Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAMA758
2006-05-01 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMANDER

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS PGOV ASEC BA REGION BILAT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9736
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHMK #0758/01 1211326
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011326Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4608
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000758 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PGOV ASEC BA REGION BILAT
OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMANDER
GENERAL ABIZAID'S MAY 8 VISIT TO BAHRAIN

REF: A. MANAMA 0727

B. MANAMA 0595

C. STATE 57548

D. MANAMA 0442

E. STATE 47881

F. STATE 45386

Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000758

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PGOV ASEC BA REGION BILAT
OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMANDER
GENERAL ABIZAID'S MAY 8 VISIT TO BAHRAIN

REF: A. MANAMA 0727

B. MANAMA 0595

C. STATE 57548

D. MANAMA 0442

E. STATE 47881

F. STATE 45386

Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) General Abizaid, we warmly welcome your May 8 visit
to Bahrain. Your Bahraini interlocutors are most concerned
about heightened tensions with Iran and will want to hear
your views on U.S. plans to deal with Iran. The Bahraini
government is deeply suspicious of Iran's nuclear program and
its assertiveness in dealing with the Arab Gulf States but
remains engaged with the Iranian leadership. Bahrain is
closely watching political and security developments in Iraq,
and you can use your meetings to urge greater Bahraini
engagement with Iraq, particularly after the formation of a
government. The domestic political environment is becoming
more highly charged as parliamentary and municipal elections
draw nearer. The security situation is somewhat unsettled
following a rash of confrontations between masked youth and
security forces in March, the April 26 detonation of an
explosive device in an upscale commercial district, and
Molotov cocktail attacks April 29 on a police vehicle and
other property. There is no indication that American or
Western interests are being targeted.

--------------
Dealing With Iran
--------------


2. (C) The Bahrain leadership is greatly concerned about the
increased tensions between the international community and
Iran. Crown Prince Salman and Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid
bin Ahmed Al Khalifa visited Washington in mid-March and
discussed Iran with Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, and
National Security Advisor Hadley. State Department Counselor
Zelikow and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Joseph visited Bahrain and raised the
concept of a U.S.-GCC strategic dialogue addressing regional

threats, especially Iran. Bahrain is interested but cautions
that all GCC countries would have to agree (read Saudi
Arabia) before launching the dialogue (Refs B-F). In his
meetings in Washington, the Crown Prince requested
consideration of a formal U.S. or NATO security umbrella for
Bahrain in the event of a nuclear threat. During his meeting
with Secretary Rumsfeld, the CP inquired about obtaining
Patriot missiles.


3. (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex. The
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian
intentions regarding Bahrain and often see an Iranian hand in
incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which comprises
some 70 percent of the country's citizens. They are
convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and assert
its influence around the region. At the same time, Bahrain
faces the reality that it must live with its large neighbor
across the Gulf. The Iranians, angered when Foreign Minister
Shaikh Khalid accused elements from Iran of "playing with
fire" in the Gulf, have been actively pursuing engagement
with Bahrain, including a recent Ahmadi-Nejad phone call to
the King and a visit by NSC Secretary General Larijani.
Trade relations are reportedly growing. It is not clear that
the Bahraini leadership has come to grips with how it will
handle efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran if that
includes, for example, calls for cutbacks in trade and
engagement.

--------------
Next Steps on Iraq
--------------


4. (C) The GOB has issued public statements in support of
each step in Iraq's political development. It has remained
quiet, however, during the period of uncertainty as Iraqi
politicians have tried to form a government. You could brief
your interlocutors on the state of play in Iraq and urge them
to issue supportive public statements following the formation
of a government.


5. (C) The Bahraini leadership is concerned about the
spillover of sectarian tensions in Iraq to Bahrain. Tens of
thousands of Bahrainis, Sunni and Shia, marched peacefully to
protest the Samarra mosque bombing in February, and there has
been no spike in inter-communal friction. However, some in
the Sunni community worry about Shia political empowerment in

MANAMA 00000758 002 OF 002


the run-up to parliamentary and municipal council elections
later this year. The government has yet to set a date for
the elections (anticipated this fall),and some rumored
amendments to the election law may be designed to inhibit
Shia participation in the elections. Leading Shia opposition
society Al Wifaq has not yet announced if it will field
candidates in the parliamentary elections, but the group
appears to be leaning in favor of participation.

--------------
Domestic Politics Heats Up
--------------


6. (C) During the month of March, there were repeated
clashes between small groups of Shia men and security forces.
The incidents typically began with young masked men burning
tires or trash dumpsters on the edge of a village, and
throwing Molotov cocktails at police vehicles when security
forces responded. Police routinely employed tear gas to
disperse protesters. Villagers caught in the middle demanded
that the youth stop provoking the police as small children,
the sick and elderly were harmed by the gas. Following
public statements by Shia leaders calling on the instigators
to stop, the incidents subsided. The clashes were likely
organized by the breakaway hardline Shia Haq Movement, which
is in competition with Al Wifaq for the support of the Shia
community. In this case, it appears that Haq overreached and
provoked a backlash that could damage its longer term support.


7. (C) In a recent development, an explosive device that
newspapers referred to as a "stun grenade" or "sound bomb"
exploded the evening of April 26 in the upscale commercial
district of Adliya. There was no damage or injuries, but
word of the incident hit the international news, including
CNN. A police patrol vehicle carrying two officers was hit
by Molotov cocktails on April 29, and seven other vehicles
were burned the same night. The Embassy and NCIS are in
close contact with the Ministry of Interior about these
incidents. The confrontations appear to be a further
extension of Shia extremists' activities against the
government. There is no indication that American or Western
interests are being targeted.

MONROE