SUGGESTED BAHRAINI EDITS AND REVISIONS TO CWC HOST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000434

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARN, ISN/CB, L
OSD FOR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY - DR. COOPER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MARR BA BILAT
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED BAHRAINI EDITS AND REVISIONS TO CWC HOST
COUNTRY AGREEMENT MOU

REF: A. MANAMA 0301


B. MANAMA 0165

C. STATE 17334 AND PREVIOUS

Classified by DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) MFA Director for International Organization Affairs
Ghassan Shaikho told Pol/Econ Chief March 15 that in
preparing the final text of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Host Country Agreement Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),the
Bahraini side had uncovered several areas that it would like
to edit or revise. Bahrain seeks USG concurrence or feedback
for each suggested change or question.


2. (C) Shaikho said Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid and the
Ambassador would sign two copies of the MOU, both with the
same text. The "Bahraini" agreement, however, would have
Bahrain listed first in each instance referring to the two
countries, while the "American" text would list the U.S.
first each time. This occurs four times in the text: three
times in the preamble and at the concluding signature blocks.
Additionally, references to Bahrain should say "the Kingdom
of Bahrain." The original preamble reads as:

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Bahrain
concerning the conduct of challenge inspections pursuant to
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction.

The Government of the United States of America and The
Government of Bahrain, bearing in mind the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for
signature on 13 January 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the
Convention),including in particular Article IX of the
Convention and its Parts II and X of the Annex on
Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred to as
the Verification Annex);

Desiring to develop procedures to apply in cases in which a
challenge inspection may affect the interests of both the
United States of America and Bahrain;

Bahrain's suggested revisions in these three paragraphs are:

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the
Kingdom of Bahrain and the Government of the United States of
America concerning the conduct of challenge inspections
pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain and The Government
of United States of America, bearing in mind the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature on 13 January 1993
(hereinafter referred to as the Convention),including in
particular Article IX of the Convention and its Parts II and
X of the Annex on Implementation and Verification
(hereinafter referred to as the Verification Annex);

Desiring to develop procedures to apply in cases in which a
challenge inspection may affect the interests of both the
Kingdom of Bahrain and the United States of America;


3. (C) The original of the signature blocks reads as:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

Bahrain's suggested revision is:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The suggested revisions in paras 2 and 3 are only/only for
the "Bahraini" version of the agreement; the U.S. version
would continue to list the United States before Bahrain.


4. (C) Part II, Para 2, Bahrain suggests changing the word
"should" to "will." The original text is:


2. Based on the principle of territorial sovereignty, which
is a basic principle reflected in the Convention and its
integral parts, Bahrain should exercise the rights and
fulfill the obligations in the Convention as the designated
inspected State Party or as the host state, as appropriate.
For inspections within the scope of this Memorandum, the
United States, with regard to assets of the United States,
should exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of an
inspected State Party in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention for those assets.

Bahrain's suggested revisions are:


2. Based on the principle of territorial sovereignty, which
is a basic principle reflected in the Convention and its
integral parts, Bahrain will exercise the rights and fulfill
the obligations in the Convention as the designated inspected
State Party or as the host state, as appropriate. For
inspections within the scope of this Memorandum, the United
States, with regard to assets of the United States, will
exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of an
inspected State Party in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention for those assets.


5. (C) In Part IV, Para 1, bullet B, Shaikho asks whether
the U.S. wants both the United States Nuclear Risk Reduction
Center and the United States Central Command Joint Operations
Center listed as the notification point of contact, or just
one of them. He requests our clarification. Shaikho will
seek his Minister's input on who the GOB contact will be, per
Part IV, Para 1, bullet C.


6. (C) In Part IV, Para 7, bullet A, the original text of
the final two sentences read as:

Unless otherwise mutually determined, the inspected State
Party should exclude equipment not identified by those
documents or devices, including equipment that has been
altered. Such equipment should be stored at the point of
entry.

Bahrain proposes a change in format and an additional
clarification:

Unless otherwise mutually determined, the inspected State
Party should exclude:

- (i) equipment not identified by those documents or
devices;
- (ii) equipment that has been altered or whose
specifications are materially different from those set out in
the said documents or devices.

Such equipment should be stored at the point of entry.


7. (C) In Part IV, Para 8, bullet B, Shaikho has a question
about the 50 meter band (no change in text, a question only).
He understands that the 50 meter band is beyond the
inspectable area. Are inspectors permitted to look into
facilities, entities or structures that fall outside the
inspectable area but within the 50 meter band? What should
be the U.S. and/or Bahraini response if inspectors attempt to
look into facilities, entities, or structures within the 50
meter band but outside the inspectable area?


8. (C) In Part V, Para 1, bullet B, the original text of the
final sentence reads as:

In the event the United States is the inspected State Party,
the United States intends to advise the Technical Secretariat
about our preference for on-site analysis as well as
considerations in selecting appropriate OPCW- designated
laboratories, should we agree to that course of action for
assets under our control.

Bahrain's suggested revisions are:

In the event the United States is the inspected State Party,
the United States intends to advise the Technical Secretariat
of its preference for on-site analysis as well as
considerations in selecting appropriate OPCW- designated
laboratories, should the United States agree to that course
of action for assets under its control.


9. (C) In Part V, Para 2, bullet C, the original text says:

The inspected State Party should ensure that the other
Participant has up to 108 hours from the inspection team's
arrival at the point of entry before the other Participant
must provide the inspection team access to its assets inside
the perimeter.

Shaikho asks how we arrived at a figure of 108 hours. He
says that in Bahrain's reading of the CWC, the time range for
allowing the inspection team entry to the inspection zone is
between 12 and 36 hours after arrival. He suggested that
Bahrain could likely find excuses to delay entry for 108
hours, but he is not clear on how we came up with that
number. Please provide a timeline to explain the figure.

10. (C) In Part VI, Para 1, the first sentence reads as:

In the case of any challenge inspection in which any part of
an asset of the other Participant is within the inspectable
area, the inspected State Party should provide the other
Participant with a copy of the preliminary inspection report
within 24 hours of receipt and a copy of the draft final
inspection report within 48 hours of receipt from the
Technical Secretariat.

Shaikho again asks how we arrived at 24 and 48 hours to pass
copies of the preliminary inspection report and the draft
final inspection report, respectively. He suggested no
alternate text, but commented that both these periods appear
to be longer than necessary.


11. (C) In Part VII, the original text reads as:

The Participants should consult to consider joint or
independent statements to the press, the requesting State
Party, the Executive Council, the Conference of the States
Parties, the Technical Secretariat, or other States Parties
to the Convention. The Participants should also discuss
relations with the media.:

Bahrain's suggested revision is:

The Participants should consult and coordinate with regard to
joint or independent statements to the press, the requesting
State Party, the Executive Council, the Conference of the
States Parties, the Technical Secretariat, or other States
Parties to the Convention. The Participants should also
discuss relations with the media.

His concern on this point is that the Bahraini side could lag
the U.S. in developing public affairs materials. A firmer
statement to coordinate provides more certainty that the GOB
will at least know about U.S. public affairs actions, even if
Bahrain is not yet ready to engage the media.


12. (C) The original signature block says:

Signed at this XXXX day of YYYY 2006, in the English and
Arabic languages.

Shaikho said the Foreign Minister had not yet decided whether
the agreement needed to be signed in both Arabic and English,
or in English only. He said one possibility was for the
agreement to be concluded in English only and the Bahraini
side would translate it into Arabic for internal use only.
If the Minister decides on this course of action, the GOB
would give the Arabic translation to us for review and
comment, even if it is not binding.


13. (C) Please provide guidance on Shaikho's suggested
revisions and questions.

MONROE