieve interoperability. U.S. provided Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) has been declining over the past few
years, making it increasingly difficult for the BDF to meet
its needs. With the advent of a democratically elected lower
house of parliament that requires the BDF to operate within a
budget, funding for purchases under the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program have also become scarcer. FMF and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) will
continue to be important for both regional stability and
force protection goals. FMF and IMET funding for 2006 are
$15.593 million and $644,000 respectively. Estimates for
2007 are $15.750 million for FMF and $640,000 for IMET. You
can expect to hear from multiple fronts that if the BDF is to
remain fully compatible with the U.S. military and other
coalition partners, that more FMF is required. During its
May 14 meeting, the Hillen delegation floated the possibility
of the U.S. increasing the amount of military assistance it
provides to Bahrain.

--------------
GUANTANAMO
--------------


13. (C) There were initially six Bahraini detainees at
Guantanamo Three were returned last fall. Bahraini press
coverage of the remaining three has been steady and intense,
focusing on allegations of mistreatment and hunger strikes.
Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid has come under parliamentary
pressure to be a more aggressive advocate for their return,
and he has told the press and parliament that he raises the
issue with senior USG officials at every opportunity.

--------------
AIR DEFENSE
--------------


14. (C) In his recent visit to Bahrain, General Abizaid
proposed building up the defenses of our allies in the Gulf,
looking specifically at a shared early warning system and
improving air defense capabilities. The Crown Prince
expressed interest in leasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries, and
noted the coming TPS-59 air defense radar system would
improve Bahrain's integration with allies. The topic of
Patriots for Bahrain has been broached on several occasions
and will most certainly come up during the MCC or during one
of your meetings. We have asked that representatives of the
U.S. delegation be prepared to provide the Bahrainis facts,
figures, and possibilities for obtaining Patriots. The Crown
Prince and the Minister of Defense have requested making an
exception for Bahrain's Stinger missiles.


MANAMA 00000873 004.2 OF 004


-------------- --------------
PROPOSAL FOR BAHRAIN TO HOST REGIONAL CT CENTER
-------------- --------------


15. (C) Bahrain was pleased that GCC leaders at their
recent summit in Riyadh designated Bahrain as the home of a
proposed regional counter-terrorism center. Bahrain will
present a proposal for the center at a meeting of GCC
Ministers of Interior later this month, with the goal of
presenting solid recommendations at the GCC Summit in
December. Bahrain would look to the United States for
support on the technical side to improve the sophistication
of the local intelligence system, and will undoubtedly seek
financial support from its GCC partners. We have invited a
representative from the Ministry of the Interior to attend
the MCC, and expressed an interest in receiving a
presentation from the MOI on their plans for developing and
implementing this Regional CT Center.
MONROE