READOUT ON GERMAN FM VISIT TO SYRIA, DISCUSSION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 002019

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS PTER KPAL KPKO KWBG BA REGION
OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: READOUT ON GERMAN FM VISIT TO SYRIA, DISCUSSION OF
ENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA

Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Meeting with NSC Senior Director for Near East and
North African Affairs Dr. Michael Doran December 8, German
Foreign Ministry Political Director for Maghreb/Middle East
Affairs Dr. Horst Freitag discussed German FM Frank-Walter
Steinmeier's December 4 visit to Damascus. Freitag said that
the FM had a series of difficult meetings in which he pressed
the Syrians to move forward in their relations with Lebanon,
identifying reactivation of the Syrian-Lebanese border
commission as a possible first step. The German FM had also
pressured Damascus to use its influence both to force
Hizbollah to back down from its "siege" on the Lebanese
government and to push Hamas to release Corporal Shalit as a
confidence-building measure in the context of the fragile
Gaza ceasefire. Freitag explained that prior to ascending to
the EU presidency, Germany had determined it was important to
visit Syria, as well as other countries in the region, so
that as EU president it could talk with authority on Middle
East regional issues. Regarding steps to empower Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas, Freitag expressed that acceptance by
Abbas of an initiative to return to the September 2000 status
quo would kill him politically. Abbas needs to present his
people with a significant offer that will give them hope in
his ability to lead them to a lasting peace and woo them away
from Hamas. Freitag commented that Syria may be reevaluating
its stance on its border with Iraq, realizing that
Syrian-origin insurgents may return to foment domestic
problems at home. End summary.


2. (C) In a December 8 meeting with NSC Senior Director Dr.
Michael Doran, German Foreign Ministry Political Director for
Maghreb/Middle East Affairs Dr. Horst Freitag gave an account
of the series of difficult diplomatic meetings German Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had December 4 in Damascus
with President Bashar al-Asad, Vice President Faruq al-Shara
and Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim. Freitag said that a
primary purpose of the visit was to identify concrete steps
on the ground to promote progress in the relations between
Syria and Lebanon. Freitag said that FM Steinmeier had
pushed President al-Asad to establish official diplomatic
relations with Lebanon. Al-Asad said that although Syria
would be ready to do so "at the right time," under current
circumstances it would not.


3. (C) According to Freitag, the parties discussed the
reactivation of the border commission that is tasked with
delineating the border between Lebanon and Syria. Freitag
suggested that the commission could begin in the north,
delineating the Lebanese-Syrian border, then address the
issue of the Golan Heights and Shebaa Farms. Syria indicated
willingness to consider accepting UN administration of a
temporary border in the Shebaa Farms area until the Golan's
status could be resolved. Freitag noted that the progression
of border delineation and resolution of the Shebaa Farms
issue could lead to the establishment of official diplomatic
relations. Doran pointed out that Syria should demarcate
Shebaa first, as is called for in UNSCR 1701.

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Steinmeier Presses Al-Asad on Hizbollah, Hamas
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4. (C) Steinmeier also pressed al-Asad on removing support
for Hizbollah's "siege" of the Lebanese government in Beirut.
Clearly enjoying the memory of the encounter, Freitag
reported that Steinmeier had asked al-Asad, "What would you
do if you were a president elected by your people in a free
and fair election, and some sub-governmental entity
surrounded your government buildings, closing off access in
an attempt to bring down the government?" Al-Asad reportedly
was slow to answer, but finally offered, "Well, I wouldn't
have let it get that far."


5. (C) Having visited Israeli officials the day before, the
German FM had suggested that the Syrian president push Hamas
to release Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit, who has been held
captive since June 2006. Steinmeier said that under the
fragile ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, it would be the perfect
time to release the soldier and thereby build trust between
the parties. Al-Asad reportedly said that Syria was prepared
to urge Hamas to do so, "but we don't know what the Israelis
want." Al-Asad did not elaborate, but Freitag took this to
mean that the signals from the Israelis have been unclear

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regarding what they would be willing to offer in return.

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Germany's Decision to Engage
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6. (C) Doran expressed U.S. dismay about the German decision
to engage with Syria, especially at a moment when it was
actively destabilizing Lebanon. Freitag put the visit in the
context of Germany's imminent ascendancy to the EU
presidency. He reminded Doran that the Germans had canceled
a previous trip, but this time the timing had been right.
Once Germany occupies the chair of the EU President, it will
not be able to make such a visit. Germany sees itself
needing to take a stance between France's policy of strict
non-engagement with Syria and Spain's active engagement with
and advocacy of increased interaction with the Syrian
administration. Freitag said it was important for Germany,
as EU president, to be able to speak authoritatively about
Syrian proposals and intentions, which it could only do
through this kind of direct contact. In addition, he said
that Syria was a key player in matters dealing with the
Palestinians/Hamas, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran, so it cannot be
ignored. There must be some level of engagement, he said.
Doran reminded him that the Syrians spin any form of
engagement, even one that delivers a "tough message," so as
to demoralize the Lebanese.

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Return to Pre-Intifada Status Quo Not Acceptable
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7. (C) Referring to the political stalemate in the
Palestinian Territories, Freitag inquired about U.S.
suggestions of ways to give Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas a political horizon. Freitag reacted strongly to
Doran's suggestion that a starting point could be an offer by
Abbas to his people of a return to the 2000 status quo before
the Intifada. Freitag asked, "Why would they want to return
to 2000? The reason the Palestinians started the Intifada
was that they were unhappy with their situation. This
suggestion is a non-starter." Rather, it was important to
move toward final status talks. Doran responded that any
serious initiative must seek to remedy the inability of the
Palestinian Authority to fight terrorism and guarantee
security. Final status talks will not deliver security.

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The German Take on Syria's Position
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8. (C) Freitag said that it was clear from Steinmeier's
meetings with Syrian officials that Syria still feels it is
vulnerable to military strikes from Israel, driving it to
enhance its relations with Iran. Regarding Syria's relations
with Iraq, Freitag predicted that Syria may be ready to
cooperate sincerely on border matters because Syrian
officials are beginning to realize that once hostilities die
down in Iraq, Syrian-origin insurgents fighting in Iraq will
return to Syria and may initiate problems domestically. The
ruling Alawites know they are a vulnerable minority because
Syrian Sunnis consider al-Asad to be Shia, while Syrian Shia
do not count the Alawites among their own. Syria also knows
its own oil and gas will run out in the next 10-15 years; it
will need access to oil but will not want to rely exclusively
on Iran. The Syrians know they need to improve relations
with Iraq to solidify the bases of cooperation on economic
issues.


9. (C) Doran argued that Lebanon, not the Golan, was the key
issue for al-Asad. Freitag claimed in response that the
Golan is of larger personal importance to the Syrian
President than merely its political importance as a Syrian
card to play. The late Syrian President Hafez al-Asad was
Defense Minister when Syria lost the Golan, and he carried
the shame of its loss to his death. Beyond being a political
issue for current President al-Asad, Freitag commented that
the return of the Golan is a deeply emotional issue for
al-Asad, his family, and for many in the wider Arab
community. Doran said that even if that were true, we are
not in a position to push the matter because the strategic
priority is the Israel-Palestinian track.


10. (C) Doran explained that USG policy regarding Syria is
to push for behavior change, not regime change. Al-Asad,
however, will not change his behavior now, because he is
riding high following the perceived Iranian-Hizbollah-Syrian
"victory" in the Lebanon war. Increased pressure, not

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engagement, is the key to pushing al-Asad out of his comfort
zone in the Iranian alliance. Freitag stressed that the
European consensus was fraying and Germany wanted to put
together a common EU policy. Doran asked whether the EU
would consider sanctions. Freitag said that for economic
sanctions to be effective, they would need to be imposed on
Syria's neighbors as well. The result would be sanctions on
the whole Middle East.


11. (C) Freitag suggested that the only viable option to get
Syria to take positive steps is engagement. A secondary
benefit of engagement is a potential weakening of the
attachment to Iran. He said that a potential area of
positive leverage with Syria is on the economic side because,
in light of the limited supplies of Syrian oil and gas, Syria
is considering significant economic reforms, including the
building of a major sea port and banking sector reform.
Doran responded that at a bare minimum the Europeans must
demand a quid pro quo for any engagement. There were three
key areas -- Lebanon, Israel-Palestinian relations, and Iraq
-- in which the Syrians must take verifiable and irreversible
steps. These steps should be the price up front for any
engagement.

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