Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA833
2006-04-17 18:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA INELIGIBILITY FINDING--DAVID EUGENIO ROBLETO LANG

Tags:  CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU 
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VZCZCXYZ0016
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0833/01 1071823
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171823Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5975
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000833 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2036
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA INELIGIBILITY FINDING--DAVID EUGENIO ROBLETO LANG

REF: A. 04 STATE 45499

B. 04 MANAGUA 2808

C. 04 STATE 242524

D. 05 MANAGUA 345

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2036
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA INELIGIBILITY FINDING--DAVID EUGENIO ROBLETO LANG

REF: A. 04 STATE 45499

B. 04 MANAGUA 2808

C. 04 STATE 242524

D. 05 MANAGUA 345

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Embassy is seeking a
security advisory opinion under section 212 (f) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, proclamation 7750,
suspending the entry into the United States by David Eugenio
Robleto Lang, born in Nicaragua on November 26, 1957. David
Robleto is currently a prominent coffee grower, but he is
also a political and business associate of former President
Arnoldo Aleman, who was convicted of corruption in December
2003 and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his
crimes. Robleto was a public official during the Aleman
administration, serving as Minister of External Cooperation
(1997-1999),Minister of Transportation (1999-2001),and
Director of the Nicaraguan Telephone and Mail Regulatory
Institute (TELCOR) (2001-2002) in Aleman's cabinet.
Previously, Robleto served as Aleman's alternate ("suplente")
on the Managua city council when Aleman was Mayor (1990-1996).


2. (C) As Minister of Cooperation, Minister of
Transportation, and Director of TELCOR, Robleto committed
numerous acts of corruption benefiting himself, Aleman and
other close associates. While president, Arnoldo Aleman was
the linchpin in several high-level corruption schemes that
defrauded the Nicaraguan state of reportedly over USD 100
million. Since Aleman left office in 2002, Robleto has
returned to the private sector, but he remains an active
supporter of Aleman in the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)
and helps the ex-president to retain total control of the
party. The massive corruption of which Robleto was an
integral part caused serious damage for U.S. national
interests in the stability of democratic institutions in
Nicaragua, U.S. foreign assistance goals, and the

international economic activities of U.S. businesses.


3. (C) Along with other corrupt associates, Robleto and
Aleman continue to damage all of these national interests by
working to overturn the fraud and money laundering
convictions of the corrupt ex-president, undermine the
government of President Enrique Bolanos, and place all of the
country's government institutions under their control. For
all of these reasons, the Department has already found
Arnoldo Aleman to be ineligible to enter the United States
under INA 212 (f). Post recommends that the Department now
issue a 212 (f) finding against David Eugenio Robleto Lang.
The following provides information requested in reftel A,
paragraph 16. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

ARNOLDO ALEMAN'S CORRUPTION ALREADY DOCUMENTED AND HIS VISA REVOKED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -


4. (C) Arnoldo Aleman, who until January 10, 2002, served as
Nicaragua's President, is currently serving a twenty year
sentence for being the linchpin of several high
level-corruption schemes to defraud the Nicaraguan government
of reportedly over USD 100 million while he was President.
The elaborate financial schemes orchestrated by Aleman
involved the transfer of public funds from the accounts of
various government agencies to the accounts of shell foreign
corporations set up for the sole purpose of defrauding the
GON. Aleman and several of his associates have been
convicted of various corruption crimes against the state,
including embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds,
money laundering, and conspiracy to commit these crimes.
Reftel B described Aleman's corruption activities in detail,
as well as the mass of evidence against the ex-President. In
reftel C, the Department issued a 212 (f) finding against
Aleman. Prior to this decision, the Department had already
revoked the visas of Aleman and three of his main
co-conspirators for money laundering under INA 212 (a)(2)(I).
The Department has subsequently revoked the visas of nearly
a dozen of Aleman's family members and political associates
involved in his massive corruption.

ROBLETO'S ROLE IN ALEMAN'S CORRUPTION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) David Robleto is a founding member of the PLC, as well as a long-time friend and associate of Arnoldo Aleman. When Aleman served as Mayor of Managua from 1990 to 1996, Robleto served as his alternate on the city council. As Robleto proved a loyal instrument of Aleman's will, Aleman brought Robleto into his cabinet as soon as he took office as president in 1997. Robleto served in one cabinet position after another from the beginning of Aleman's administration to the end, holding the posts of Minister of External Cooperation (1997-1999),Minister of Transportation (1999-2001),and Director of TELCOR (2001-2002). In at least the latter two of these three cabinet jobs, Robleto is known to have participated in, and benefited from, Aleman's massive corruption schemes.

THE COERCO ROAD CONSTRUCTION SCHEME
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) As president, Aleman was notorious for using corrupt
proxies to loot government ministries, independent agencies,
and state-owned companies. One of Aleman's most well-known
corruption schemes involved the looting of the Regional
Businesses Corporation (COERCO),a state-owned development
company that carried out a wide variety of infrastructure
projects as a subcontractor for the Ministry of
Transportation and Infrastructure (MTI). In 2001, Aleman
appointed Victor Guerrero (whose visa the Department revoked
under INA 212(f) in 2005) to serve as Director General of
COERCO, at a time when David Robleto was Minister of
Transportation and Guerrero's immediate supervisor. Aleman,
Robleto, Guerrero and several other conspirators fashioned an
elaborate road construction scheme intended to defraud the
Nicaraguan state for their own personal benefit. Much of
this scheme was already described in reftel D, but the
information is repeated here for the convenience of the
Department.


7. (C) Several times during his presidency, Aleman announced
that he would ensure the paving of a 35 kilometer highway
between the isolated Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Cabezas
and the River Wawa, which would effectively connect Puerto
Cabezas to the rest of the country for the first time. The
project finally began in 2000-2001, with a budget of 27
million cordobas (USD 1.7 million) but it turned out to be
nothing more than a massive corruption scheme designed to
benefit President Aleman and several of his cronies,
including Robleto, Guerrero, Director of Taxation Byron
Jerez, and Rural Development Institute (IDR) Director Eduardo
Mena. The Department revoked Jerez's visa under INA
212(a)2(I) in 2002 and Mena's under 212(f) in 2005.


8. (C) First, Aleman and his PLC deputies in the National
Assembly privatized a state-owned stone-making company called
Materials and Construction, Inc. (MAYCO) and placed it in the
hands of one of their partners, Sebastian Martinez Reyes.
Martinez Reyes then transferred three huge paving-stone
producing machines to the Nicaraguan Concrete, Inc.
(Concrenicsa),owned by none other than Aleman, Robleto,
Jerez, and Mena, and had the three machines trucked from
Managua to Puerto Cabezas. Next, Victor Guerrero entered the
picture. With the approval of Robleto and as the newly
appointed Director of COERCO, which was responsible for
contracting to carry out the highway project, Guerrero
authorized a contract with Concrenicsa to provide the paving
stones for the first five kilometers of the new highway.


9. (C) Robleto and Guerrero authorized the contract without
the normal solicitation procedures mandated by Nicaraguan law
and despite the fact that the price offered by Concrenicsa
per paving stone (7 cordobas) was double the price of such
stones in Managua (3.7 cordobas). Robleto and Guerrero also
failed to obtain the legally-required approval of the
Controller General's Office (Contraloria) for the contract.
With the approval of Robleto and Guerrero, COERCO ultimately
paid Concrenicsa 6.5 million cordobas (400,000 USD) of state
funds for the purchase of over 900,000 paving stones.


10. (C) Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the
quality of the paving stones provided by Concrenicsa proved
to be very low. Construction costs on the highway also
proved dramatically higher than anticipated. By mid-2001 the
Aleman government abandoned the entire Puerto Cabezas highway
project after a total of 2 (out of 35) of the planned
kilometers of road had been paved. All of the 27 million
cordobas budgeted by COERCO for the entire length of the road
were gone. As if this theft of GON funds were not enough,
Concrenicsa ended up keeping not only the 6.5 million
cordobas it had been paid, but also 600,000 of the 900,000
paving stones that it was supposed to have sold and delivered
to COERCO.


11. (C) Subsequently, Concrenicsa was "bought out" by a "different" construction company, Concrete and Construction, Inc. (Concretosa) also owned by Aleman, Robleto, Jerez, and Mena. Concretosa thereby "inherited" the 600,000 paving stones left in the hands of Concrenicsa. It used some of the stones for other (GON-financed) construction projects and sold off the rest to other companies. Thus, in the end, the entire 27 million cordoba Puerto Cabezas highway project produced virtually nothing for the Nicaraguan people, but greatly enriched Aleman, Robleto, Jerez, and Mena. None of this would have been possible had it not been for David Robleto and Victor Guerrero, who, as Minister of Transportation and Director of COERCO, respectively, personally approved all of the transactions associated with the failed construction project.

CASCO AND CHANNEL SIX
- - - - - - - - - - -


12. (C) Later in 2001, with the end of the Aleman
administration approaching and with Aleman seeking to steal
as much money as possible before leaving office, both for his
own benefit and to fund the PLC electoral campaign, the
president transferred Robleto from the Ministry of
Transportation to TELCOR. At TELCOR, Robleto was a key
participant in one of Aleman's most infamous corruption
schemes, the theft of 1.3 million USD in state funds that
were nominally to be spent for the modernization of the
state-owned Channel Six television station. This case was
reported previously in reftel B, but is repeated here for the
convenience of the Department.


13. (C) In August 2001, then-president Aleman asked
government agencies to help finance modernization of the
state-owned television station Channel Six. The
modernization project was awarded to CASCO, a Mexican
consulting firm that would act as an intermediary with TV
Azteca, the Mexican company tapped to provide the new
equipment, technical expertise, and training for the
modernization process at Channel Six. As a result of
Aleman's request, the state telephone company (ENITEL),then
headed by Aleman-crony Jorge Solis (whose visa the Department
revoked under INA 212(a)(2)(I) in 2002, issued at least five
checks totaling approximately $570,000 to Channel Six. All
five checks were immediately endorsed over to CASCO. The
Tourism Institute (INTUR) contributed a $350,000 check to
Channel Six, which was subsequently endorsed to CASCO. The
Airport Authority (EAAI) contributed a $150,000 check, which
was cashed by Channel Six, and $79,000 was turned over to
CASCO. TELCOR Director David Robleto contributed $500,000 to
the project, transferring the money via the Ministry of
Finance, headed by another Aleman crony, Esteban
Duque-Estrada (whose visa the Department revoked under INA
212(a)(2)(I) in 2002). Of this 500,000 USD, at least 300,000
USD was diverted to CASCO. Thus, from August to November
2001, four government agencies transferred $1,299,000 to
CASCO, a company that, according to the testimony of various
witnesses, provided no services to modernize Channel Six.


14. (C) CASCO was a subsidiary of a company called SINFRA,
owned by Alejandro Lopez Toledo, a Mexican national who had
personally negotiated the CASCO contract to modernize Channel
Six with Aleman. From August to September 2001, Lopez Toledo
ordered that a total of $500,000 in three transactions be
transferred from SINFRA's account at Banco de la Produccion
(BANPRO) in Nicaragua to one of the accounts of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Foundation (FDN) in Panama. As
reported in reftel B, the FDN was a shell organization opened
and owned by Aleman and used solely to launder stolen GON
funds before they were transferred to private accounts owned
by Aleman, his family, and his cronies. Lopez Toledo
specifically asked that two transactions, totaling $300,000,
be sent from BANPRO's correspondent bank, Bank of America in
Florida, through Citibank in New York, to the FDN account.
The remaining $200,000 were sent through Banco Internacional
de Costa Rica. In short, four GON agencies transferred,
through CASCO, a total of $500,000 to the FDN account.


15. (C) During the 2001 electoral campaign, David Robleto
served as one of the PLC's treasurers. After the Aleman
administration left office and questions were raised
regarding the ex-president's money laundering activities and
his use of state funds for PLC electoral campaigns,
documentation emerged showing that Robleto personally
received at least USD 50,000 from the Nicaraguan Democratic
Foundation (reftel B) in August 2001 and immediately
deposited it in a PLC party account in the Banco de la
Produccion (BANPRO).


16. (C) In early 2002, after the Aleman administration left office, ten individuals, including Byron Jerez, Esteban Duque-Estrada, and David Robleto, were provisionally convicted for fraud, embezzlement and criminal conspiracy for their roles in defrauding the government in the Channel Six scandal. Although several people provided testimony at trial indicating that Aleman ordered, approved, and was kept informed of the entire scheme, he was not prosecuted because of his parliamentary immunity. Subsequent to the lifting of Aleman's immunity, the Nicaraguan Attorney General charged the ex-president with orchestrating the Channel Six money-laundering scheme.


17. (C) During the trial, prosecutors documented that, as
Director of TELCOR, Robleto had, at Aleman's bidding,
personally transferred 500,000 USD to the Ministry of
Finance, where Duque-Estrada subsequently transferred it to
CASCO. When the investigating judge ordered the arrest of
the conspirators, Robleto and Duque-Estrada fled the country.
The only defense his lawyers offered, acting on his behalf
in his absence, was the argument that the evidence against
Robleto had been "improperly" obtained. Documents and
computer records presented by prosecutors showed clearly that
Robleto had personally transferred the 500,000 USD to the
Ministry of Finance and that at least 300,000 USD
subsequently went to CASCO and on to the FDN. In May 2002,
Judge Ileana Perez found Robleto, Duque-Estrada and several
of the other Channel Six conspirators guilty and ordered
their assets seized. However, both Robleto and Duque-Estrada
remained at large.


18. (C) However, as is often the case in Nicaraguan
corruption prosecutions, after the principal Channel Six
conspirators were convicted, the political negotiations
began. Aleman knew that the investigation of Channel Six and
other brewing scandals would eventually lead to him, and that
he could be prosecuted if his immunity were lifted. Seeking
to protect himself, he cut a deal with Sandinista leader
Daniel Ortega whereby an FSLN appeals court judge would
overturn the Channel Six verdict. Judge Juana Mendez, one of
Ortega's most notorious judicial fixers, handled the appeal.


19. (C) In March 2003, by which time Aleman had lost his
immunity, Mendez ignored the mountain of documentary evidence
against Robleto and the other Channel Six conspirators, and
accepted the argument of their lawyers that prosecutors had
failed to prove any acts of corruption. This deal "absolved"
Robleto, allowed him to return to Nicaragua, and protected
Aleman from any Channel Six fallout. Ironically, it was the
same judge, Juana Mendez, who convicted Aleman of corruption
in a different case in December 2003, and assigned him a
twenty year prison sentence when negotiations between Aleman
and Ortega for yet another not guilty verdict failed.
Because of his flight from justice and the subsequent
protection of Aleman, David Robleto never spent one day
behind bars for his role in the Channel Six scheme.


20. (C) Since the Aleman administration left office in
2002, Robleto has returned to the private sector, running a
coffee production business, but he has remained active in the
PLC and, in his capacity as a PLC convention member, has
served as one of Aleman's enforcers of party loyalty. Aleman
uses the 700 voting members of the national PLC convention to
provide a fig leaf of democracy in the party, but all the
convention members, including Robleto, owe their positions to
Aleman and serve as little more than rubber stamps for
Aleman's decisions, as was demonstrated once again in March
2006 when the PLC confirmed Aleman's choice for the 2006 PLC
presidential nomination.

SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


21. (C) The massive corruption of Arnoldo Aleman, David
Robleto and their other associates, specifically their theft
of tens of millions of dollars from Nicaraguan institutions
and their efforts to launder some of the money in U.S. banks,
had serious adverse effects on those U.S. interests specified
in the Presidential Proclamation as well as U.S. foreign
policy priorities highlighted in the Embassy's Mission
Program Plan (MPP). The Embassy has encouraged Nicaragua to
prosecute officials for corruption and has provided financial
and technical support in corruption cases, including that of
Aleman himself. President Bolanos has made the imprisonment
of Aleman, the recovery of stolen assets and a wider
anti-corruption campaign the cornerstones of his presidency.
Since his conviction, Aleman, who still has vast political
influence in the country, has worked incessantly through
Robleto and other corrupt associates in the PLC and other
institutions to further undermine all of Nicaragua's
democratic institutions, including the presidency, the
National Assembly and the judiciary, all in an effort to have
his conviction erased, regain the frozen assets they stole
from the Nicaraguan state, and maintain political power.


22. (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions: The Embassy's top priority is strengthening and consolidating democracy through the development of transparent, accountable and professional governmental institutions, including the judiciary. Our MPP states that "... abuse of power, corruption and politicization of many state institutions, especially the judiciary, have impeded the consolidation of democracy and economic growth." A judicial system subject to political and corrupting influences undermines democracy and could lead to instability. The actions of Arnoldo Aleman, David Robleto and their associates have contributed directly to the widespread belief in Nicaragua that justice comes from political bosses and can be bought and sold. This has undermined confidence in the system. In addition to working for Aleman's release from imprisonment, Aleman and Robleto's actions have helped other corrupt figures, including Robleto himself, to elude justice. Additionally, a judiciary free of corruption is necessary for improving the ability of the GON to investigate and prosecute those suspected of international criminal activities that can have a direct impact on United States homeland security, such as money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking or terrorism.


23. (C) Foreign Assistance Goals: One of the top three USG
foreign assistance goals in Nicaragua is strengthening
democracy. The chief goals of USAID assistance in this area
are battling corruption and effecting judicial reform.
Aleman and Robleto's actions have directly damaged progress
in both of these areas. In December 2003, the USG froze USD
49 million of judicial assistance in response to endemic
judicial corruption, highlighted by what appeared to be an
imminent fraudulent "not guilty" verdict for Aleman, due to
backroom dealing between Sandinista (FSLN) leader Daniel
Ortega and the corrupt ex-president. Thanks to corrupt
members of the PLC such as Robleto, Aleman retains near total
control of the party and its caucus in the National Assembly
and uses this power to negotiate with Ortega. Without
co-dependent cronies such as Robleto in the PLC and the
Assembly, Aleman would not be able to control the PLC caucus
and use it to negotiate with Ortega and corrupt all the other
institutions of the state that are under the Assembly's
supervision, including the Controller General's Office, the
judiciary, and the Supreme Electoral Council, among others.


24. (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses: Corrupt
Nicaraguan institutions hamper U.S. investment in Nicaragua
and discourage U.S. exporters from establishing
agent/distributor relationships. U.S. investors and
business-people are reluctant to risk their resources in
Nicaragua, knowing they could easily be subjected to the
vagaries of a corrupt judiciary or the whims of politicians
should they become involved in any commercial dispute, real
or trumped up. By stealing over a hundred million dollars
from the Nicaraguan state and subsequently trying to
manipulate the presidency, judiciary, and the National
Assembly behind the scenes in order to erase Aleman's
conviction and keep their ill-gotten gains, Aleman, Robleto
and their associates have contributed directly to the erosion
of confidence of the business community in all of Nicaragua's
democratic institutions.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING
--------------


25. (C) David Eugenio Robleto Lang has been informed of the
fact that he may be covered by Presidential Proclamation
number 7750, under section 212 (f) of the INA.


26. (C) David Eugenio Robleto Lang has been issued numerous
visas over the years, but he does not presently possess a
valid visa. On April 3, 2006, he applied for a new B1/B2
visa at Embassy Managua, but his application was refused
under INA P212(f) in order to allow time for post to submit
an advisory opinion request to the Department.


27. (C) Post recommends that the Department make a 212f visa
ineligibility finding for David Eugenio Robleto Lang and that
no (rpt no) further travel be allowed to the United States.
TRIVELLI