BAHRAIN'S ELECTIONS: DESPITE ALLEGED FLAWS, A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 MANAMA 002004

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM KISL BA POL
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN'S ELECTIONS: DESPITE ALLEGED FLAWS, A
SIGNIFICANT STEP AHEAD

REF: A. MANAMA 1995

B. MANAMA 1984

C. MANAMA 1963

D. MANAMA 1953

Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

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Summary
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1. (C) Bahrain's parliamentary elections, held in two rounds
November 25 and December 2, represent a major step forward in
the King's democratic reform program. In a significant
improvement over the 2002 parliamentary elections, which were
marred by a boycott by leading Shia opposition political
society Al Wifaq and its allies, over 73 percent of Bahraini
voters participated in the first round of elections and 69
percent of eligible voters took part in the second round
runoff elections. Demonstrating that it is the voice of the
great majority of Shia Bahrainis, Al Wifaq won 17 of the 18
elections it contested (out of 40 total seats). Its presence
in the parliament - within the political system rather than
out on the streets - is a real accomplishment that greatly
enhances the credibility of the parliament and the reform
program.


2. (C) Islamist candidates, both Sunni and Shia, achieved
the greatest successes in the elections, taking 35 of 40
seats. However, their ability to see through an Islamist
agenda is severely limited. The government controls most of
the levers of legislative power, and the Islamists are split
almost exactly in half between Sunnis (18 MPs) and Shias (17
MPs),with each group having radically different policy
priorities. The Sunnis focus on introducing religion into
everyday life while the Shias will advocate increased
attention to social problems such as unemployment, low wages,
lack of public housing, and mediocre public education and
health care in poor Shia areas. The big losers in the
elections were liberals, moderates, and technocrats,
including the secular, liberal opposition society Al Waad,
whose six candidates failed to take any seats.


3. (C) The government is likely pleased with the outcome of
the elections, which balance the influence of the Sunni and
Shia communities. Critics allege that this is no accident,
saying the government has employed long-term and short-term
measures to boost the chances of candidates friendly to the
government. These include drawing electoral districts to
ensure an almost even Sunni-Shia split, despite Sunnis
representing only about one-third of the citizenry. The
government is alleged to have used its naturalization law to
grant citizenship to Sunni Arab, Pakistani, and other South
and Southeast Asian residents. During the elections, the
military and security forces reportedly mobilized their
personnel to vote for pro-government candidates while
well-known preachers urged voters to cast ballots for Sunni
Islamists. (Shia religious figures did the same on Al
Wifaq's behalf.) There are accusations that the ten general
polling centers could have been the site of possible
tampering, and it is true that votes from the general centers
played a decisive role in three races.


4. (C) Election monitors have not yet released their
findings, but a preliminary report from an independent
committee composed of local NGOs issued after the first round
of voting recommended that election officials ensure
uniformity and increased transparency in announcing poll
results. This particular item seems to have been remedied in
the second round. The sectarian split of the parliament,
between Sunni government supporters and Shia oppositionists,
is likely a satisfactory outcome for Royal Family hardliners,
who seek to paint the opposition as being a Shia-only segment
of the political spectrum. The Shias' long-term commitment
to staying inside the system depends on their ability to
deliver on the demands of their constituents, and the
government would be wise to engage on these issues. End
Summary.

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Islamists Claim 35 of 40 Seats in Parliament
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5. (C) Bahrain's historic second set of elections for the
lower house of parliament, the Council of Representatives
(COR),since the adoption of the 2002 constitution concluded
December 2 with Sunni and Shia Islamists occupying up to 35
of the chamber's 40 seats. Participation in the November 25
first round topped 73 percent of registered voters and

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reached 69 percent in the December 2 second round.
(Appointments to the 40-member upper house Shura Council are
expected to be announced shortly.) The single largest bloc
in the COR is held by leading Shia opposition political
society Al Wifaq, with 17 seats. Al Wifaq is making its
first entry into the COR, having boycotted the 2002
parliamentary elections to protest the 2002 constitution, and
Al Wifaq's participation and success mark an important step
forward in the King's democratic reform process. The next
largest group is the Sunni Salafi Al Asala political society,
which now holds eight seats following the December 3
announcement that three MPs who had run as independents have
joined Al Asala. There are reports that the society could
attract the membership, or at a minimum the support, of three
other independents. The Muslim Brotherhood-associated Al
Minbar political society took seven seats.


6. (C) Among the five remaining independent MPs, most
prominent is former and likely future COR Chairman Khalifa Al
Dhahrani. He is close to the Sunni Islamists but is widely
viewed to be the chamber's elder statesman and generally
tries to remain above the fray. He is the only sitting MP
who also served in the 1973 parliament. Liberal Abdul Aziz
Abul is the only Sunni oppositionist to have been elected,
having received the support of both Al Wifaq and the liberal,
secular Al Waad political society during the campaign period.
(None of Al Waad's six parliamentary candidates made it to
the COR despite three reaching the second round and a fourth,
female candidate Munira Fakhro, coming very close to making
the second round.) He will ally himself with Al Wifaq on
political, economic, and social, but not religious, issues.
Independent Adel Al Asoomi, a businessman with ties to the
Prime Minister, and Lateefa Al Qaoud, Bahrain's first female
MP, have no apparent links with the Islamist societies but
are both safely pro-government.

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Limited COR Ability to Enact Religious Measures
-------------- --


7. (C) Given the overwhelmingly Islamist nature of the COR,
observers expect there to be renewed parliamentary action on
issues related to the introduction of Islamic law into
everyday life. These include moves to ban or limit access to
alcohol, restrictions on nightclubs, and more stringent curbs
on prostitution - steps to promote "family" or "clean"
tourism, advocates say. The COR could revive efforts to
create a Committee to Promote Virtue and Combat Vice along
the lines of the Saudi religious police, or mutawa'een.


8. (C) The COR's ability to implement such steps, however,
is severely curtailed. The 2002 constitution gives the
government the sole right to draft legislation, and the Shura
Council and Cabinet can easily stop or defer COR legislative
initiatives. The previous COR often passed measures known as
"iqtirahat bi raghba" (desired proposals),which are similar
to U.S. "Sense of the Congress" motions in that they express
a point of view but carry no legislative weight. In the
past, the government has for the most part ignored these
proposals until such a time as it needs something from the
COR, when it may then negotiate implementation of all or part
of a proposal in exchange for something it wants. An example
is the ban on selling alcohol during the holy month of
Ramadan. Before Ramadan 2005 (October/November),five-star
hotels were allowed to sell alcohol at bars and restaurants.
The government suddenly announced a ban on alcohol at the
start of the month, taking hotels by surprise. Some ignored
the order and were later fined and forced to keep bars and
restaurants closed during the post-Ramada holiday of Eid Al
Fitr. All hotels complied wih the order during Ramadan 2006
(September/Octobr).

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plit on Sunni, Shia Legislative Agendas
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9. (C) Al WifaqSecretary General Shaikh Ali Salman has been
themost vocal politician in reaching across the aislein the
post-election period. He told journalist December 3, "We
will work in close cooperation wth other political societies
in order to achieveour goals collectively. Now we are a
strong grop in parliament... We will focus on building a
society where everybody ca have a job, house, and
education." In a November 29 interview, he said, I can
assure you that the common ground that Al sala, Al Minbar,
and Al Wifaq share is vast and eeds to be put into practice
with other groups."


10. (C) But the potential for COR unity on Islmic actions
should not be exaggerated. Two overlpping but not identical

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fault lines run through the parliament -- the Sunni/Shia and
pro-government/opposition splits. The existence of these
camps argues strongly against the development of a united,
efficiently Islamist COR that a shallow analysis of the
election results might suggest. The opposition agenda, that
of Al Wifaq and Independent Abul, focuses on social issues
such as unemployment, wage growth, education, housing, and
health care, mostly to improve the lot of Bahrain's Shia
majority. They could also move toward addressing fundamental
political grievances such as proposing constitutional reform,
redrawing parliamentary constituencies, investigating
corruption, and institutionalizing decision-making on land
zoning and reclamation projects.


11. (C) The Sunni Islamist legislative agenda, by contrast,
focuses mainly on the introduction of Islamic law and
practices into Bahraini society. During the previous
legislative session, the Sunni Islamists were reliably
pro-government on issues outside the realm of religion. They
will continue to be with the government, and will be joined
by non-Islamist Independent Sunni MPs Al Asoomi and Al Qaoud.
In some cases, there are indications that the government
allowed the Sunnis to stake out extreme positions on certain
issues, enabling the government to step in to demand a
reasonable compromise. An example is the battle earlier this
year on a long-debated draft press law. Islamists demanded
stringent penalties, including lengthy jail sentences, for
journalists found guilty of covering forbidden topics such as
the catch-all "harming the unity of the country." Liberals
and some newspapers reacted, sparking a high volume war of
words. Although there appeared to be consensus on the idea
of fines and sanctions for guilty journalists, the COR never
voted on the press law. The issue is certain to resurface
during the coming parliamentary session.

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What Happened to the Moderates?
--------------


12. (C) The losers in the elections were liberals and
moderates. The previous parliament boasted a great number of
business people, economists, and technocrats - so much so
that one MP commented that there could have been two fully
staffed economic and financial affairs committees. The
coming parliament will have a difficult time putting together
one. The only qualified MPs who stand out are Al Wifaq Ph.D.
economist and professor Dr. Jassim Hussein and businessman Al
Asoomi. Ahmed Juma, chairman of the moderate Al Mithaq
political society, told the press that the massive success of
the Islamists "is a political tsunami that needs to be
contained before it devastates the liberal and tolerant
foundations of the nation." Prominent Al Watan columnist
Sawsan Al Shaer has written a series of articles complaining
that the "silent majority" of Bahrain's moderates are not
represented in the COR and she calls on the King to appoint
centrists to the Shura Council to provide balance. Lamenting
the Islamic nature of the COR, Al Ayam columnist Saeed Al
Hamad writes, "it is regrettable to see Bahrain lose its
tolerance."


13. (C) With its collapse in the elections, Al Waad is
looking to pick up the pieces. Secretary General Ibrahim
Sharif, who lost in a runoff election to Abdul Rahman
Bumjeed, told the press December 3 that the society will
build up its popular support through more interaction with
the public, including the establishment of local branches in
areas where it has a following. Two of its candidates,
Munira Fakhro and Abdul Rahman Al Nuaimi, claim to have lost
their elections because of votes cast for their competitors
in the ten general polling centers. Fakhro's court case
demanding an investigation was rejected by the Court of
Cassation December 4, and Al Nuaimi is preparing to file a
similar case contesting the outcome of his election.

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Strategies for Long-Term Up Support for Government
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14. (C) The election outcome, with a Sunni majority in the
COR representing a country where about two-thirds of the
citizens are Shia, comes as no accident, and likely reflects
the Royal Family and government's preference. A minister
very close to the King told the Ambassador some time ago that
the parliamentary electoral constituencies are designed so as
to result in a 50-50 split between Sunnis and Shias. This is
gerrymandering taken to extremes: the smallest district
covering the (Sunni) southern reaches of the country has less
than 1,200 voters while the largest district, comprising Shia
villages just outside Manama has 15,500 voters, a
magnitudinal difference of 13 times. The Minister of

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Interior told the Ambassador December 5 that it was important
to have a "balanced" parliament so that both Sunnis and Shias
feel they have a stake in the system.


15. (C) Critics allege that the government has employed its
naturalization law in an attempt to alter the sectarian
balance in the country. An unknown number of Saudi members
of the Al Dossari tribe, likely 10,000 or more, received
Bahraini citizenship years ago on the grounds that Bahrain is
their ancestral home. Shia politicians and activists have
accused the government of recent illegal "political
naturalization;" that is, granting citizenship to foreigners
- Arabs, Pakistanis, and non-Muslims, including Indians, Sri
Lankans, and southeast Asians - who have not fulfilled the
law's residency requirements or, if they have fulfilled the
requirements, received expedited processing. Last summer
there were allegations that the passports directorate of the
Ministry of Interior was issuing thousands of passports to
newly naturalized citizens. Despite the naturalization law's
stipulation that new citizens cannot vote until after holding
citizenship for ten years, government officials declared that
the 2002 election law's provision that all citizens can vote
superseded the naturalization law.

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Mobilizing Friendly Voters...
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16. (C) Moving from the strategic to the tactical, many
Bahrainis believe that the government had a hand in
mobilizing voters presumed to be pro-government - most
Sunnis, especially Islamists, members of the military and
security services, and newly naturalized citizens. There are
many reports of military and police officers holding the
passports and identification documents of their personnel
until election day. This forced the staff to come to
assembly points to retrieve their documents, at which time
buses were provided to bring them to the general voting
centers after the personnel had received advice from their
superiors about which candidates to support or not to
support. The brother of an Embassy staff member works in the
health services department of the Bahrain Defense Force
(BDF). He reported that a commanding officer instructed
personnel not to vote for opposition candidates because the
opposition might cut the BDF's budget, possibly leading to
layoffs.


17. (C) The Al Waad candidates, symbolically important
because they are Sunni (vice Shia) oppositionists, were
forced to deal with outside efforts to support their
opponents and, at the same time, a smear campaign of their
personal reputations. Prominent Sunni preachers, including
some Islamist MPs, delivered sermons one day before both
election days urging listeners to vote for anyone but Al Waad
(Al Wifaq did not have candidates in districts with Al Waad
candidates). Al Waad candidate Al Nuaimi has complained that
Islamist MPs Mohammed Khalid and Jassim Al Saeedi delivered
sermons in mosques in his district on December 1 urging
voters to cast their ballots for his opponent Isa Abul Fateh.
Khalid and Al Saeedi normally speak at mosques in East Riffa
and Hamad Town, nowhere near Al Nuaimi's Muharraq district.
(Note: Sunnis were not the only ones using religious figures
to promote election participation. Senior Shia cleric Shaikh
Isa Qassim and others repeatedly urged listeners to vote for
the "faithful" bloc, understood to be Al Wifaq.)

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...While Smearing Opposition Candidates
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18. (C) Ibrahim Sharif and (non-Waad but liberal, secular)
Abdul Aziz Abul told Emboffs about smear campaigns employing
cellphone SMS messages, leaflets, and posters accusing them
and other Al Waad candidates of being communists, rejecting
God and religion, and supporting prostitution. Munira Fakhro
faced particularly vicious accusations that implied she was
sexually promiscuous. Sharif told us that the thoroughness
and complexity of these efforts signal that they were carried
out by a government organization, either the intelligence or
security services, in his view.

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The X Factor: General Polling Centers
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19. (C) The ten general polling centers have been a central
focus of those concerned with possible governmental
manipulation of the elections. The original justification
for their existence in the 2002 elections was that citizens
living in areas where the majority of people were boycotting

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would feel uncomfortable voting in their district centers,
and so they could cast their ballots at the general centers.
With the end of the boycott by political societies (only some
supporters of the hardline Shia Al Haq movement boycotted
this election),the need for the general centers seems to
have disappeared. But the government justified their
existence by saying they are a convenience that encourages
citizens living or working some distance from their district
centers to vote.


20. (C) Critics complain that the general centers are ripe
for manipulation because they are far from villages and
neighborhoods where residents likely could identify outsiders
coming to vote in a district center. There is no evidence,
but plenty of accusations, that voters with no fixed
addresses voted at the general centers, where they were told
in which district to vote and for which candidate. The same
allegations are made about the Saudi Al Dossaris, who have no
address in, indeed very little if any connection to, Bahrain,
as well as military and security cadres and newly naturalized
citizens. In three races, involving Fakhro, Al Nuaimi, and
Sharif, votes cast in the general centers were
disproportionately in favor of the Al Waad candidates'
competitors, and ensured their opponents' victories. These
accusations, combined with election monitors' concerns about
the lack of transparency in some aspects of how those running
the general polling centers carried out the first round of
the elections on November 25 (para 21),do not necessarily
mean the centers were used to influence the outcomes of
specific races. But there are serious questions that have
not been answered to date.

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Some Transparency Issues in Conduct of Elections
-------------- ---


21. (C) The independent NGO Election Monitoring Joint
Committee (EMJC) has not yet issued a preliminary report on
the December 2 voting, but following the first round of
voting, which took place on November 25, it issued a strong
recommendation that the High Commission for Elections ensure
uniformity and increased transparency in announcing poll
results. The EMJC suggested that election officials announce
the number of voters who cast ballots, the number of valid
and invalid ballots, and a detailed breakdown of votes for
each candidate at the district and general polling centers
prior to the movement of the ballots and tally sheets to
governorate level supervisory centers (Ref B). Privately,
EMJC leaders have told Poloff that these recommendations
result from reports that judges at the general polling
centers did not permit monitors to observe the counting of
votes, did not announce the results before departing the
centers, and did not provide candidates with a list of the
names of all those who voted in the elections they were
contesting. Initial indications are that in the second round
of voting, judges did announce the results at general polling
centers before departing for the supervisory centers.


22. (C) EMJC leader and member of the board of Al Waad
Abdullah Al Durazi, speaking in his private capacity,
complained to the press December 3 that there was
"circumstantial evidence" that pro-government Sunnis won as a
result of fraud, specifically citing the December 2 runoff
races involving three Al Waad candidates. He claimed there
were widespread reports of soldiers being ordered to vote for
pro-government candidates and the existence of some 8,000
"floating voters" without addresses who were reportedly sent
to vote in particularly tight races. He criticized the use
of the ten general polling centers, saying they were
unnecessary in such a small country. (Comment: Al Durazi's
comments likely reflect his personal frustration with the
outcomes of the elections involving Al Waad candidates,
rather than a measured analysis and evaluation of the
transparency of the elections. Post will report the
conclusions of the EMJC as they become available.)

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Comment
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23. (C) Although they represent almost 90 percent of the
COR's members, Islamists are likely to find only limited
success pursuing a religious agenda. The government
maintains almost all of the levers of legislative power in
its hands and it will want to protect Bahrain's reputation as
a liberal oasis in the Gulf attractive to Western residents
and investments. As in the past, the government is expected
mostly to ignore the COR's religiously oriented "iqtirahat bi
raghba," and engage MPs on these issues only when it needs to
cut a deal, offering some limited implementation of an

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Islamist proposal as a quid pro quo for support for a GOB
priority.


24. (C) Many observers believe that a COR split on sectarian
grounds is exactly what the government wanted, and may have
been the aim of the Bandargate conspiracy, which alleged that
a senior Royal Family power broker was interfering in
parliamentary elections. The government can tolerate the
existence of a sizable Shia opposition bloc if that is the
price of getting them to join rather than remain outside the
system. What it did not want was a significant group of
Sunni oppositionists that could ally with Al Wifaq to form a
majority opposition bloc in the COR. Additionally, a vocal
bloc of Sunni oppositionists like Abdul Aziz Abul and the Al
Waad candidates could undercut arguments by hardliners in the
Al Khalifa family and their media surrogates like Al Watan
newspaper that only disgruntled Shia oppose the government.
Reliance upon Sunni Islamists to wage battles on behalf of
the government inside the COR could come back to haunt
officials, should the Islamists' popularity and influence
continue to grow.


25. (C) The Shia opposition's long-term commitment to stay
inside the political system remains an open question. Al
Wifaq Secretary General Salman has sent out soothing messages
to both the government and the Sunni blocs, saying Al Wifaq
intends to help make the political process successful and not
stand against the government. Salman admitted in a press
interview, however, that Al Wifaq retains the right to use
all political tools available, including demonstrations,
rallies, boycotting a parliamentary session or withdrawing
from the COR entirely, if it is unable to pursue its
legislative agenda. Relations between the executive and
legislative branches will undoubtedly become strained as the
oppositionists demand greater government attention and
resources to combat social ills afflicting their
constituents. For the long-term health of the political
system, the government would be wise to engage on these
issues and keep the opposition inside the parliament rather
than out on the streets.


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