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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA851
2006-04-18 21:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

NICARAGUA AND SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE

Tags:   ETRD  ETTC  PREL  CU  VE  NU 
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VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0851 1082109
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182109Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6002
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0617
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0017
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
						C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000851 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN AND WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2026
TAGS: ETRD ETTC PREL CU VE NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA AND SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE
LIBERTAD ACT

REF: A. STATE 57782


B. 05 MANAGUA 3103

C. 05 MANAGUA 1577

D. 05 MANAGUA 1659

E. 05 MANAGUA 1944

F. 05 MANAGUA 2195

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Nicaragua (GON) remains
responsive to U.S. efforts in favor of a democratic
transition in Cuba and maintains frank communication with the
Embassy on Cuba-related policies and issues.
Nicaraguan-Cuban trade and mutual investment are
statistically insignificant. A failure to waive Title III of
the Libertad Act for Nicaragua could undermine continued GON
support for U.S. Cuba policy and play into the hands of the
opposition Sandinista party (FSLN), which argues that Cuba
and Venezuela are more reliable, generous allies than is the
United States. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) Since post submitted its last cable on Nicaragua and
Title III of the Libertad Act in December 2005 (reftel B),
little has changed in the country's relations with the
government of Cuba. The GON has been responsive to U.S.
efforts in favor of a democratic transition in Cuba.
President Bolanos and his administration have consistently
demonstrated a strong aversion to Castro's regime and its
oppression of the Cuban people. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs maintains frank communication with Emboffs regarding
Cuba-related policies and issues.



3. (C) With limited financial and political resources to
influence the Government of Cuba, the GON has taken
considerable action in international fora to support the
advancement of democracy, human rights, and fundamental
freedoms in Cuba. The GON has consistently supported US
positions related to Cuba, and has voted in favor of or
abstained from most related votes in the UN. It has also
consistently supported U.S. positions and candidacies in
international fora more generally. Although the GON has
joined international calls for an end to the U.S. economic
embargo of Cuba, as have many other countries in the region,
this position reflects a disagreement over tactics rather
than support for the Castro regime.



4. (C) As in previous years, during 2005 and the first
months of 2006, the GON has been supportive of U.S. policies
on most issues related to Cuba. The GON resisted
Cuban-Venezuelan pressure to reject CAFTA in favor of their
"Bolivarian" alternative (ALBA) (reftel C) and expressed
understanding of U.S. policy relating to Cuban exile Luis
Posada Carriles (reftel D). The GON also continues to
confront the strongly pro-Castro opposition Sandinista party
(FSLN), which is counting on Cuban and Venezuelan financing
and propaganda to win the 2006 national elections (reftels E
and F). In 2006 the media have reported that the governments
of Cuba and Venezuela are working with the FSLN (with no GON
involvement) in "Operation Miracle" to send groups of
Nicaraguan citizens to Caracas and Havana for free eye
surgeries as part of the FSLN's electoral campaign.



5. (C) Nicaraguan-Cuban bilateral trade has declined
steadily since 1990-91. The Nicaraguan Central Bank
estimated that two-way trade was about $800,000 in 2003. The
Central Bank's 2004 and 2005 statistical information limits
country specific data to Nicaragua's major trading partners.
Central Bank officials described the country's trade with
Cuba as statistically insignificant. The Central Bank's
annual report lacks country specific information on foreign
investments, however, post is not aware of any substantial
Nicaraguan investments in Cuba. Given the lack of any
substantive political or economic relations with Cuba,
Foreign Ministry officials have confided to Emboffs that the
only reason the GON maintains an embassy in Havana is to
avoid provoking the ire of the FSLN.



6. (C) A failure to waive Title III of the Libertad Act for
Nicaragua could undermine continued GON support for US Cuba
policy, and for U.S. positions in international fora more
generally. It would also undervalue the GON's considerable
efforts in pressuring Cuba to improve its human rights
record, and would only strengthen the Sandinistas' arguments
that Cuba and Venezuela are more reliable, generous allies
for Nicaragua than is the U.S.
TRIVELLI