VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000806

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INL/C/P, CA/VO/L/C, WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2036
TAGS: CVIS PREL PGOV KCOR KCRM EFIN NU
SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: REQUEST FOR CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA
INELIGIBILITY FINDING--TOMAS EDUARDO CORTEZ MENDOZA

REF: A. 04 STATE 45499

B. 04 MANAGUA 1349

C. MANAGUA 36

D. 04 MANAGUA 2740

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Embassy is seeking a
security advisory opinion under section 212 (f) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, proclamation 7750,
suspending the entry into the United States of Tomas Eduardo
Cortez Mendoza, born in Nicaragua on November 30, 1971.
Cortez is currently a Sandinista (FSLN) judge in Managua's
seventh criminal court. He is a protQgQ of corrupt Supreme
Court Justice Rafael Solis, and was appointed to his current
position thanks to his patronage. Solis, Cortez and other
Sandinista (FSLN) judges use their positions to benefit FSLN
leader Daniel Ortega and his party's political and economic
interests.


2. (C) With the FSLN controlling an overwhelming majority of
the judiciary via corrupt judges like Cortez, the Sandinista
party is virtually assured of winning any legal dispute, can
threaten opponents with incarceration and conviction on
trumped up charges, and can fill party coffers by extorting
legitimate businesses and allowing international drug and
arms traffickers and other criminals to go free in return for
bribes. Judge Cortez has a long record of disregarding the
facts and the law, and has been implicated in one judicial
corruption scandal after another in recent years. His
corrupt acts have made banner headlines, and his involvement
in freeing international drug traffickers and corrupt former
government officials is increasing. He is also the FSLN's
"judge of choice" for all criminal matters; he has regularly
absolved prominent Sandinistas accused of crimes and has
brought politically-motivated criminal charges against those
who oppose the FSLN.


3. (C) Although the Attorney General's office
(Procuraduria),the office of the National Prosecutor
(Fiscalia),and others have called for multiple
investigations of Judge Cortez's corrupt acts, no
investigation has ever taken place, thanks to the fact that
Judge Cortez enjoys the protection of Supreme Court (CSJ)
magistrate Solis and the FSLN, who have blocked all efforts
to launch an investigation. As long as Judge Cortez enjoys
their protection, he is effectively untouchable in Nicaragua.
The ongoing political and financial corruption of which
Cortez has been an integral part has caused enormous damage
for U.S. national interests in the stability of democratic
institutions in Nicaragua (including the judiciary),U.S.
foreign assistance goals, and the international economic
activities of U.S. businesses.


4. (C) Because he remains both one of the chief proxies of
Rafael Solis and his corrupt cronies in the Supreme Court and
the FSLN, and one of the FSLN's primary means of filling
party coffers, Cortez continues to damage all of these
national interests, and to sustain Ortega's stranglehold on
the judiciary and the country as a whole. Moreover, Cortez's
involvement in drug trafficking and official corruption cases
has all played out in public. The spectacle has made more
obvious than ever that justice can be bought and sold in
Nicaragua, and that those involved are untouchable so long as
they enjoy the political protection of Daniel Ortega or rival
party leader Arnoldo Aleman. Unfortunately, numerous judges
at all levels, handpicked for the bench because of their lack
of ethics and judicial independence, are emulating Cortez's
example, severely undermining the entire system of justice
and the U.S. and Nicaraguan fight against international drug
trafficking. For all of these reasons, post recommends that
the Department make a 212(f) finding against Tomas Eduardo
Cortez Mendoza and that no (rpt no) further travel to the
United States be allowed. The following provides information
requested in reftel A, paragraph 16. END SUMMARY AND ACTION
REQUEST.

CORTEZ A PROXY OF CORRUPT SUPREME COURT JUSTICE RAFAEL SOLIS
AND FSLN JUDICIAL "FIXER" LENIN CERNA
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5. (C) As the Department's recent annual Human Rights
Reports on Nicaragua have noted, almost all judges appointed
to the country's Supreme Court (CSJ) owe their loyalty to
either Aleman or Ortega, and their decisions on all sensitive
cases are blatantly partisan and political. Once loyalists
of Aleman or Ortega are appointed to the CSJ, they are then
responsible for appointing and promoting lower court judges,
and they fill the ranks of the judiciary with corrupt
followers such as Tomas Cortez. In 2001, Judge Cortez was

promoted from judicial legal assistant to full-time criminal
court judge thanks to the patronage of CSJ magistrate Rafael
Solis, whose corruption is well known and whose visa was
revoked under 212(f) in 2004 (reftel B).


6. (C) Like Solis, Cortez both serves as an instrument of
the FSLN on politically sensitive issues, and exploits his
office to sow corruption in the judiciary, "fixing" judicial
decisions in return for bribes for his personal benefit and
to fill FSLN coffers for use at election time. According to
credible Embassy sources, the FSLN's use of the judiciary to
obtain money from international drug traffickers in return
for having Sandinista judges set them free is organized by
Lenin Cerna, the 1980s head of the Sandinista regime's State
Security Directorate, with the approval of Daniel Ortega.
Although post cannot document the entire money trail in such
cases, credible contacts state that using the judiciary to
free corrupt ex-officials and international arms and drug
traffickers is one of the FSLN's primary sources of income.
Post also has credible reports that Daniel Ortega's proxies
are negotiating agreements with international drug
traffickers whereby traffickers will be allowed to operate
unimpeded on the country's Atlantic Coast if Ortega is
elected president in 2006.


7. (C) Cortez maintains a strong personal connection to the
FSLN "family", as he is married to Lenina Cerna, the niece of
Lenin Cerna, the architect of the entire FSLN system of
judicial corruption, bribes and campaign finance. Although
such a family connection to the leaders of a major political
party obviously constitutes a conflict of interest in cases
concerning the party and would lead an honest judge to recuse
himself from such cases, Cortez has never done so. In
practice, this personal connection makes Cortez one of the
FSLN's most reliable judges and the party does all it can to
ensure that Cortez hears all politically sensitive cases
involving both FSLN leaders and their opponents.

CORTEZ'S LONG RECORD OF JUDICIAL IMPROPRIETY AND HIS
INCREASINGLY BOLD ACTS OF CORRUPTION
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8. (C) Tomas Cortez is a Sandinista judge presently serving
in Managua's seventh criminal court. In recent years, his
name has surfaced regularly in association with judicial
irregularities. He has a long record of disregarding the
facts and the law, dismissing evidence without explanation
and allowing defendants in all manner of criminal cases
(everything from drug trafficking, to official corruption and
money laundering, to fatal traffic accidents) to go free.
Each and every time that Cortez has been publicly accused of
any act of wrongdoing, CSJ magistrate Solis has leapt to his
defense, using increasingly tortured legal "reasoning" to
justify his acts.


9. (C) In 1999 and 2000, when Cortez was still a judicial
assistant in Managua's seventh criminal court rather than a
judge, thirteen revolvers seized by police in several
investigations and legally placed in Cortez's hands as
evidence simply "disappeared." Cortez was legally
responsible for the firearms, but was unable to offer any
explanation for what happened to them. However, after their
"disappearance" several turned up somehow legally registered
to new owners, who claimed that a third party had sold them
the guns. The CSJ's disciplinary commission opened an
investigation of Cortez's role in the "disappearance" and
resale of the firearms, but CSJ magistrate Solis ensured that
the investigation never progressed, and that it did not block
Cortez's appointment as a full-time criminal court judge in

2001.


10. (C) In September 2003, Edgard Antonio Vargas Solis, the
son-in-law of Humberto Ortega--the former Sandinista Army
Commander and the brother of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega--was
involved in a traffic accident that killed two men. Although
police and prosecutors presented strong evidence that
reckless driving on the part of Vargas caused the accident
and the deaths of the two men, Judge Cortez ruled that the it
was the driver of the other car, one of the dead men, who
caused the accident, and absolved Vargas of any wrongdoing.
Family members of the deceased and the media accused Judge
Cortez of disregarding evidence and of altering police
diagrams of the accident.


11. (C) In December 2003, Haroldo Montealegre, a notoriously
corrupt banker with close ties to ex-President Aleman (and
whose visa was revoked for money laundering under INA
212(a)(2)(I) in 2002),came before Judge Cortez in one of his
many criminal cases relating to his looting of Banco
Mercantil (BAMER). Montealegre's looting of the bank forced

the GON to intervene to bail out defrauded depositors in

2001. In this particular case, prosecutors accused
Montealegre of fraud, embezzlement, insider trading, and
falsification of documents, and had a strong paper trail to
document their accusations. However, Cortez dismissed the
criminal charges as having been "improperly filed", and
ordered the government to return to Montealegre all the
assets that it had seized from him when the bank collapsed.
This "clean slate" given Haroldo Montealegre by Judge Cortez
allowed him to be a candidate for the presidential nomination
by the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) in 2006.


12. (C) In February 2004, William Hurtado, an FSLN militant
and former member of the Sandinista state security apparatus,
shot and killed journalist and radio personality Carlos
Guadamuz in Managua. A former Sandinista himself, Guadamuz
had broken with Daniel Ortega and used his radio program to
criticize Ortega, Dionisio "Nicho" Marenco (the current Mayor
of Managua),and other FSLN leaders on a wide range of
issues, including rape charges brought against Ortega by his
stepdaughter. Although the involvement of Ortega and Marenco
in the Guadamuz murder was never proven in court, the killing
was carried out in classic FSLN assassination style and
removed a thorn in the side of both men at a time when
Marenco was running for the mayor's office. Prior to his
killing, Guadamuz had filed a criminal complaint against
Ortega and Marenco for making death threats against him.
While this criminal case had languished in Judge Cortez's
court for four years prior to Guadamuz's murder, two days
after he was killed, Cortez finally took up the case, only to
immediately dismiss it because the person who had filed the
complaint was now dead. In this way, Judge Cortez helped
Ortega and Marenco to clean up a "loose end" in the Guadamuz
case and clear the way for Marenco's election as mayor in
November 2004.


13. (C) In October 2004, one of the many corruption cases
brought against Byron Jerez, Arnoldo Aleman's Director of
Taxation and his chief partner in corruption (and whose visa
was revoked by the Department under INA 212(a)(2)(I) in 2002)
came to Judge Cortez's court. This particular case, known
locally as "los camionetazos" (roughly translatable as the
"Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) scandal"),involved Jerez's
purchase of 23 luxury SUVs for his family using official
government credit notes issued by the Directorate of Taxation
under his signature. Prosecutors estimated that Jerez robbed
the Nicaraguan state of at least USD 750,000 in this case,
and they presented the entire paper trail (no less than
13,000 documents),including all of the purchase documents
signed by Jerez. Prosecutors had previously seized the
vehicles in question from Jerez's residence. However, when
the case came to trial, Judge Cortez dismissed all the
evidence as "improperly presented", leaving the jury with
nothing on which to convict Jerez and his co-conspirators.
The jury thus found Jerez not guilty, and he subsequently
brought a civil case against the Nicaraguan state, demanding
the return of all 23 vehicles. In March 2006, another FSLN
judge, Ligia Rivas, ruled in Jerez's favor in the civil case,
ordering the GON to return the vehicles to Jerez. Sandinista
judges have similarly "absolved" Jerez in several other
corruption cases brought against him by the GON, and post has
received credible, confidential reports that Jerez paid large
bribes to the FSLN campaign finance machine and its judges
for these verdicts. Jerez's money reportedly financed much
of the FSLN's 2004 municipal election campaign.


14. (C) In 2005, when former Managua Mayor Herty Lewites
broke with the FSLN and declared that he would run for
President on his own since Daniel Ortega had violated FSLN
party statutes and declared himself to be the party's
candidate for the 2006 presidential elections, the FSLN
political machine immediately moved against Lewites and
brought numerous politically-motivated charges of corruption
against him. When Lewites defended himself and accused the
FSLN of defamation and of plotting his murder (the latter in
the aftermath of a suspicious incident in which a mysterious
vehicle nearly ran down Lewites),party officials brought
criminal charges of libel and slander against him. This case
went to Judge Cortez, who immediately ruled that there was
enough evidence to put Lewites on trial. When other FSLN
officials brought still more charges against Lewites, they
were ultimately gathered together and heard by a different
Sandinista judge, who found Lewites guilty and slapped him
with a fine.


15. (C) In April and May 2005 the Daniel Ortega launched
several weeks of violent protests against the Bolanos
administration. These protests by FSLN-affiliated unions,
transportation collectives, and student groups were nominally
to protest rising gasoline prices, but actually served as a

means to pressure the GON at a time when the FSLN was seeking
to force it to accept numerous constitutional reforms that
would strip powers from the presidency and transfer them to
the National Assembly, where the FSLN has much greater
influence. During the violent protests and riots, FSLN
agitators attacked police officers and burned police
vehicles. Several of those involved in these attacks were
arrested and went on trial in July--in Judge Cortez's court.
Not surprisingly, Judge Cortez dismissed all the evidence
against the FSLN thugs (including police eyewitness testimony
and video filmed by local television stations) and found the
rioters not guilty on all charges.


16. (C) In the fall of 2005, Nicaragua witnessed its most
notorious case to date of judges freeing international drug
traffickers in return for bribes. This case is still under
investigation, but confidential, credible sources involved in
the case have revealed that at least four different Supreme
Court magistrates, including Rafael Solis, were involved in a
plot to free Colombian drug traffickers and money launderers
Leyla Bucardo and Jorge Eliezer Hernandez, along with USD
609,000 that police seized when they arrested the
traffickers, in return for large bribes to all the judges
involved in the case and for a sizable contribution to FSLN
electoral coffers (reftel C). Along with nearly a dozen
other judges and lawyers, Judge Cortez played a part in this
case. When she was arrested, trafficker Leyla Bucardo
carried a falsified Nicaraguan identity document ("cedula"),
leading prosecutors to bring charges of document fraud and
identity theft against her. While other judges handled the
money laundering case, the document fraud and identity theft
charges went to Judge Cortez. Cortez dismissed all evidence
and found Bucardo not guilty, despite the fact that police
and prosecutors presented the fake identity document that
Bucardo carried and presented at the time of her arrest
(which she did without the consent of the legitimate owner of
the identity document) and had a solid case against her.


17. (C) During the early morning hours of December 11, 2005,
a vehicle owned by the FSLN struck another vehicle and killed
two young men in the other car. Eyewitnesses reported that
the person driving the FSLN vehicle was Rafael Ortega, Daniel
Ortega's son and the director of FSLN-owned television
station "Channel 4", but, in order to protect the Ortega
family, the FSLN pulled a switch and claimed that another
driver was behind the wheel. Police forensic experts and
NGOs that investigated the case reported that the substitute
driver showed no signs of "seat belt burn" or other injuries
consistent with involvement in a serious accident, while
Rafael Ortega was subsequently seen in Managua with a cast on
his arm and other bandages that clearly could have resulted
from involvement in such an accident. However, police and
prosecutors, fearing Daniel Ortega's power, refused to
investigate the switch or to bring charges against Rafael
Ortega. When the case of negligent homicide against the
substitute driver came to the court of Judge Cortez in March
2006, family members of the two young men who died tried to
persuade the judge to accept the eyewitness evidence against
Rafael Ortega and make him a defendant in the case, but Judge
Cortez dismissed all the evidence of Rafael Ortega's
involvement and of the switch of drivers, and insisted that
the case would go forward against only the substitute driver.
After dismissing the evidence of Rafael Ortega's
involvement, Judge Cortez allowed his substitute judge
("suplente") to finish the case, and the substitute judge
found the substitute driver guilty of negligent homicide in
April. The families of the two young men killed in the
accident announced that they intend to appeal the case to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since it is clearly
not possible for them to obtain justice in Nicaragua.


18. (C) Although post cannot document that Judge Cortez and
the FSLN received money from the drug traffickers, money
launderers and other corrupt individuals in the cases
described above, post does have credible reports that Cortez
is part of the FSLN campaign finance machine, and has
benefited personally from the arrangement as well. Indeed,
his repeated ignoring of the law and the facts and his
nonsensical rulings, always to advance whatever political or
financial interest the FSLN may have in the litigation before
him, offer no real other explanation. Both credible media
sources and individuals involved in the cases described here
attribute Judge Cortez's actions to bribes and loyalty to the
FSLN, but this particular form of corruption is almost
impossible to document in Nicaragua. Post has every reason
to believe that Judge Cortez is one of a growing number of
FSLN magistrates who take bribes in return for using their
positions to free international traffickers and corrupt
individuals of all sorts without bothering to explain their
dubious (or outright illegal) reasoning.


SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECT ON U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST
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19. (C) Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza has used his judicial
position to serve the political interests of Daniel Ortega
and the FSLN as they seek to undermine the GON and the
constitutional order, has helped to free drug traffickers and
corrupt former government officials, and has returned their
seized money to them, reportedly in return for bribes. All
of these corrupt acts have had serious adverse effects on
those U.S. interests specified in the Presidential
Proclamation as well as U.S. foreign policy priorities
highlighted in the Embassy's Mission Program Plan (MPP). The
Embassy has encouraged Nicaragua to prosecute officials for
corruption and has provided financial and technical support
in corruption cases, but almost all of these cases have
failed because of the willingness of Judges like Cortez to
free corrupt individuals in return for bribes.


20. (C) The Embassy has also provided a great deal of
resources and training to the Nicaraguan police and military
in order to increase their capabilities to intercept, arrest,
investigate and prosecute international drug traffickers.
This training and support has been increasingly successful,
with Nicaraguan law enforcement capturing increasing
quantities of drug shipments, drug traffickers, bulk cash
smugglers and laundered drug money each year. Unfortunately,
the corruption of Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza and other
Nicaraguan judges has not only enabled many of the drug
traffickers to go free, but also to recover drug money and
other drug properties seized by police, undermining the hard
work of the police, military and prosecutors and the very
rule of law. Although Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza is just
one part of Nicaragua's judicial corruption problem, his
corrupt actions, and his total impunity, both of which have
been thrown in the face of the public for years, have
reinforced widespread attitudes that justice can be bought
and sold in Nicaragua. Lower court judges like Cortez are
increasingly emulating and following the directives of their
corrupt Supreme Court (CSJ) counterparts and freeing drug
traffickers and their money in return for bribes.


21. (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions: The Embassy's
top priority is strengthening and consolidating democracy
through the development of transparent, accountable and
professional governmental institutions, including the
judiciary and the Controller General's Office. Our MPP
states that, "... abuse of power, corruption and
politicization of many state institutions, especially the
judiciary, have impeded the consolidation of democracy and
economic growth." A criminal justice system subject to
political and corrupting influences undermines democracy and
has led to serious political instability. Manipulation of
the independence of the judiciary encourages and attracts
organized criminal organizations, because they realize that
bribing judges is a suitable cost of their illegal business
in exchange for acquittals and continued impunity. The
actions of Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza on behalf of the
FSLN, corrupt former government officials and international
drug traffickers have contributed directly to the widespread
belief in Nicaragua that power and wealth come from political
bosses and can be bought and sold. This pattern has
undermined confidence in the entire political system and all
the institutions of the state. A politicized and corrupted
judiciary is the biggest roadblock to the development of a
sustainable anti-corruption strategy. When Nicaraguans see
top government officials like Cortez enriching themselves and
their families over a period of many years and going
completely unpunished, they lose faith in all the country's
democratic institutions.


22. (C) Individuals like Cortez, who have benefited both
financially and politically because of their subservience to
Ortega and who have been able to spread the benefits of their
corruption to family and associates, are widely seen as
examples of officials untouchable by the law. The resulting
total impunity for corrupt individuals has bolstered the
widespread attitude that even a democratically elected
government is incapable of providing for the public good.
The resulting cynicism has undermined confidence in democracy
and all government institutions and significantly reduced
confidence in the administration of justice. Judge Cortez's
politically-motivated corruption in support of the FSLN and
its leaders has been particularly damaging to the credibility
of Nicaragua's institutions, as overwhelming evidence of many
of his corrupt acts has been front page news for
years--without Cortez having suffered any legal consequences.
His case has demonstrated to the entire country that corrupt
officials can commit any corrupt act, and be caught at it,

without suffering any legal consequences as long as they
enjoy the support of Ortega or Aleman.


23. (C) Thanks to well-placed corrupt cronies like Cortez,
Ortega and Aleman retain near total control of all the
institutions of the state, except for the presidency.
Without co-dependent enablers such as Cortez, Ortega and
Aleman would not be able to protect themselves and their
cronies from prosecution in Nicaragua for their numerous acts
of corruption, nor be able to perpetually threaten to remove
President Bolanos from office. Because everyone in
Nicaragua, from Ortega and Aleman's co-conspirators, to
members of their political parties, to ordinary citizens,
knows that the two party bosses have the ability to protect
anyone they wish from prosecution, or bring (usually
trumped-up) charges against anyone who opposes them, everyone
in Nicaragua has a strong incentive to comply with the wishes
of the two corrupt ex-presidents.


24. (C) Foreign Assistance Goals: One of the top three USG
foreign assistance goals in Nicaragua is strengthening
democracy. The chief goals of USAID assistance in this area
are battling corruption and effecting judicial reform. The
actions of corrupt judges like Cortez and his patron, Rafael
Solis, have directly damaged progress in both of these areas.
In December 2003, the USG froze USD 49 million of judicial
assistance in response to endemic judicial corruption,
highlighted by what appeared to be an imminent fraudulent
"not guilty" verdict for Arnoldo Aleman, due to backroom
dealing between Ortega and the corrupt ex-president. Thanks
to corrupt judges such as Cortez, Ortega possesses the means
to protect allies from the consequences of their corrupt acts
and the power to sanction and silence opponents. This power
has enabled him to retain total control of the FSLN caucus in
the National Assembly, and he uses this power to negotiate
the very future of the country with Aleman.


25. (C) Control of the entire court system, from the CSJ to
criminal court judges like Cortez, gives Ortega the ability
to use nominally legal means to arrest and intimidate anyone
he wishes. In a vicious circle that guarantees their
political power, Ortega and Aleman use co-dependent cronies
such as Cortez in the judiciary and other state institutions
to ensure their control of the National Assembly, which, in
turn, ensures their control of all the other institutions of
the state that are under the Assembly's supervision,
including the judiciary, the Controller General's Office
(Contraloria),and the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE),among
others. For as long as Cortez and people like her remain in
the judiciary, it will be an integral part of Nicaragua's
corruption problem, rather than what it should be, a key
institution aiding the government in its anti-corruption
fight.


26. (C) Moreover, the persistent efforts of Sandinista
judges to weaken President Bolanos and/or remove him from
office have so damaged the country's stability, that the
future of international aid programs in Nicaragua has been
called into question. In October 2005, the efforts to remove
the President and his ministers from office had gone so far
that Deputy Secretary Zoellick informed the Nicaraguan media
and the political class that if Ortega, Aleman, and their
cronies in the judiciary and other state institutions went so
far as to remove the President, the Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA) and other USG aid programs would be terminated
(reftel D). The Department's 2006 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) highlighted judicial
corruption as one of the single greatest factors undermining
anti-drug trafficking efforts in the country.


27. (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses: Corrupt
Nicaraguan institutions hamper U.S. investment in Nicaragua
and discourage U.S. exporters from establishing
agent/distributor relationships. U.S. investors and
business-people are reluctant to risk their resources in
Nicaragua, knowing they could easily be subjected to the
vagaries of a corrupt judiciary or the whims of politicians
should they become involved in any commercial dispute, real
or trumped up. By shamelessly serving only the interests of
Daniel Ortega and the FSLN, sowing corruption in the
judiciary, by taking bribes to enable drug traffickers and
corrupt former government officials to escape with their
proceeds, and by undermining the GON's anti-corruption
campaign, Cortez has ensured that U.S. and international
business-people continue to regard Nicaragua as a risky
investment prospect.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR FINDING
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28. (C) Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza has been informed of
the fact that he may be covered by Presidential Proclamation
number 7750, under section 212 (f) of the INA.


29. (C) Tomas Eduardo Cortez Mendoza has been issued several