Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MANAGUA813
2006-04-11 22:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Managua
Cable title:  

CHONTALES, NICARAGUA: CALL FOR UNITY AND

Tags:  PGOV ECON EINV SOCI NU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0813/01 1012244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 112244Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5944
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000813 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV ECON EINV SOCI NU
SUBJECT: CHONTALES, NICARAGUA: CALL FOR UNITY AND
MONTEALEGRE OPPORTUNITY IN A LIBERAL COMMUNITY (SECOND OF
TWO)

REF: MANAGUA 721

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI FOR REASONS 1.4 (a & b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000813

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV ECON EINV SOCI NU
SUBJECT: CHONTALES, NICARAGUA: CALL FOR UNITY AND
MONTEALEGRE OPPORTUNITY IN A LIBERAL COMMUNITY (SECOND OF
TWO)

REF: MANAGUA 721

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI FOR REASONS 1.4 (a & b)


1. (SBU) Summary: While baseball is Nicaragua's national
sport, it is surpassed by politics in the Department of
Chontales. Emotions are still raw in this cattle raising
region where misguided economic policy, Contra attacks and
Sandinista reprisals devastated the countryside in the
1980's. During a March 9 visit, ECONOFF encountered a wide
variety of opinions about how best to defeat the Sandinista
Front Party (FSLN) in November, but uniform hostility to
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and skepticism about the
democratic bonafides of Sandinista dissident Herty Lewites.
In meetings with politicians, business owners, and cattle
ranchers - and even chats with waiters and hotel staff -
Chontelenos distinguished themselves for being politically
savvy. The oft repeated themes were fear and loathing of the
FSLN, a high regard for PLC dissident Eduardo Montealegre,
and a desire for Liberal unity. End Summary.

Chontales Politics - No Love For Local Boy Ortega
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (U) Until the 1990's, Chontales had traditionally been a
bastion of Conservative Party (PC) Support. The domination
of political and economic life by owners of large estates was
disrupted by the Sandinista Revolution of 1979. In the
1980's, these already "conservative" leaders became strong
supporters of the anti-Sandinista insurgent (Contra) forces
as the FSLN's property reform program resulted in the
confiscation of great tracts of land. Contras were also
active in Chontales, constantly attempting to disrupt traffic
on a highway that brought needed supplies to the
revolutionary government via the river port of El Rama, which
enjoys access to the Atlantic Ocean. The Sandinistas
governed this center of opposition with a heavy hand, earning
the eternal enmity of much of the population - including many
of the rural poor whose interests the FSLN were theoretically

representing. Further alienating Chontales from the FSLN is
the fact that this region had been one of the most prosperous
in Nicaragua prior to the Revolution and was devastated by
the war and land reforms that left a great deal of the
previously productive land idle.


3. (U) After Nicaragua's emergence from a decade of
revolutionary leadership, the bulk of former PC and Liberal
Party members formed the PLC to counter the FSLN. As a
result, the PLC has replaced the PC as the dominant political
party in Chontales. Even so, several current PLC members
told ECONOFF that they really still consider themselves to be
Conservatives. Alternatively, the two PC members with whom
we spoke admitted that they usually wind up voting for the
PLC candidate as the most viable choice to defeat the FSLN.
Despite the fact that FSLN leader Daniel Ortega is from La
Libertad, Chontales, he is a despised figure in this
department, and his hometown is run by the PLC.

Cattle Ranchers Supportive of Montealegre But Wary of Liberal
Disunity
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (SBU) Since 40% of all cattle in this cattle raising
country are found in Chontales, the political views of cattle
ranchers are key to understanding the region. To that end,
ECONOFF held meetings with members of the Chontales
Cattlemen's' Association (AGC) and the Santo Tomas
Cattlemen's' Cooperative (CGST). Three of the four leaders
of AGC identified themselves as being Liberal and the fourth
Conservative. The CGST meeting was attended by two PLC
members, a Vamos Con Eduardo/Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
(ALN) member, and a PC member. To a person, these beef and
dairy sector leaders were hostile to the FSLN and Daniel
Ortega. They also challenged the democratic bonafides of
Sandinista dissident Herty Lewites, calling his candidacy a
"hoax." Furthermore, they opined, Lewites has surrounded
himself with hard-line leftists so he should not be trusted.
Although some participants admitted knowing a few people who
said they plan to vote for Lewites, they saw no evidence of
any Herty 2006 campaign apparatus in Chontales.


5. (SBU) The cattle ranchers spoke favorably of Eduardo
Montealegre. They liked the fact that he represents
government transparency and economic modernism; they
acknowledged that the corruption of Arnoldo Aleman damages
the country and enables the FSLN. On the other hand, the
examples of the March 5 Atlantic Coast regional elections and
the municipal elections of 2004, give these hard-line
anti-Sandinistas pause. Several said that if they unite the


Liberals will win, but that disunity could enable Daniel
Ortega to slip into the Presidential Palace with 35-40% of
the vote. The ranchers also spoke favorably of Jose Rizo (who
had not yet been named as the PLC presidential candidate) and
APRE presidential pre-candidate Jose Alvarado. Several
cattlemen opined said that Montealegre needs to visit their
department more often and that he suffers from an image of
being cold and elitist.


6. (C) There was disagreement among the cattlemen about
whether Aleman's corruption was bad enough to justify
abandoning the PLC. The consensus view was that if
Montealegre is sufficiently ahead in the polls prior to
election day, then they and their fellow Chontelenos would
likely vote for him. On the other hand, if it looks close,
the cattlemen said that many Liberals would hold their noses
and vote for the PLC candidate to prevent Ortega from
becoming president. Hilario Vargas, former mayor of Santo
Tomas and an ALN member, said that the Atlantic Coast
election results (in which the FSLN was able to win many
seats despite having fewer votes than the Liberal bloc)
caused him to think that Liberal unity might be even more
important than his desire to end the Alemanista culture of
corruption. In the end, about a third said they would
support Montealegre no matter what, a third said they would
support Montealegre only if Ortega had no chance of winning,
and a third were unsure or unwilling to say. None of the
ranchers defended Aleman on his own terms. The two ranchers
who are members of the PC said that they will vote for
Montealegre, as his party has formed an alliance with the PC.

Vamos Con Eduardo/ALN Taking Over the PLC Infrastructure in
Chontales
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) Leaders of Vamos Con Eduardo/ALN in Chontales are
enthusiastic about their candidate's prospects in the
Department. All of these Montealegre supporters have long
histories as PLC activists and leaders. One reason for their
enthusiasm is their claim that they are taking over the
infrastructure of the PLC from the inside. Elman Urbina,
former PLC municipal council president of Juigalpa and
Lombardo Madriz, a Juigalpa city councilman and ex-chief of
the PLC in Juigalpa illustrate this phenomenon. These ALN
members reported that many PLC council members, mayors, party
functionaries and election officials are members of both
organizations simultaneously and plan to use PLC resources to
benefit Montealegre. They also noted that Montealegre has
five campaign centers in Chontales. Comment: To down play
its poor performance in public opinion polls the PLC argues
is that it has superior organizational power to mobilize
voters and defend election results compared to the newly
cobbled together Montealegre organization. If the apparent
take over of the PLC structure by Montealegre's people is
happening in other parts of Nicaragua as well - - and
EMBOFF's have witnessed a similar phenomenon elsewhere - -
the PLC may be in worse shape than it admits. End Comment.


8. (SBU) ALN meeting participants said that they appreciate
USG calls for free and fair elections, transparency in
government, and an end to the caudillo politics of Aleman.
To them the leaders of the PLC do not represent the true
feelings of the voters. They see the PLC as having been
"kidnapped" by a few leaders and asked that the Embassy be
even more outspoken in our opposition to Aleman's domination
of the PLC and the PLC-FSLN power sharing pact. Other
insights included sharing the view that the Rizo would be the
strongest PLC candidate in Chontales, and they incorrectly
predicted that Aleman would not permit Rizo's nomination.

Aleman Loyalist Says PLC Victory Necessary to Defeat FSLN,
While Defending Pact With FSLN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) Marcio Gutierrez, the Departmental Electoral Council
(CED) president for Chontales repeated familiar PLC bromides
and shared a few surprising confessions. Gutierrez admitted
that the PLC had learned a lot from the Mexican PRI as to how
to steal elections, although he did not admit to being
personally involved in such fraud. He argued that only the
PLC has the organizational capacity to defeat the
Sandinistas, while also defending the PLC pact with the FSLN
as the "only way to get anything done." Gutierrez rejected
ALN claims that they are well organized in Chontales and that
Montealegre is a popular figure in the department. He shared
his belief that Jose Rizo has the best chance of winning in
Chontales (Note: This comment was made before Rizo was
nominated by the PLC. End Note.). Gonzalez did not defend
Aleman's criminal activity, but it was a sore spot - - he


appeared to tear up on two occasions when the subject arose.


10. (C) Gutierrez argued that Aleman's leadership is still
strong and the USG should stop denying it. In his view, the
Embassy should not interfere in the internal politics of
Nicaragua when it comes to opposing the Aleman-dominated PLC,
although we should do whatever we can to keep the Sandinistas
from winning. He did confess that he thinks the PLC would be
better served if Aleman were replaced by another leader.
Gutierrez remarked that his wife had been denied a tourist
visa in November 2005 and that he believed it was because of
his political loyalties. (Comment: According to consular
sources, she was not refused a visa for political reasons.
However, the fact that Gutierrez thinks his wife was refused
because of his political allegiances, is evidence that the
USG policy of revoking visas from corrupt politicians has
struck a cord. End Comment.)

Voting Patterns Show Liberal Strength in Numbers and FSLN
Strength in Organization
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (U) In 1990 the National Opposition Alliance (UNO) won
with 80% of the votes in Chontales. In the 2001 presidential
election the anti-Sandinista vote was 72% with the PLC
gaining 53,439 votes, the PC 1,872 and the FSLN 21,771. In
the 2004 municipal elections, a low voter turn out, a divided
center-right, and alleged electoral malfeasance did allow the
FSLN to capture mayorships in Juigalpa (the departmental
capital),Acoypa, and Santo Tomas. As a whole, the
anti-Sandinista vote was still 70% in Chontales, but the
center-right was splintered into eight parties. The
comparison between the PLC and FSLN was 21,113 votes to
16,774, with 17,386 votes going to other center-right
parties.


12. (SBU) COMMENT: These figures show that 16,812 fewer
center-right voters cast ballots in the 2004 municipal
elections than in the last presidential election, compared to
only 658 fewer FSLN voters. The FSLN is clearly more
organized and disciplined in Chontales than its competitors,
as is true throughout Nicaragua. The Sandinistas' tactical
advantage in 2006, therefore, would come from a divided
and/or reduced turnout from their competitors since the FSLN
has mastered the science of getting its voters to the polls.



13. (SBU) Chontales offers a treasure trove of voters for
anti-Sandinista candidates in the 2006 national elections. A
united center-right would rack up big numbers, Similarly,
the good will that Eduardo Montealegre has built in the
department should give him an opportunity to take advantage
of the seemingly genuine desire for good government in
Chontales. His biggest challenge is to convince these voters
that he can win.
TRIVELLI