Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAMA456
2006-03-21 12:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Manama
Cable title:  

POLITICAL ISLAM IN BAHRAIN (PART II): ISLAMISTS

Tags:  PGOV KISL KDEM SCUL BA POL REFORM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000456 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM SCUL BA POL REFORM
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM IN BAHRAIN (PART II): ISLAMISTS
SUCCEED IN PROMOTING AGENDA IN PARLIAMENT

REF: A. 05 STATE 1580

B. MANAMA 0339

Classified by DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000456

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM SCUL BA POL REFORM
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM IN BAHRAIN (PART II): ISLAMISTS
SUCCEED IN PROMOTING AGENDA IN PARLIAMENT

REF: A. 05 STATE 1580

B. MANAMA 0339

Classified by DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Although their agenda is controversial and opposed by
many, Sunni Islamists generally represent the interests of
their constituents, in the view of non-Islamist members of
the elected Council of Representatives (COR). Despite their
success in passing non-binding resolutions on
religious-oriented issues, the COR speaker often assigns
these proposals the lowest priority for action. There is
much debate about the relationship between the Sunni Islamist
political blocs and the government. Most rival politicians
agree that relations between the two are very good, with
neither the Islamists nor the government interfering in
issues of great importance to the other. The government
certainly is careful to secure its Sunni base, but some
speculate that it wants to use the parliament as a scapegoat
for the country's problems, or to raise the specter of an
Islamist-dominated COR as a scare tactic to be used against
democracy advocates.


2. (C) Summary continued: In a recent development, the new
Salafi political society National Justice Movement was
launched on March 5. Its leader calls it an opposition group
but opponents refer to it as the "Salafi/Al Qaeda"
organization. While the Sunni Islamist MPs have been
successful in raising the profile of their agenda, it has
been non-Islamist deputies who have been most active in
promoting the COR's oversight and accountability functions.
End Summary.


3. (C) This cable is the second in a three-part series of
reports covering political Islam in Bahrain. Part I (Ref B)
discusses the three leading Islamic political societies and
their agendas; Part II reports the views of competing
political societies and politicians on the Islamist agenda;
and Part III describes the reactions of civil society,
business people, and liberals in the country.

-------------- --------------
Sunni Islamists Accurately Represent Constituents...

-------------- --------------


4. (C) Although their agenda is controversial, the Sunni
Islamist political societies in the elected lower house of
parliament, the Council of Representatives, accurately
reflect the interests of their constituents, according to
fellow COR members. With the approach of the parliamentary
elections scheduled for October 2006, satisfying the
political base has become even more urgent. Shia Islamic
Bloc MPs Ali Al Samaheeji, Mohammed Al Shaikh, and Abbas
Salman told EmbOffs that the controversial issues championed
by the Sunni Islamist blocs, Al Minbar (associated with the
Muslim Brotherhood) and Al Asala (Sunni Salafi),such as
calling for a ban on alcohol, amputating the hands of
thieves, creating a committee for spreading virtue and
punishing vice, closing businesses during Friday prayers, and
segregating the sexes at Bahrain University, are the subjects
of greatest concern to many of their constituents. To a
great, but not universal extent, Sunnis are not as directly
impacted by the economic and social ills harming Bahrain's
Shia majority, Al Shaikh said. They are not afflicted with
unemployment, lack of affordable housing, low wages, shoddy
infrastructure, and bias in government jobs. In the absence
of these more basic needs, Sunnis and their elected
representatives can pursue a more narrow agenda focused on
religious issues and their relevance for everyday life.

--------------
...But Proposals Often Put in Deep Freeze
--------------


5. (C) Al Minbar and Al Asala hold 12 of 40 seats in the COR
and are among the most active members of the Council. Their
activism, which often takes the form of a legislative device
called an "iqtirah bi raghba," or desired proposal (similar
to a "Sense of the Congress" resolution),to promote their
policy views, is unsettling to their opponents and the COR
leadership. COR Speaker Dhahrani, a traditionalist, is under
no obligation to act upon these desired proposals, and often
gives them the lowest priority for action, according to MP
Jasim Abdul Aal. However, he warned, the proposals can
resurface when the government needs something from the
Islamists. They can point to a proposal that has not been
acted upon and request that the government implement it in
exchange for their support.

6. (C) Ironically, COR votes on the Islamists' "iqtirah bi
raghba" often attract overwhelming support. The deputies do
not want to be tarred as bad Muslims, Abdul Aal said, so they
usually vote in favor of the measures while privately hoping
that neither the COR leadership nor the government act upon
the proposals. Al Shaikh complained that the Sunni Islamist
MPs' focus on religious issues, and the Shia MPs' focus on
economic and social challenges, is a situation that can lead
to sectarian tensions. Neither side wants to understand or
work seriously on the policies of the other, and as a result
the people see Sunnis and Shias pulling in different
directions.

-------------- --------------
Friendly Relations Between Government and Islamists...
-------------- --------------


7. (C) An open question, subject to much debate and
speculation, is the relationship between Al Minbar and Al
Asala and the government, prime minister, and king. COR
Second Deputy Chair and former head of the Al Asala bloc
Shaikh Adel Al Moawada told EmbOffs that his bloc supports
the King and government, but not blindly. He recalled
telling King Hamad, after the referendum approving the
National Action Charter in 2001, "This is no longer yours, it
is ours now." He said the government does not intervene in
COR business so as to allow the parliament to establish its
own credibility and track record.


8. (C) Liberal MP Abdul Nabi Salman points out that Bahrain
has a long history of Islamist political activity. The
government tolerates the Islamists because they generally
have been concerned with religious affairs, not politics or
national issues. They served as a useful counterweight to
liberals, socialists, and communists during the 1970s, and
more recently, to balance the Shia. The government is
careful to secure its Sunni base. Salman claimed that the
government still uses the Sunni Islamists to keep moderate
Sunnis and Shias from forming an alliance. Leading Shia
opposition society Al Wifaq Advisory Council member Nizar Al
Qari voiced a similar view. He said he believes the
government encourages the Islamists. While senior government
officials know the majority of Bahraini citizens (read:
Shias) disagree with the religious initiatives, Al Asala and
Al Minbar pursue them anyway as "agents of the government."
These policies represent a way to divide and rule, Al Qari
said, using sectarianism as the wedge to keep the Sunni and
Shia communities apart.

--------------
...But No Touching the Cookie Jar
--------------


9. (C) Ibrahim Sharif, president of the liberal opposition
Al Waad society, said the government does not challenge the
Islamists on their policies. In exchange, they "do not touch
the cookie jar." Sharif argued that the Islamists are silent
on issues such as corruption, land development and
reclamation, the constitution, electoral constituencies,
employment, housing, and other important issues.


10. (C) MP Al Shaikh said that Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa
in particular is happy to let the Islamists pursue their
narrow policy agenda. The government historically has made
only half-hearted attempts, and little progress, addressing
key Shia issues such as unemployment, wages, housing, and
social insurance. (Note: He commented that the recent
National Employment and Training Program could be an
exception.) The policies of the Islamists could harm the
commercial environment by making investors and tourists feel
less welcome, thus adding to Bahrain's social and economic
challenges. The government, therefore, is able to blame the
Islamists for the situation instead of taking responsibility
for it.

-------------- --------------
Specter of Islamist COR to Scare Democracy Advocates
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Others assign more sinister motives to the PM, who
is often accused of quietly opposing the King and Crown
Prince's political and economic reform programs. Dr. Muneera
Fakhro, vice president of Al Waad society, said that the PM
points to the anti-business measures taken by the Islamists
and tells people, in particular business leaders, that this
is what they get when they demand a more open, democratic
system. Al Wifaq member Al Qari said that the PM wants the
Islamists to pursue their agenda because their success
demonstrates for all observers that the elected deputies are
incapable of governing, thus delegitimizing the parliament
and reform program.

12. (C) Islamic bloc MP Al Shaikh said the PM uses his
influence with the Islamist and "Independent"
(pro-government) deputies to slow down economic reform
legislation. A good example is the Crown Prince's labor
reform legislation, which the COR has tied up with debates
since November 2005. The Islamist agenda also gives the PM a
reason to attack the King's reform plan, according to MP
Abdul Aal. The PM can point to actions by the Islamists and
say that reform and democratization are ruining Bahrain's
traditional openness, and argue that the present time is
worse than the "good old days," before there was an elected
chamber.

--------------
Cabinet Positions Reward for Loyalty
--------------


13. (C) Several contacts argued that the government rewarded
the Islamists for their loyalty by the appointment of Dr.
Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar as Information Minister (in addition
to his previously held position of Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs) and Dr. Fatima Al Balooshi as Minister of
Social Development. MPs Salman and Abdul Aal and Al Waad VP
Fakhro all stated independently that both Abdul Ghaffar and
Al Balooshi are affiliated with Bahrain's Muslim Brotherhood.
(Comment: Which is pro-government, unlike in many other
Arab countries.) Salman said Abdul Ghaffar was "the worst
person" to head the Information Ministry, which is
responsible for the state-owned news outlets, the foreign
press center, and the tourism directorate, because he could
impose his personal religious views on the Ministry's
policies.


14. (C) As reported reftels, Abdul Ghaffar made headlines
last Ramadan (early October - early November 2005) by
instructing five-star hotels to close all bars and clubs
during the Holy Month, an unprecedented move in Bahrain. He
also sanctioned those outlets that did not comply immediately
with the order by closing them for the seven days following
Ramadan, which included the festive Eid Al Fitr holiday.


15. (C) In defending this policy, Abdul Ghaffar said that
"even some (MPs) who drink supported the Ramadan ban and the
punishment of those who broke it." Jamal Fakhro, a
businessman and member of the appointed upper house Shura
Council, refuted Abdul Ghaffar's assertion that tourism was
not harmed by the ban and complained that the Minister had
"followed MPs' orders" even though the COR had only passed an
"iqtirah bi raghba" rather than legislation banning alcohol
during Ramadan. In a meeting with the Bahrain Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Abdul Ghaffar threatened to take
strict measures against anybody who tries to transform
Bahrain's tourism facilities into "dens of prostitution and
sin." Since this controversy in late 2005, Abdul Ghaffar has
yielded a bit, at least on cultural activities. The Ministry
of Information sponsored American hip-hop band Opus Akoben's
performances in Bahrain in February and sponsored a
public-private partnership presenting the "Spring of Culture"
series of performances, lectures, and events during the month
of March, including American jazz musicians and Lebanese and
Egyptian female singers. (Comment: In its interactions with
Abdul Ghaffar at the Foreign Ministry and the Information
Ministry, the Embassy has found him to faithfully adhere to
palace and government policy. Interestingly, he told us he
wants to use Bahrain television to provide a platform for
voices of moderation in Islam, and sought American help to
reform Bahrain television.)

--------------
New Salafi Society Launched
--------------


16. (C) In a new development on the political scene, the
National Justice Movement was launched March 5. Movement
head attorney Abdulla Hashem said publicly that the group was
an opposition movement with the aim of reinforcing national
unity. Hashem's roots are in the socialist movement of the
1970s but the main supporters of the new movement are hard
line Sunni Salafis. While Al Asala represents pro-government
Salafis, Justice Movement supporters, according to Shura
Council member and critic Faisal Fulad, are "Salafi/Al
Qaeda." A founding member of the Bahrain Human Rights Watch
Society and a frequent sparring partner with both Sunni and
Shia Islamists, Fulad attended the Justice Movement launch
event and told EmbOff that about one-third of the 150 people
attending were hard line Salafis. Former Guantanamo detainee
Adel Kamel Hajee, who returned to Bahrain in November 2005,
spoke at the gathering and complained that he had moved from
"a small prison to a large one," saying he did not have
freedom of movement in Bahrain and was monitored by security
personnel.


17. (C) In a statement to the press March 19, Hashem said it
was a "source of pride" that some former Arab/Bahraini
fighters in Afghanistan (from the time of the war against the
Soviet occupation) had joined the Movement. Mohieldine Khan,
who was arrested in June 2004 and charged with planning
terrorist attacks in the country, was appointed head of the
Movement's executive committee. Liberal MP Farid Ghazi, a
former colleague of Hashem's in the National Democratic
Gathering Society, commented that Hashem was so desperate to
get elected to the COR that he was willing to make a deal
with people whose beliefs and values are radically different
from his own.

-------------- --------------
No Natural Alliance Between Sunni, Shia Islamists
-------------- --------------


18. (C) Echoing Al Qari's comments in Ref B, MP Abdul Aal
and Al Waad President Sharif said they believed that Shia
Islamist society Al Wifaq would not form an alliance with the
Sunni Islamists, should Al Wifaq decide to participate in the
legislative elections and win seats in parliament. Sharif
said that Al Wifaq President Shaikh Ali Salman is a pragmatic
politician who focuses on bread and butter issues, not
religious affairs. Abdul Aal said that Al Wifaq's agenda
does not include symbolic religious matters. Al Wifaq would
want to work on issues affecting their constituents like
employment, housing, wages, and combating corruption. He
noted, however, that Al Wifaq could find itself pushed into a
corner to support the Sunni Islamist proposals, so it did not
appear to be anti-Islamic. Abdul Aal said even the appointed
Shura Council members might have to support these proposals,
if the proposals cleared the COR and were formally passed to
the Shura, because "they are also members of this society."

--------------
Comment
--------------


19. (C) Political rivals of Sunni Islamists often find
themselves on the defensive in the COR as the Islamists force
votes on proposals that any Muslim would have a hard time
opposing on religious grounds. Al Waad VP Fakhro lamented
that "unfortunately, the political system is more open and
liberal than the people who participate in it." That said,
it is non-Islamist deputies who are the leading forces in two
areas where the COR has excelled: monitoring and oversight
of the government budget, and demanding government
accountability through the questioning of ministers. If it
decides to participate in the elections, Al Wifaq could
further enhance the COR's performance in these areas because
of its policy focus on national issues rather than religious
affairs.

MONROE